Defense and Security

Drawing comparisons to the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, the Red Sands Integrated Experimentation Center will increase US-Saudi cooperation to counter two of the greatest threats emanating from Iran and its proxies — drone and missile attacks.

As welcome as recent moves toward Iranian-Gulf détente have been, extensive obstacles continue to stand in the way of a real and sustained relaxation of tensions, cause by what international relations scholars call the “security dilemma.”

The Saudi-Iran dialogue continues, but has produced little progress. As James Jeffrey of the Wilson Center and Bilal Saab of the Middle East Institute argue, part of the reason is that the two powers have fundamentally different objectives for the negotiations and that the power imbalance in Iran’s favor is profound. They suggest ways that Saudi Arabia might improve its bargaining power and argue that the United States can help strengthen Riyadh’s position.

Since seizing the capital of Sana’a in September 2014, the Houthis have been transforming the portions of Yemen under their control in line with a radical political and religious ideology. The Houthis’ war is complicated and may not be resolved quickly. But for now, the main obstacles to peace are ones that only Yemenis can resolve, which are rooted in rival concerns over the distribution of political power and equitable delivery of public services.

U.S. Central Command is quietly making a historic transition from a wartime command center to something like a hub for cajoling the region’s partners large and small toward stouter collective defense. But since CENTCOM’s new commander has vastly fewer resources for his tough new mission, defense and national security leaders in Washington need to back him up with a larger measure of policy coherence.

Kuwait plays a larger role than is often assumed in America’s present and future military plans in the Middle East. But as Washington prioritizes the Indo-Pacific, it is critical that the security arrangement between the United States and Kuwait is thoughtfully reconfigured.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine renewed focus on Moscow’s earlier military intervention in Syria, which often became framed as a “testing ground” for the weapons and tactics it now employs against Ukrainian cities. But crucially, the Russian forces backing Assad’s embattled regime also understood the importance of rebuilding the broken Syrian security forces into more effective fighting units.

Israel’s early August offensive against Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza achieved several strategic and tactical goals, but it failed to entirely sever the PIJ’s relationship with Hamas.

On Aug. 30, 2021, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, Maj. Gen. Chris Donahue, boarded the last U.S. military flight out of Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul. For many, the image of the final American soldier stepping onto a C-17 military transport plane marked the end of the war. But even as we remember the chaotic end of America’s longest war, we should also recall the sublime acts of loyalty and resolve that took place simultaneously.

The battle for control of the Yemeni heartland and its energy resources has reached a turning point. Yemen’s internationally recognized institutions are, once again, in crisis. In fact, the current infighting within the “government camp” threatens both the long-stalled implementation of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement and the political legitimacy of the newly-established Presidential Leadership Council.

The renewal of the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program does not undermine Israeli national security per se but rather a longstanding tenet of Israel’s strategic thinking: that it must be able to fully eradicate any challenge to its military superiority deep inside enemy territory.

The United States and its Gulf Arab partners need a new security arrangement that effectively shares the burden of defending against Iranian hostility and goes beyond deterrence.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE purchased $5 billion of U.S. air-defense missiles at a time when multiple American partners around the world are also looking to buy the same systems. The main effort in the Gulf will continue to be training and provisions of the material to develop an indigenous missile-defense capability.