Research & Commentary Results

At the September G20 meeting, host country India, along with the United States, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), signed a memorandum of understanding, a non-binding commitment to work towards building two separate “corridors”, essentially envisioning a political line that is connected by some new and some existing, or already under construction, physical infrastructure.

The Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and the latter’s ongoing military operation in Gaza have stalled progress in the development of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and raised questions about its prospects for eventual completion. The IMEC faces multiple viability challenges, but none of them are insurmountable; thus, its participants are unlikely to abandon it.

The renewed violence in Gaza could not have come at a less opportune time for the climate agenda in the Middle East. From energy economics to environmental degradation, the ripple effects of conflict will complicate the path ahead.

Outside of the security risks brought about by war, the Israel-Hamas conflict has yet to result in major changes in the regional natural gas market.

In recent years, China’s presence in Egypt’s strategic ports has grown noticeably, including the involvement of both private and state-owned Chinese companies. While this reflects Beijing’s growing ambitions in the region, the opacity of the Sino-Egyptian agreements and the blurry lines between China’s commercial ports and its military aspirations raise questions about the potential implications.

With no new interregional or international gas pipelines currently planned, gas-poor Morocco should consider alternative import schemes, such as LNG import via ISO tank containers, utilizing its well-developed port, rail, and road infrastructure.

The state of Israel and the terrorist group Hamas are engaged in an existential conflict, each threatening the survival of the other, as well as the survival of civilians, both Palestinian and Israeli, caught in-between. The conflict could widen into a regional or even global crisis. For energy markets and the global economy, the risks are considerable and could swerve or accelerate in response to multiple variables.

As the existential threat of climate change continues to intensify, the future of fossil fuels has been thrust into the international spotlight. Reducing hydrocarbon production and consumption has gained traction in international climate talks amid warnings that the window to avoid catastrophic warming is closing quickly.

Iran has yet to ratify the 2015 Paris Agreement, but efforts to address the impact of climate change have great potential to create opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation, building on the recent trend of regional de-escalation. Climate diplomacy represents an untapped opportunity for Iran to engage globally by incentivizing it to adopt the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals in exchange for sanctions or debt relief.

As the original Abraham Accords signatories — Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain — observe the third anniversary of their September 2020 agreement, there is a sufficient basis to evaluate whether the Abraham Accords are real, hype, or something in-between. Much like the case a year ago, the results so far remain mixed.

Pakistan’s intensifying economic, political, and security instability is not good news for China’s strategic investments. So, what are Beijing’s options?

At the start of 2023, optimism was high that China would see a rapid recovery in consumer spending and an acceleration in GDP growth. Since then, however, the world’s second-largest economy has been in the doldrums. China’s ailing economy is a problem not just for China but for the entire world. A prolonged slowdown or a sudden financial crash, were it to occur, would ripple across global markets — including the countries of the Middle East, whose economies have become increasingly intertwined with that of China.

Georgia’s near total reliance on imported Russian wheat forms an extremely dangerous vulnerability that compromises both its food security and sovereignty. Fifteen years after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, Tbilisi finds itself depending on Russia for over 90 percent of its wheat supply amidst a growing global shortage. In 2022, NATO reiterated its commitment to Georgia, pledging to help build Georgia’s resilience and uphold its political independence.

This study on community leadership and social resilience factors in Moldova in the context of the war in Ukraine is based on in-country interviews with 15 Moldovan experts and community leaders, conducted in May-August 2023.

Russia’s malign behavior in the Black Sea includes piracy, plunder, petroleum price cap violations, and actions to prevent the free transit of foreign commercial and naval vessels. Its largely unchallenged position in the Black Sea also helps Russia maintain access to foreign-made products and components, circumventing sanctions. The West and the broader international community have yet to act to decisively rein in these flagrant violations of international laws and norms.