The Middle East Institute hosted an on-the-record briefing on recent shifts in US policy towards the Israel-Hamas war and other strategic priorities in the Middle East.
Speakers
Brian Katulis
Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy and Senior Advisor to the President
Mara Rudman
Distinguished Professor at the University of Virginia
Former deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs
Transcript
The following transcript was automatically generated and may contain errors.
Thomas Halvorsen [00:00:00] Hello everybody. My name is Thomas Halvorsen, and I'm the associate director for corporate and foundation relations at the Middle East Institute. I'd like to welcome you all to another session in MEI's virtual briefing series on the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, which this week will focus on recent shifts in U.S. Middle East policy. Since October, MEI has been working hard to provide you with expert analysis on every dimension of the ongoing conflicts in the region post October 7th, and we hope that you’ve found this to be a valuable resource to you and your colleagues. Today, this week, I'm excited to welcome two highly regarded MEI experts to the series. Brian Katulis is an MEI senior fellow on U.S. foreign policy who has conducted extensive research on the Biden administration's Middle East policy approach here at MEI. In September, he published a report assessing Biden's policy over the first three years of his term and is currently collecting research for another report on the administration's approach to the Middle East post October 7th, which should be published in the coming weeks. Mara Rudman is the James R. Schlesinger distinguished professor at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia and a close friend of MEI. Prior to her time at UVA, she served as deputy assistant to the president for National Security Affairs under both President Obama and President Clinton and has held several other positions in government throughout her career. Thank you both for joining us this morning. It's great to have you.
Mara Rudman [00:01:31] Thanks. I'm happy to be here.
Thomas Halvorsen [00:01:31] Of course. On February 8th, in a press conference, President Biden said that Israel's military operations in Gaza have been, quote, over the top, which was perhaps one of his strongest public rebukes of the Israeli campaign since it began in October. Since then, the Biden administration seems to be less publicly supportive and increasingly critical of Netanyahu's government and its handling of the war. This comes amid strong backlash from groups across the country for Biden's handling of the conflict in Gaza so far. Democratic political leaders in Michigan have pushed for uncommitted votes in the state's primary earlier this week, and Aaron Bushnell's self-immolation outside the Israeli embassy last Sunday was another example of extreme domestic outrage at Biden's handling of the situation. With an extremely consequential presidential election later this year, and more brutal violence inside Gaza every day, yesterday's tragic incident near the aid convoy was another grim example. Is the Biden administration changing its policy approach towards the Middle East and towards this war, and if so, how? Brian, I'll first turn to you for your assessment and then you can turn it over to Mara for hers.
Brian Katulis [00:02:42] Great. Thanks, Thomas, and thanks for all of you for joining us here this morning. As the war between Israel and Hamas approaches its five-month mark, we thought it'd be good to take a step back from the focus on our briefings, which have looked at particular aspects. Last week, it was Egypt and Rafah and how Israel is approaching the Rafah question, and before, we had a wonderful briefing on Iraq and Syria by Charles Lister. I want to thank both of you, Thomas and Courtney Lobel and others for pulling these together, because they're a wonderful resource. Today, we're going to take a step back and try to offer a clinical assessment and snapshot of the Biden administration's handling of this war and, more broadly, how it's implementing Middle East policy. I want to acknowledge at the outset that given a number of different factors, there's so many different perspectives, there's a lot of emotion related to this as Thomas indicated earlier. We're going to do our best to just offer a clinical assessment. It's not easy to do. We're happy to talk about the political dimensions of this as well, but from an analytical standpoint, not from an advocacy standpoint.
