Research & Commentary Results

On May 23, President Donald Trump’s administration suspended the majority of sanctions on Syria, marking the most sweeping shift in the policy of the United States toward Damascus in over a decade. But lifting sanctions will not magically make Syria safe for return. For millions of displaced Syrians, their country remains a minefield — literally and bureaucratically.

Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on Dec. 8, 2024, after the rebel military operation “Deterrence of Aggression” and the establishment of a transitional government, Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s interim president, quickly began working to form a unified national army, dismantle the existing factions, and centralize all weapons under the authority of the state in an effort to address one of the most pressing challenges facing his administration. While several initial moves have been completed, important steps in this complicated process are still pending. This article highlights the current developments surrounding the formation of the new army, including progress achieved to date and key challenges going forward.

The spotlight in America this week is trained on the home front, with growing tensions inside the country over President Donald Trump’s immigration crackdown and a showdown unfolding on the streets of Los Angeles. At times like these, the rest of the world has a way of intruding, sometimes unexpectedly, and Trump 2.0’s foreign policy is still struggling to produce a major positive outcome from its frenetic activity trying to end kinetic wars while prosecuting an unprecedented economic war with much of the rest of the world.

MEI Senior Fellow Charles Lister joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to discuss the Trump administration’s dramatic reversal of four decades of US policy toward Syria. Following President Trump’s May 2025 meeting with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and the issuance of a new general license and 180-day waiver of Caesar Act sanctions, the episode explores the implications of this policy shift. What does this mean for Syria’s recovery and reconstruction? How are regional actors like Turkey, Israel, and the Gulf states responding?

The harsh realities of the region’s threats and challenges, like Iran and the Gaza war, stubbornly persist following the pomp and circumstance of Trump’s “spring bling” tour, which featured eye-popping dollar figures and an offer of a luxury jumbo jet from Qatar.

Two recent developments present the new Syrian government with a critical opportunity to stabilize the country. First, US President Donald Trump announced plans to lift sanctions on Syria. Second, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party declared it would disband and dissolve itself — a move that will help Damascus to finalize a deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces and integrate it into the new Syrian national army. President Trump should build on this momentum and seize the opportunity to address one of the most complex remaining challenges facing Syria: the risk of a military confrontation between Turkey and Israel inside the country.

One of the strategic thrusts of the opening months of Trump’s second terms has been aimed at deepening America’s economic engagement with the leading economies of the Gulf. Thus, the first leg of his trip to the region resulted in a template for deeper US-Saudi ties.

This week, US President Donald Trump makes his inaugural visit to the Middle East since the start of his second term, traveling to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates on May 13-16. Amid the heightened focus on US policy toward the Middle East, MEI’s experts take stock of Trump’s trip to the Gulf, how his administration has shaped its approach to the wider region in its first several months, and how regional actors are responding to the policies coming out of Washington.

On March 10, 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa, the president of Syria, and Mazloum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, signed a historic agreement, ending a long-running divide between Damascus and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Now, two months after the deal was signed, how far has it progressed, and what are the main obstacles and disputes between the parties during this transitional phase?

President Donald J. Trump’s trip to the Middle East on May 13-16 comes on the heels of more than three months of whirlwind activity in US foreign policy where the region has been a higher priority than it was in the early months of the previous US administration. The US president has gained attention by proposing some provocative ideas and his team has made some signs of progress in talks with Iran, but thus far the second Trump administration has produced very few tangible advances for stability, prosperity, and progress in the Middle East. The following report assesses the US government’s actions on Middle East policy over the past three months, from late January to late April 2025.

As the EU prepares for its annual review of sanctions imposed on Syria, it faces a moment of reckoning — an opportunity to demonstrate whether its policies not only continue to be principled and legal, but also in line with its strategic interests. They no longer serve the purpose for which they were designed, and the EU should let the entire sanctions regime on Syria collapse unconditionally and immediately.

For months, Turkey’s government has been trying to accomplish three major tasks simultaneously or nearly so to solidify its hold on power at home and enhance its influence in the broader region. Its three-pronged approach to fulfilling that goal consists of seeking to 1) crush democracy and destroy the political opposition in Turkey by bringing serious criminal charges against Ekrem İmamoğlu, the popular mayor of Istanbul; 2) bring Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party into a coalition to win the next national election with current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continuing his 22-year rule; and 3) leverage its new and powerful influence in Syria to neutralize Kurdish power in the northeast and in the Syrian national government.

The biggest development this past week in the Middle East policy of Trump’s second administration was the initiation of talks between the United States and Iran. This small sign of hope for diplomatic progress comes at a time when the administration continues to implement an assertive and unpredictable economic unilateralism that has roiled global markets and reduced trust and confidence between the United States and most close international partners. Brian Katulis unpacks three things to watch closely as Trump’s Iran policy evolves and his broader national security approach unfolds.

For much of the past two decades, ISIS has enjoyed favorable conditions in Syria, but since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, dynamics have changed. With Assad’s departure, ISIS lost its long-standing and vitally important safe haven in Syria’s central desert and its most significant driver for recruitment. The results — so far — have been dramatic.

President Donald Trump is focused on realizing two transformative breakthroughs that his predecessors failed to accomplish: an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, centered on a tripartite US-Saudi-Israeli deal, and an agreement between the US and Iran. Both would be historic achievements. So far, however, progress in each case has proven difficult and plodding.