Brenda Shaffer (Georgetown University), Anna Borshchevskaya (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and Alex Vatanka (MEI) join host Alistair Taylor to discuss how the dynamics between Russia and Iran are playing out in the Caucasus, and what it means for the countries of the region.
On the surface the latest protests in Iran appear to be not that different from the previous ones in late 2017 and early 2018. In reality, however, things are quite different this time around, and the Iranian authorities are deeply alarmed.
Amid widespread protests over an abrupt decision to hike gasoline prices by 50 percent, Iran’s internet is out again. The government cut access in what is widely seen as an attempt to stem the flow of information, pictures, and videos of protests that reportedly took place in at least 100 cities and towns and involved an estimated 87,000 Iranians.
The role of cybersecurity in the future of geopolitics in the Middle East and the surrounding regions will have much to do with individual state and enterprise preparedness. With cyber threats a growing source of interstate tension, governments must take measures to increase national cyber preparedness that are tailored to their vulnerabilities and cyber ecosystems. Israel and Estonia are examples of states that prove this rule. Despite their relatively small size, both have demonstrated an exceptional capacity to deter or defend against cyber aggression from their much larger, more aggressive neighbors.
Emerson T. Brooking of the Digital Forensics Research Lab at the Atlantic Council and Steph Shample of Flashpoint join guest host Mike Sexton, director of MEI’s Cyber Program, to discuss several recent investigations into Iranian and Russian hacking and disinformation campaigns that have targeted US politics and other international organizations.
East Ghouta is perhaps the darkest example of renewed Assad regime rule over former opposition territory. 18 months after the regime recaptured the area, its security forces and intelligence apparatus continue to terrorize Syrians there. Night-time raids on homes, mass arrests, and forced disappearances are common occurrences across the region. Intelligence forces assert themselves in every aspect of daily life, especially at the ubiquitous checkpoints where personnel extort residents for bribes when they pass, subjecting them to security checks that can lead to civilians either being arrested on the spot or conscripted into military service. In addition, residents of East Ghouta are facing a humanitarian crisis amid a total lack of basic services, from sewage to schools and hospitals, and the basic pillars of the local economy remain in total disrepair.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is set to meet with his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, in Washington on Wednesday. While there are doubtless other items for discussion on the agenda, at the top of the list is, at least on Turkey’s side, Syria — or more specifically, what U.S. policy is and should be in Syria.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall 30 years ago, ties between Western and Eastern Europe were renewed. In the same period, another wall crumbled — between the Middle East and the former Soviet states. And yet, to this day, U.S. national security institutions continue to view these two regions through a Cold War lens, separating how they are handled. This approach needs to change; integrating research and policy toward the Middle East and the bordering states of the former Soviet Union would improve analytical understanding and help identify new policy options.
If the Syrian Constitutional Committee does not address the oppressive security and military apparatus, which are the primary root causes of the Syrian crisis, then its work will not actually effect change in Syria — and so far, reforms of those two sectors are not yet on the table.
Taking the American diplomats hostage for 444 days consolidated the Iranian revolution around the Khomeinists, but very few people in Tehran today will deny that it came at the great expense of isolating Iran internationally for the past 40 years.
Once he’s gone, it will have to find a new purpose.
The Trump administration inherited a number of complex problems in the Syrian file from its predecessors in the White House. In dealing with the Syrian crisis, the Obama administration had three main priorities: not disturbing Iran in Syria during the process of nuclear negotiations, working with Russia toward a ceasefire in various parts of Syria (without trusting that Russia could deliver or should have the upper hand), and, most importantly, carrying out a limited military intervention in the northeast to defeat ISIS — an issue it considered separately from the Syrian crisis.
It has now been almost 18 months since Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued 12 demands to Iran and imposed a “maximum pressure” campaign to compel Tehran to change behavior.
Damascus’ position is marginally stronger, and it is unlikely to concede anything of substance in Geneva despite continued American control of Deir ez-Zor’s oilfields.
Had America’s posture in Syria not been so uncertain, and if President Trump had not effectively green-lighted a Turkish incursion into the northeast, we would have a much better chance of capitalizing on Baghdadi’s death.