Brian Katulis [00:03:51] I’m lucky to be joined here in this briefing with my friend and former colleague, Mara Rudman, who has many more years of experience than I have working at the white House, State Department, USAID, and Congress on US policy in the region. The bottom-line up front is that, at least my assessment, that since October 7th, the Biden administration has quite obviously stepped up its engagement on the Middle East in reaction to the Hamas attack against Israel that started this war, but that its approach is largely, tactical, reactive, and it's in a crisis management mode. My sense is and I'm going to lay out what I see as the main goals and markers the administration has set for itself, but that events in the region are still largely being driven by actors in the region, including, Israel, Hamas, Iran, Iran's network of partners, and the so-called axis of resistance. But I also think that America has stepped up its role and plays an important role, more so than any other country, more so than China, Russia, even Europe, in trying to shape the conditions and the outcomes in the region. So, what I'm going to do is outline what I see as Biden's five main goals. I'll offer a bit of a background descriptive analysis and assessment on the first three, and then Mara is going to talk about two, and then we'll open it up to questions.
Brian Katulis [00:05:18] So since October 7th, if you look at the mix of President Biden's statements, things that have been laid out by his top officials in briefings and in congressional testimony, the Biden administration has had five main goals in responding to this situation. Number one, and I do think this is the top priority, it's to support Israel's right of self-defense, including its goal of eliminating Hamas as a security threat and removing Hamas's capacity to rule in Gaza. So, you can look at different statements or different moves by the administration, but this is the one consistent through-line that's been in there. And I'll talk a little bit about that more in detail. Second top goal has been to gain the release of hostages, which may still include six U.S. citizens. I highlight the word may because the unfortunate consequence of the situation, the initial attack by Hamas against Israel on October 7th, plus, who grabbed these individuals has led to a lot of unclarity about how many people are still remaining. The release of the hostages is the second clear goal. Third, was to avoid a wider regional war. And those three things I'll talk about. The two other goals, fourth, to support protections against civilian casualties and the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza, Mara, we'll talk about. And then, fifth, to advance a longer-term pathway towards a two-state solution and engage key US partners in the region to support the long-term framework for peace. So those are five goals. I'm going to talk about the first three a bit, then Mara we'll offer her assessments. And as I said, we're happy to talk about the broader geopolitical implications of this war, how the Biden administration's handling it, and also, the question of what impact this may or may not have on domestic politics, given that it's an election year.
Brian Katulis [00:07:14] So first, and I'll try to be brief. The first goal, to support Israel's right of self-defense and its goal of eliminating Hamas as a security threat. Clearly, from the get-go, this was a top priority of President Biden himself. The initial statements, plus his action of flying to Israel, at a time of war, a rarity for a U.S. president, and to meet with the top leaders, was a strong show of support to Israel after the Hamas attack. He and his team backed Israel's actions to defend itself from Hamas and also supported the goal of eliminating Hamas as a security threat. When President Biden came back from his trip in mid-October, he made a speech to the nation and presented a supplemental funding request for additional military aid to Israel, on top of what we provide to Israel each year. And he combined this request with additional funding for contingencies for the war in Ukraine and Taiwan's defense against China. Here we are, more than four months later, after this request was made. Congress has not yet passed this request for funding, though it seems like there's some movement in different directions. Despite the lack of additional funding that he requested, the Biden administration has delivered some extraordinary arms transfers to Israel since the start of the Gaza conflict, including weapons replenishment, precision guided munitions, tank munitions, a number of arms. And it has invoked emergency rule several times to bypass Congress and deliver these weapons to Israel. Throughout this whole process, the Biden administration has, I would characterize it, offered advice about the need to prioritize avoiding civilian casualties. They send in some advisers early on and warned that Israel should learn from America's own mistakes, in the post 9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as what we think we've learned from the anti-istle campaign, as it relates to trying to protect civilians, while we go after deadly terrorist groups.
