In 2025, jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan made a historic call for the group to disarm and dissolve, raising hopes of ending a 40-year conflict that has shaped Turkey and the wider region. Months later, the PKK symbolically laid down arms in what many viewed as a breakthrough moment for the peace process.
The UAE’s departure represents an undeniable strategic setback for OPEC+. Its most likely response will be to shore up the amount of output capacity subject to quotas. For now, there are two clear pathways it could take to accomplish this, although neither represents a quick fix.
After a decade of post-Arab Spring isolation, Turkey’s leaders have recognized that their ambition to position the country as an agenda-setter on the world stage requires active engagement in all directions. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s consolidation of executive authority has centralized foreign policy decision-making and tied it to his domestic political priorities, transforming the country’s revisionist approach to one shaped primarily by personal and pragmatic interests.
The Iran war has posed significant immediate challenges for Turkey, including rising energy prices. But Turkish officials think that Ankara could reap benefits from the war in the long term.
After months of trying to head off a US-Israeli war with Iran, Turkey now finds itself caught in the middle of it — and deeply concerned that a prolonged, regionalized conflict could pose serious security, economic, and political risks.
The balance of power in the Middle East is shifting. Iran is on the defensive — its military capabilities were badly degraded by last year’s 12 days of Israeli and US strikes, and growing protests at home have made the regime look more vulnerable than it has in years.
Saudi Arabia has stepped up its efforts to unify and restructure Yemen’s anti-Houthi forces after the rapid expansion and sudden implosion of the United Arab Emirates-backed secessionist Southern Transitional Council following Abu Dhabi’s military withdrawal from the country.
The Abraham Accords have represented a remarkable shift in U.S. Middle East policy. They reframed Arab-Israeli normalization as a result of shared interests – within the Middle East and directly with the US, rather than as a byproduct of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Signed in September 2020, on the last leg of the first Trump administration, the Accords brokered by Washington normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, followed by framework agreements with Morocco and Sudan. From the American perspective, the Accords were intended to break decades of diplomatic stagnation in the Middle East in order to establish a regional framework aligned with American strategic objectives.
MEI Senior Fellow Mohammed Soliman joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to discuss his new book, West Asia: A New American Grand Strategy in the Middle East. The book argues that it is time for the United States to move decisively away from nation-building and focus instead on order-building, outlining a framework for a new regional order that links Europe to the Indo-Pacific. Soliman also shares how he conceived of the core ideas behind his book and explains why his thesis is especially relevant in today’s geopolitical, economic, and technological landscape.
Media and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are hyping the idea that President Trump’s attempt to gain sovereign control of Greenland has caused unprecedented and irreparable damage to the over 75 year-old Transatlantic Alliance. This “analysis” stems from multiple sources. On both sides of the ocean, there are those who pounce on any deviation from the norm by Trump as evidence the world as we know it is ending. And in Europe, there is the human but unattractive reaction of weak, dependent states against their one powerful ally when it rejects Europe’s preferred script. Much of the US media criticism is summarized by the concept that our other NATO allies can never again “trust” the US.
Whether the truce between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces holds or collapses will have major implications for neighboring Turkey, which has long-standing interests in Syria, but recent developments already point to a win for Ankara.
As the rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi sharpens in Yemen and beyond, Turkey has begun edging closer to Saudi Arabia, sparking claims that a new regional order is taking shape: a Turkey-Saudi axis backed by a NATO-like defense architecture, implicitly aligned against Israel and the United Arab Emirates. This reading overstates the case.