Research & Commentary Results

This week, US President Donald Trump makes his inaugural visit to the Middle East since the start of his second term, traveling to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates on May 13-16. Amid the heightened focus on US policy toward the Middle East, MEI’s experts take stock of Trump’s trip to the Gulf, how his administration has shaped its approach to the wider region in its first several months, and how regional actors are responding to the policies coming out of Washington.

On March 10, 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa, the president of Syria, and Mazloum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, signed a historic agreement, ending a long-running divide between Damascus and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Now, two months after the deal was signed, how far has it progressed, and what are the main obstacles and disputes between the parties during this transitional phase?

President Donald J. Trump’s trip to the Middle East on May 13-16 comes on the heels of more than three months of whirlwind activity in US foreign policy where the region has been a higher priority than it was in the early months of the previous US administration. The US president has gained attention by proposing some provocative ideas and his team has made some signs of progress in talks with Iran, but thus far the second Trump administration has produced very few tangible advances for stability, prosperity, and progress in the Middle East. The following report assesses the US government’s actions on Middle East policy over the past three months, from late January to late April 2025.

As the EU prepares for its annual review of sanctions imposed on Syria, it faces a moment of reckoning — an opportunity to demonstrate whether its policies not only continue to be principled and legal, but also in line with its strategic interests. They no longer serve the purpose for which they were designed, and the EU should let the entire sanctions regime on Syria collapse unconditionally and immediately.

For months, Turkey’s government has been trying to accomplish three major tasks simultaneously or nearly so to solidify its hold on power at home and enhance its influence in the broader region. Its three-pronged approach to fulfilling that goal consists of seeking to 1) crush democracy and destroy the political opposition in Turkey by bringing serious criminal charges against Ekrem İmamoğlu, the popular mayor of Istanbul; 2) bring Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party into a coalition to win the next national election with current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continuing his 22-year rule; and 3) leverage its new and powerful influence in Syria to neutralize Kurdish power in the northeast and in the Syrian national government.

The biggest development this past week in the Middle East policy of Trump’s second administration was the initiation of talks between the United States and Iran. This small sign of hope for diplomatic progress comes at a time when the administration continues to implement an assertive and unpredictable economic unilateralism that has roiled global markets and reduced trust and confidence between the United States and most close international partners. Brian Katulis unpacks three things to watch closely as Trump’s Iran policy evolves and his broader national security approach unfolds.

For much of the past two decades, ISIS has enjoyed favorable conditions in Syria, but since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, dynamics have changed. With Assad’s departure, ISIS lost its long-standing and vitally important safe haven in Syria’s central desert and its most significant driver for recruitment. The results — so far — have been dramatic.

President Donald Trump is focused on realizing two transformative breakthroughs that his predecessors failed to accomplish: an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, centered on a tripartite US-Saudi-Israeli deal, and an agreement between the US and Iran. Both would be historic achievements. So far, however, progress in each case has proven difficult and plodding.

The leaked Signal chat among top US administration officials discussing military strikes against the Houthis laid bare the central problems with Trump 2.0’s nascent national security approach: a strong inclination to prioritize tactics and propaganda in statecraft without a clear and practical strategic framework to deal with the biggest challenges in the world and in the Middle East.

Iran is accumulating enough near-weapons-grade enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon within weeks or months, not years. President Donald Trump, having withdrawn the United States in 2018 from the nuclear deal that would have postponed that possibility, is now appealing for negotiations with Tehran. But in the Middle East, the nuclear question does not concern only Iran.

The work of the Syria Strategy Project and the considerable policy recommendations found in this report present a realistic and holistic vision for Syria’s recovery and reintegration into the international system.

While most media attention was focused on its global economic policy moves, the Trump administration continued to keep the Middle East high on its agenda this past week, with the president sending a letter to Iran’s supreme leader and his team directly engaging with the Palestinian group Hamas. This continued engagement on the region’s top two strategic questions, Iran and Arab-Israel affairs, contrasted with America’s hands-off approach to Syria, which saw some troubling violence.

Syria’s national dialogue, held in Damascus at the end of February, was intended to chart the country’s future, one that would have been unthinkable just three months earlier. However, the process and outcomes of the dialogue were flawed, left critical questions unanswered, and raised new concerns.

Some analysts try to explain Trump’s Middle East rhetoric as an effort to provoke a new type of conversation and to break the mold. But one unconventional source that helps explain Trump’s tactics is pro wrestling, in which the actions are understood to be illusory but still prompt a response from all sides.

This massive distraction of the Trump administration’s Gaza non-plan and the even more serious move of dismantling America’s ability to shape and influence events abroad together carry three risks for the Middle East.