Brian Katulis [00:09:22] But as we can see from how the war has unfolded here, and Thomas mentioned a bit of it, and with the death toll sounding like it's topping 30,000 Palestinians in Gaza, that's a very difficult proposition to move forward. So, while the US has provided strong support to Israel's self-defense, it has offered some guidance along the way of how it should be used. Earlier last month, on February 8th, the Biden team issued National Security Memorandum 20, which states that any country receiving US weapons must give the US credible and reliable written assurances that such weapons will be used in accordance with international humanitarian law. And according to my discussions with some in the administration, as well as press reports, the Biden administration is giving Israel until mid-March to sign a letter offering those assurances. Now, those are just assurances, it doesn't represent any sense that the Biden administration might cut off any flow of delivery of aides, and the NSC spokesperson said that this does not impose new standards at all for military aid, it just provides a transparent, consistent structure for assurances and compliance to preexisting standards. So, they're trying to lift up the warnings and concerns, about how US funded weapons are used. But they're not, hinting at cutting things off or using excessive, or strong leverage.
Brian Katulis [00:10:46] So the Biden administration, in conclusion, on this first has provided essential defense military support to Israel. Israel has mostly used it as it has seen fit. And the Biden team has not yet wavered in terms of offering this assistance, despite the growing criticisms and domestic political heat over how Israel is conducting its campaign in Gaza. I don't expect that to be static, but I think you'll see sort of more of a back and forth of how the US is trying to engage this current Israeli government, more quickly. The second goal was to gain the release of hostages, which may include, six US citizens. This remains a top priority. And, Biden administration officials I've seen this week, Qatari and Egyptian officials I've talked to this week are still working on it. Just to review, this has only been a partial success. A round of negotiations in October and November produced that weeklong ceasefire in November and early December that led to the release of 105 hostages from Gaza and 240 Palestinians freed from Israeli prisons. Hamas, to be clear, was responsible for ending that temporary ceasefire in December, they refused to continue with the hostage release and then also took military actions that restarted the conflict. In the three months since, and we've seen a lot of press on this, there's been a lot of back and forth with the President Biden sending top officials, including CIA director Bill Burns, Secretary of State Tony Blinken, white House adviser Brett McGurk, nearly every week, to try to engage, to move those talks forward with Egypt and Qatar. And they've hinged a lot on trying to get a deal, a hostage deal, and a temporary ceasefire before Ramadan on March 10th or 11th.
Brian Katulis [00:12:40] My main concern here, from a policy standpoint, is that there hasn't been sufficient contingency planning and policy planning in the event that another deal is not brokered. So, the bottom line on the hostages is that this saw some limited success in their releases in late November, early December. There's some hope in the next few days before Ramadan, that this may have more success. But less than half of the hostages come home, and the big debates and the protests about ceasefires often turn their eyes away from the fact that hostages are still in Gaza and are a key part of the equation and being held by Hamas as leverage and is part of the reason why I think the conflict continues. Lastly, and I'll be very quick on goal three before turning to Mara, is to avoid a regional, war. The Biden administration quite quickly set additional military resources in addition to the arms transfers. I talked to Israel, they set more to the region as a sign of deterrence against Hezbollah and other Iran backed actors in the region early in the conflict, in October, November to strike carrier groups were sent there. In the first weeks of the Gaza war, the Biden team urged Israel to show restraint against Hezbollah, after some series of attacks there. And the Biden team has tried to broker a diplomatic solution that would lead to a buffer zone, being recreated between where Hezbollah forces are and Israel's border. That has not yet succeeded. And there's extreme worries that the conflict that has been simmering on that northern border could, blow up, quite soon.
