Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.
The two leading presidential candidates in America’s 2024 election have made statements and established track records on the Middle East based on their time in office. This document aims to highlight the most important and reliable positions staked out by former President Donald Trump and current Vice President Kamala Harris.
Before Tunisian voters have their say in the presidential election on Oct. 6, state institutions have already had their say. The security services, judicial authorities, and the High Independent Electoral Authority (ISIE) have either obstructed or officially barred over a dozen potential candidates from running. Of the three eligible candidates officially approved by the ISIE, only President Kais Saied and former Saied supporter Zouhair Maghzaoui remain outside of prison. Candidate Ayachi Zammel was arrested on Sept. 6. Many other potential candidates attempted to run from prison or were jailed for alleged technical violations of election laws. By restricting the list of potential candidates effectively to two, state institutions have embraced their historically paternalistic, modernizing role toward a distrusted citizenry.
After more than six months of talks, the United States and Iraq look set to announce a significant agreement stipulating that the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition will withdraw entirely from the country over the next two years.
Shiraz Maher – Co-Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) – and Charles Lister – Director of MEI’s Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs – speak to MEI Editor in Chief Alistair Taylor about ISIS and the detainee dilemma. What is the international community to do with the tens of thousands of foreign ISIS detainees and their families, including children, held in makeshift facilities in northeastern Syria under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces?
In the corridors of power in Brussels, it is common to hear that the position of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is an impossible job. It may actually become even more difficult for the outgoing Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, who is set to succeed the Spanish Josep Borrell as the European Union’s foreign policy chief in the coming weeks.
A reflection on the state of conflict and political change in the Levant by Middle East Institute’s Vice President for International Engagement.
Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack touched off a destructive war with Israel and a limited but fierce regional conflagration between Israel and the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance,” with Lebanese Hezbollah at the forefront. The ongoing conflict has been multi-fronted, multi-faceted, dynamic, and already highly consequential. While a clear bottom line remains elusive, exploring the war’s primary origins and evolution offers useful indicators.
On this week’s episode, Director of MEI’s Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs Charles Lister speaks with MEI Editor-in-Chief Alistair Taylor on the resurgence of the Islamic State, or ISIS, in Syria and Iraq. This episode is the first in a several-part series looking at where the terrorist group stands today and its international footprint 10 years on from the founding of the 87-country Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
As speculation continues about a possible Turkish-Syrian normalization, what might such a process mean for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a close US ally? In a new piece for MEI, Amer al-Ahmed lays out three possible scenarios for the future of the SDF amid normalization.
Israel’s targeted killing of Hezbollah military leader Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran are explosive events for the region. Coming within 12 hours of each other, they were also an earthquake within the “Axis of Resistance” — but not one likely to encourage de-escalation. Far from it.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
China’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis should be viewed within the broader context of its evolving approach to humanitarian aid and its overall involvement and objectives in the Syrian conflict.
Six years ago, the Syrian regime conquered the southern province of Daraa, popularly known by millions of Syrians as the “cradle of the revolution.” That military victory represented a pivotal moment for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. After all, it was the last time the regime captured a sizable swath of opposition territory, and in doing so in July 2018, its impunity was laid bare for all the world to see. On paper, Daraa had been designated a “de-escalation zone” after months of intensive international diplomacy in which the United States had played a central role.
On July 16, CENTCOM announced that after six months of 2024, “ISIS is on pace to more than double” the number of attacks in Syria and Iraq it claimed in 2023. But the reality is far worse than this statement suggested because the data represents only a fraction of ISIS’s actual attacks in Syria and Iraq.