Great Powers in the Middle East

Last week’s collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam on the Dnipro River in Ukraine is one of the largest environmental disaster the Black Sea region and Europe has faced in decades. Its far-reaching environmental, economic, and humanitarian consequences will affect not just Ukraine and the Black Sea region, but also the Middle East and Africa.

Even though Russia and China’s strategic partnership has strengthened in recent years, the leaderships of both countries infrequently engage on Middle East affairs. Russia views China’s growing diplomatic assertiveness in the Middle East as a positive step toward a multipolar regional order. Nevertheless, Russia is trying to avoid being completely eclipsed by China as a prospective conflict arbiter. While the two countries concur on opposing unilateral sanctions and democratic uprisings in the Middle East, Beijing does not universally approve of Moscow’s positions on regional crises and its power projection strategy.

The “Axis of Resistance,” a network of non-state actors aligned with Iran, has emerged as a significant force in the Middle East in the last two decades. Despite the attention given to the more well-known members of the Axis of Resistance, the Azerbaijani group Hoseyniyun, which also operates within the network, remains relatively unknown.

The Biden administration has been trying to diplomatically reengage with China, although so far with little response from Beijing. Any broad reengagement would necessarily include reengagement in the Middle East and North Africa. Both sides have a long list of common interests in the Middle East; the areas where their interests diverge relate mainly to suspicions of the other side’s long-term strategy and global ambitions. How can Washington and Beijing build on common interests in the region while addressing their long-term concerns, reducing some of them and accommodating robust competition or even sharp adversarial attitudes in other areas?

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has destabilized and distressed the entire Black Sea neighborhood. Yet despite the war, or perhaps because of it, strategically important foreign direct investments into Black Sea littoral countries, including from the Gulf, have endured or even grown.

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Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine helped influence the updated European Maritime Security Strategy’s approach to the Black and Mediterranean seas, with implicit and explicit references to the war dispersed throughout the document. The updated EUMSS showcases the wide array of security issues present in the region, including seaborne UXOs, human and drug trafficking, and threats to critical infrastructure. But security in the Black and Mediterranean seas will require greater cooperation with non-EU countries.

The structural pretext that drove West Asia’s cycle of competition and proxy conflict is still in place without a clear solution in sight

Ukraine’s partners, led by the United States and spread over the globe, have increasingly responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of February 2022 with a dizzying array of financial, humanitarian, and military assistance. Unfortunately, the way in which the U.S. and Ukraine’s other partners have provided military assistance over the last year — that is, by delivering a wide range of equipment, ammunition, and training — significantly undermines the longer-term objective of developing a sustainable system via which Ukraine can generate combat power in the coming years to overcome Russian aggression.

Relations between Tehran and Baku have long had their ups and downs, but a recent series of events in late March have once again brought tensions to a boil. However, despite the mutual threat perceptions, the recurring tensions between the two countries have not gotten out of control and led to military conflict. In fact, over the past three decades, relations between Tehran and Baku have consistently followed a cycle of escalating and de-escalating tensions.

Israeli-Azerbaijani relations are based on two main pillars: patient and cordial political relations as well as defense cooperation and arms sales. While the former reached a more intensive level this year, with the opening of an Azerbaijani embassy in Tel Aviv in late March, the latter pillar of the relationship was well developed long before, as Israel became Azerbaijan’s largest weapons supplier.

French President Emmanuel Macron is taking Ursula von der Leyen with him on his trip to China next week. Von der Leyen is president of the European Commission and, until now, one of the European Union’s (EU) staunchest supporters of Ukraine. The two are scheduled to arrive in Beijing on April 4. While Macron’s visit had been announced some time ago, von der Leyen’s recent decision to join gives the trip a pan-European stamp of approval. But for what?

Repeatedly throughout Russia’s history, its authorities have employed unlawful occupations, annexations, deportations, filtration, and ethnic dilution through an influx of Russian settlers to control and reshape the Eurasian map in favor of Russian expansionism. The de-occupation and reintegration of the Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine can be the only guarantee of durable peace in the heart of Europe.

While the U.S. and its NATO allies work on developing a Black Sea strategy, Washington should continue to cooperation with the Romanian Armed Forces, encourage the Romanians to build up their capabilities, and support the Romanian military’s officer corps development. In a multipolar world, solutions will need to be first and foremost regional — and in the Black Sea region, the Romanian Naval and Special Forces are a solid anchor for European stability.