Brian Katulis [00:14:21] In Yemen, quite clearly, we've seen in the news that the United States built a coalition in response to Houthi threats and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. These are attacks that Houthis linked to Israel's military operation in Gaza. And since the start of the year, the US and its coalition partners have been trying to highlight, trying to restore some sense of deterrence. But it's has not succeeded, by conducting attacks against Houthi sites, in Yemen and trying to protect international shipping. We've had other briefings on that. And it's a big, I think, key strategic picture in the region, in the world as well. And then lastly, on the avoiding regional war, the United States faced more than 180 attacks against its troops from last October through February, and that included the deadly drone strike in Jordan that killed three U.S. troops on January 28th. That particular attack led to reprisals by the US military, and there's been a series of strikes conducted against Iran backed militias in early February. Those attacks, so far, have actually in contrast to the Houthi theater, it's seen so far to have had some desired effect and impact on preventing additional strikes from these militias. But it's a dynamic situation. And, of course, Iran is behind all this network. So, to close off and before I hand it off to Mara. Sorry for going on long, Mara. The bottom line on the regional wars that so far, the United States has avoided a major regional war by committing more resources, not less, by conducting targeted strikes against different groups in the theater that have threatened the US and other partners. But the security environment is by no means stable, and there's a high risk of a wider war breaking out, at any moment, in my view, and it's a very worrisome situation. But it's better that the US has engaged and has engaged more deeply than the Biden administration itself had planned, to do at the start of its administration. And it's good that we're in there. So, over to you, Mara, to talk about the Civilian Protection and Humanitarian Aid and then the longer-term pathways on two state solution and engagement with partners.
Mara Rudman [00:16:37] Thanks Brian, and thanks Thomas and all of you for joining us. I appreciate the opportunity to be in conversation on this topic. And in that context, also, I know Brian and I are both eager to get to questions and conversation, and I'll try to cover these two topics accordingly to be able to get to a dialogue with you. On the fourth goal that Brian laid out, the fourth administration goal, which is to support protections against civilian casualties in the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza. Stating the obvious, it's clearly a very challenging situation. I will say that I found the administration, the Biden administration's appointment of Ambassador David Satterfield very early on back in October, as the clear sign that you could give of the serious intent of being able to act on this goal, appointing Satterfield as special envoy for Middle East humanitarian issues. And I'm going to reference heavily public comments that he has made in the last couple of weeks, about his role, and what he's doing and trying to. And I say this partly because he has, I think, in part, showing the skill that he has, largely stayed out of the headlines, and that shouldn't be confused with a lack of work that he's doing in this space. I think he has been working nonstop on increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza. I think the issues surrounding hostages and hostage discussion have gotten their points tangled up in that. And while I believe, and he and others have indicated that certainly having a deal on hostages in place will make it easier perhaps for the humanitarian aid to get in and get distributed, the need for a significant increase in humanitarian aid, coming in is the case regardless, as well as a clear distribution network.
Mara Rudman [00:18:56] And in that context, I think there's widespread acknowledgment that the amount going in is not sufficient. It is also far more than it would have been had the United States not put Satterfield in the role that he's in and had someone who is every day, 24 hours a day, figuring out how to do more, how to work with all the key players to get more in. Some of the specific things that he and others have called for is the need to have more crossings open erez in the north. One good example right now is Kerem Shalom, which is in Israel and near Nitzana, which I'm sure I'm mispronouncing, which is the Egypt-Israel crossing, they are the two and they are functioning eight hours a day. And so, for both, you need kind of an around the clock 24 hours a day. And you need eraz, you need basically more means to get stuff in. And when I say get stuff in, it's also with screening processes that have long been, and I’m happy to discuss that in more depth for anyone who cares to go into the details of the screening processes that have long been in place for goods going into Gaza. In addition to that, though, you need the distribution networks and abilities inside, which are extraordinarily difficult, even without the current situation. And given what the status is of daily life in Gaza at this point, even more difficult, which includes needing to provide some sort of security for those who are distributing food and water. And Satterfield has said that tacitly that security is coming from de facto security forces associated with Hamas. Israel knows that other players know that, but it also contributes to some of the difficult dynamics, in terms of being able to distribute what's needed on the humanitarian front.
