Research & Commentary Results

In this MEI Policy Paper, Ross Harrison asserts that a new regional order is emerging out of the conflicts of the Middle East. The relationships among the pillars of this order–Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran–are crucial, as they will largely determine “whether the future of the Middle East will be a continuation of the current chaos and destruction or a more positive transition toward stability and prosperity.” Harrison argues that global powers must concentrate on creating conditions conducive to cooperation among the pillars.

On April 24, Turks, Armenians, and millions of others around the globe will clash again over the events that began 100 years ago in the Ottoman domains. The mass deportations and massacres of Armenians in 1915 and later years have led many to call this great tragedy a genocide. The old arguments and contested evidence are now going to be heard once more. It might also be the perfect moment for Ankara and Yerevan to take practical steps that benefit all and harm none.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, reiterating Turkey’s support for a diplomatic solution over the use of force regarding Iran’s nuclear program, welcomed the interim deal between Tehran and the world powers. Turkey’s slowing economy may be among the first to reap economic benefits from the deal, and Ankara’s longtime quest to become an energy hub could finally be realized. Yet the deal could also pose a challenge to Ankara’s Iraq and Syria policies and its recent rapprochement with the Saudis.

In Turkey today, as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu wrestle over who governs, the political uncertainty they are creating may be a ground tremor about to generate an earthquake. The earthquake, however, may not only be political in nature; it may also be economic. 

Turkey’s remarkable economic growth is now in jeopardy. Its economy is drifting, beset by contrary winds of economic policies and political wrangling. There is a clear track forward, but to reach the next level of prosperity, the government must undertake a major new effort.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2013 proclamation of the Silk Road Economic Belt (“One Belt, One Road”) and Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives provided an overarching framework for understanding China’s strategic priorities over the coming decade. The land-based and sea-based Silk Roads will link Asia and Europe via the Middle East and Central Asia through a series of transcontinental railroads, pipelines, ports, airports, and other infrastructure projects.

The recent public row between Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc and Ankara Mayor Melih Gokcek marked the latest fallout from a widening rift between the country’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his handpicked prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. If the crack continues to widen, it will not only deal a blow to Erdogan’s presidential dream but also to the future of the ruling party.

 Ivan L. G. Pearson’s In the Name of Oil: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East, 1950-1958 provides a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which British interests in the Middle East influenced or were furthered by the United States between 1950 and 1958.

Frustrated by the United States’ failure to heed its advice on Syria and Iraq, and by Iran’s growing clout in these countries, Turkey seems to have decided to mend its frosty relationship with Saudi Arabia. When King Abdullah died earlier this year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan immediately cut short an African tour and flew to Riyadh to offer his condolences. He declared a period of mourning in Turkey and ordered the Turkish flag to be flown at half-mast.

The term “strategic partnership” has been increasingly used in GCC circles to signify that relations with China are important and worthy of long-term investment. In a March 14, 2014 speech during his visit to Beijing, Saudi Arabia’s then Crown Prince Salman announced that “we are witnessing the transformation of the relationship with China to one of strategic partnership with broad dimensions, to the benefit of both our countries.” Saudi Arabia’s position was echoed by the emir of Qatar during a 2014 visit to China in which issues of common concern to all GCC states, especially combating terrorism, were discussed. Abdel-Aziz Aluwaisheg, GCC general assistant secretary for negotiations and strategic dialogue, has also noted that there is growing interest in the Gulf to develop a “strategic dialogue” with China.

Turkey’s first tangible democratic push came from the Islamist camp in 2002 when the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power. The second could come from an unlikely source: the Kurds.

Turkey is in an unprecedented state of political tumult. Since the ascent of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2002, all Turks have struggled to support, defeat, or accommodate this party that rose suddenly in free elections to national power. Now, that contest has entered a new and more dangerous phase.

Over the course of the past ten years, NATO[1] has consistently invited Saudi Arabia and Oman to join the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which launched in 2004 as a cooperation framework between NATO and the GCC countries. So far, the ICI contains just four Gulf partners (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates), and neither Riyadh nor Muscat has accepted the invitation.

Turkey’s Kurds are playing a risky game. If they succeed, they can boost the country’s troubled democracy. If they fail, a further drift toward authoritarianism will follow.

While there have been studies on the development of Islamic philanthropic organizations in fostering social welfare in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, the role of international Islamic aid agencies, including those from Gulf countries, in their dealings with Southeast Asian domestic welfare issues remains unexplored. This essay discusses the growth of Gulf charitable organizations operating in Southeast Asia, particularly the reasons for this phenomenon and the types of activities in which these organizations are engaged, and then takes an in-depth look at two Gulf charities that are active in Indonesia, namely the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) Asian Muslim Charity Foundation (AMCF) and Qatar Charity.