It has been a remarkable week for Lebanon. President Aoun, Speaker Berri, and Prime Minister Salam have acted in unison, never something to be taken for granted in Lebanon.

With its new government at the half-year mark and the UNIFIL international peacekeeping force’s mandate due for reauthorization at month’s end, Lebanon stands at a pivotal moment.

The Hamas attack on Oct.

The monarchical Arab Gulf states emerged on the other side of last June’s Israeli and US attacks on Iran largely unscathed, with the important exception of a limited, retaliatory Iranian missile strike on the American airbase in Qatar. However, in a larger sense, this short war, part of the broader regional conflict that began with the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, reinforced the precariousness of the Gulf monarchies’ security situation.

The unresolved crises unfolding on the Israeli-Palestinian front — a growing humanitarian disaster inside of Gaza, the horrific images of emaciated Israelis held hostage by terrorists in the coastal strip, and ongoing tensions in Jerusalem and the West Bank fueled by religious extremists of all stripes — represent one of the biggest strategic challenges to stability facing the Middle East. With Israel now openly contemplating a full occupation of Gaza, this set of issues serves as an obstacle to broader regional peace and normalization efforts.

Whatever you think about events since October 2023, a fundamental shift in the balance of power has occurred in the Middle East.

During June’s Israel-Iran war, a quieter but significant battle played out in cyberspace, highlighting how Tehran has refined its use of digital tools to shape the battlespace, control domestic narratives, and project influence abroad. While largely ineffective in operational terms, Iran’s cyber response marked a new phase in its strategic evolution.

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s first year in office has been defined by Iran’s familiar political structural constraints, external crises, and a moderate-reformist base forever frustrated with his cautious pragmatism and unfulfilled promises. His July 2024 election was undeniably a setback for hardliners. Yet one year later, the assessment is sobering: While Pezeshkian has in some ways perhaps helped in slowing the hardline march, he has not made any fundamental difference in how the Islamic Republic is run. Every decision requires second-guessing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s next move, and even as a president boxed in by the system with limited powers, he is constantly under the sword of Damocles.