Mara Rudman [00:21:24] The one other point that I'd want to make, I happened to testify a few weeks ago in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on UNRWA two days after the stories about the UNRWA staff who were found to have been involved on October 7th, the 12 staff people. there are questions about other numbers, and there's certainly been a lot of renewed public commentary, I would say, on shutting down UNRWA in some way. The point I made then, and I would make now is that UNRWA, in the current situation is a key on the ground actor for having the infrastructure, the staffing, the people, the knowledge and experience to be able to distribute this desperately needed humanitarian relief. So, there is not a substitute right now for UNRWA you can't flip a switch and otherwise have the ability to get the humanitarian relief that is needed in and distributed to folks. I do think that there's an open discussion that a variety of different policy leaders ought to engage in, about the future of UNRWA. But from what I see in here should be in the context of planning for a Palestinian state. So, I want to go to a Palestinian state that would encompass West Bank and Gaza. And that in one way or another also gets linked to when people talk about day after plans for Gaza. I do not see these topics as separable. So, in terms of the Biden administration goal on advancing a longer-term pathway toward a two-state solution and engaging key U.S. partners, to support that long term framework for peace, a tremendous amount of work is underway on this. I want to first emphasize the word pathway. I think President Biden has talked about this, even earlier this week on public commentary. To me, pathway does not mean that the United States somehow announces the existence of a Palestinian state tomorrow, or again, flipping a switch, it means there is a clear indication of what the destination is. In other words, that Palestinian state with Israeli security, with guarantees for Israeli security, which is what we've heard multiple times from folks in the administration. But the work to be done is on how you build that pathway. What steps can be taken? And to my mind, the way Gaza gets run going forward from today, contributes to is part of the steps towards getting to a two-state solution.
Mara Rudman [00:24:38] And I say this with the very real challenge that the majority of Israelis and frankly, the majority of Palestinians and Arabs in the Middle East, beyond West Bank and Gaza agree on one thing, at this point. I think that you could get agreement that peaceful coexistence is not foreseeable right now. And so, that commonly held perception, tests the credibility of the many, I would include myself in that equation who see routes to coexistence as the only realistic route, the only realistic path for way to achieve stability and security, in the region and for Israelis and Palestinians. So, there's much work to be done to change the perceptions about what is realistic and why, to achieve that stability and security. And I think a lot of this work also follows the United States to European partners, to others in the region. In terms of setting the goal for a two-state outcome and pathways to get there, to me, the most interesting work being done right now is on the Saudi - US discussions that have come out on what the Saudis would be willing to do in the context of Israel, If there's agreement on that two-state pathway. And also the Saudis with Egypt, with the UAE, with Qatar, and those might be two parallel processes, working with Europeans, that may set out, perhaps starker terms that destination, but can help to set the ground against which others can continue to lead, to putting some steps, putting some marks on the ground, putting, if you'll excuse me, the reference which I appreciate is loaded, putting some facts on the ground, on how you get to that two state outcome. So, work being done, fairly aggressively. Challenges all around, both on the needed to significantly increase humanitarian assistance getting into Gaza and, ways in which everything about day-to-day operations in Gaza needs to be linked to how we advance a longer-term pathway towards a two-state solution, have the United States, others in the region, and engaging partners to support that longer term framework for peace. So, with that, let me turn it back over to you, Thomas, and open up for folks’ questions.
Thomas Halvorsen [00:27:21] Great. Thank you guys so much for your analysis, for your comments. At this time, I'd like to open up the discussion to all the callers on the line to ask a question. Please use the raise hand function on zoom. Keep your hand raised until I call on you and unmute. Then kindly state your name and affiliation and direct your question to one or both of our scholars on the call. Questions can also be submitted using the chat box. The Q&A chat box on zoom. To start things off, we do have one question here in the chat box, that has to do with how does the presidential campaign and the presidential election impact the Iranian Hamas and Houthi war strategy? Will they keep dragging this out until there's clarity on who will be in the white House in 11 months or ten months? And then on the flip side also, how is the war affecting campaigns domestically? If you guys could provide comments on both those, that'd be great. Brian let's start with you.
Brian Katulis [00:28:21] Okay. So first, on your second question first, and then I'll turn to the first. That's a really interesting question. My sense is that President Biden and his team, are avowedly focused and laser like focused on trying to get to what they see as the best policy on this. And they're overwhelmed in a sense of trying to figure out how to offer the support to key partners, achieve the five goals that Mara and I laid out, and that domestic politics is somewhere in the background, but it certainly is not in the room. As one senior official, said to me earlier this week, it’s not in the conversation when they're thinking about hostage negotiations. They're trying to get to the right policy, which I think is the right approach. Now, of course, we live in a democratic system, and it's an election year, and there's analysis, and in my view, over interpretation of different results. I want to stipulate that MEI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, We're bipartisan. so, this is just my own take, it’s not leaned in any way, I'm not favoring one candidate versus the other. But my take on things that have been discussed this week, for instance, the Michigan primary results, there was a lot of energy devoted by the Arab American community and others to an uncommitted vote to show protest to Biden. And they got about 100,000 votes, which is significant. It's about 12- 13% of the vote, but it's also on par with what has happened in other elections, previous cycles, Obama in 2012. In the broader landscape, when you look at what happened on the other side of the ledger, 300,000 voters, voting for Nikki Haley, who was the main opponent to Donald Trump.
Brian Katulis [00:30:20] When you think about November, and hopefully this war and the conflict won't continue, you may have a different scenario on the ground, which I think events drives things. But then secondly, the simple fact is that 300,000 voters, some of whom will likely swing in Biden's direction, it's hard to guess, because most of these debates right now, aren't even driven by the Israel-Hamas war. There's another thing I'd add, the political architecture for the 2024 election, objectively speaking, from the polls is being driven by number of other factors by abortion, immigration, concerns about our own democracy and the economy. And, as we saw yesterday, both former President Trump and President Biden at the border in Texas, while this war is going on in the Middle East. I think that's a reflection of how they read the electorate as well. So, my main point here is that I think there's a lot of anger and emotion and disagreement with the president's policy, but I don't think they're really focused so much on responding to different domestic constituencies, whether it's pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian. I think they're mostly trying to get the policy right. And on the first question on whether Iran and the conflict will continue, I suspect as we see with Russia and Ukraine, all of these actors and especially Iran, looks carefully at things that are said by the current president, by the would-be presidents that might replace them.
Brian Katulis [00:31:56] So you know, I think you'll probably see what we've seen for the last year or so, and especially the last few months, a continued conflict unfortunately, unless we get this temporary cease fire in Gaza. I would note, others have noted this, that when they got that weeklong cease fire that led to the hostage release, it mostly led to a drop in the in the violent attacks from Iran's network of proxies. So, it led to a, I want to highlight relative period of calm, especially relative to now. So, I think it's less about our elections and more about the conditions on the ground and the security conditions. Last thing I'd say Mara, I'm sorry for going on here is that I do think a big gap in U.S. policy under the Biden administration these days is the lack of a clear strategic approach to Iran. It's something that I think, forms the backdrop in the architecture for all of this. It's something that our colleagues, Alex Vatanka and I, and others are working on, and what would be a more optimal approach? But the simple fact of the matter is that a lot of things that were attempted by both the Obama and Trump administrations, and then what Biden has tried with Iran has not produced the results that were the stated goals. So, there's a lot of work to be done there, and clearly Iran plays a role not only in Gaza or in Yemen or in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, but in its nuclear program, which we somehow don't talk about these days, is continuing apace. So, I think events rather than domestic politics will largely shape the US policy and also the actions of those in the region.
Mara Rudman [00:33:33] Well, I agree, Brian with you on all points. Not unusual, but in this case, I do. I would just add a couple small additions. First, I had the good fortune very early in my career of working for Lee Hamilton at the House Foreign Affairs Committee and his guidance and the way that he lived it with all his staff, was to say outright, first tell me what the right thing to do is, let's figure out what the right thing to do is. This would be when people tried to prognosticate politics with him back and forth, on whether we could do something or couldn't or, you know, where the political space was. And he said, let's figure out what the right thing to do is and then navigate a path to getting there, but we start with what the right thing to do is. I bring that up because I actually think that President Biden is cut from the same cloth, the same way up of looking at what responsibilities are for any political leader, and particularly so for the president of the United States. So, though I wasn't part of the conversation that Brian references, I absolutely believe that is how he is operating on this issue, and how he is leading the administration on this issue. The second point I'd make just in terms of Michigan, because in Michigan and frankly, media reporting and fervor on these kinds of issues of looking for a storyline to me. It was stark when I went back and saw what President Obama won Michigan by in 2012, in the primary. He had 89% of the vote. So, I think President Biden in Michigan, the percentages were less than that, but not by a whole lot. And so, I think it is amazing how quickly folks lose perspective or pick a certain storyline and run with it. And I think it's important to leaven that with the facts.
Thomas Halvorsen [00:36:04] Great. Thank you both for that. Again, for everybody, if you'd like to ask a question, you can raise your hand or submit it in the Q&A box here and I'll read it out. Another question we have here in the Q&A is, well you've delineated US policy very well, but can you speak at all to how US relationships with partners in the region have shifted, specifically the US's relationship with Israel? How has it changed, and how is it the same pre and post October 7th? And how have the U.S. relationships with different partners in the region changed? Have they been strengthened? Have they, you know, have they not? If you could speak to both of those, that would be great. Mara, how about we start with you this time?
Mara Rudman [00:36:48] Sure. Let me start with Israel because I actually don't think it has changed. I think that, yeah, as Brian laid out kind of what the five objectives are, and the first being ensuring Israel's right to self-defense. President Biden has been consistent about that, and his administration has been consistent about that. That's not a pre and post October 7th view, and his kind of travel over there was to reinforce that. At the same time, I would also say that he and his administration have been consistent about a challenging relationship with the current prime minister of Israel, which has played out quite clearly as well, and we've all heard President Biden in multiple points, talk about how long he's known Prime Minister Netanyahu and in what context and how rarely they agree. And so those tensions and how you navigate, Israel is not unique in this when you're a US president, with the head of a government, with whom you may profoundly disagree, even as you have a strong relationship, and a committed relationship to the particular country. And I think that's the situation in Israel right now, and I think so, you know, we've seen that play out in various ways for the administration in trying to maximize how to move forward on what they believe is in U.S. and Israel and regional security interests and stability interests, with a prime minister who may have a very different take on these things. I'll stop there and Brian, I'll turn it to you, to discuss others in the region.
Brian Katulis [00:38:42] Yeah. So first, it's a good question. The Biden approach to the region when it entered office was to essentially de-prioritize it, relative to other challenges. He came into office, at a time when the Covid pandemic was still killing 4000 people a day in America, and there was an economic crisis at home, joblessness over 10 million. I think it was in part because of the forced shutdown of the economy. So, there's a domestic focus. But then on the international scene, there was a higher prioritization at that time given to China and to other issues like reengaging allies and trying to advance sort of the jumpstart of the economy at home and working with partners to build those networks. Also, climate change was a higher priority. They gradually increased their engagement in part, because of factors outside of the Middle East, in my assessment. The war in Ukraine led to rising oil prices, which led the Biden team to try to engage Saudi Arabia, which President Biden called a pariah state, as a candidate in the 2020 elections. And I think, they became more pragmatic about the need to engage with partners and work with partners across the board. When China announced in March 2023 last year its brokered deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia to reopen diplomatic ties, that I know was a wakeup call for some in the white House, because they saw that the risk that the United States could lose, a swing state, and here not in the domestic election context, but a geopolitical swing state like Saudi Arabia to China, that you needed to double down engagement there, which they did. This was pre 10/7. There were talks not only about the Israel Saudi normalization accord Mara mentioned, but the concept that was announced at the G20 for an Indian Middle East Europe corridor. So, there was an attempt at a proactive strategy and to work with some of those partners, and I think that helped relations. There were still deep concerns in the Gulf, and then, other parts of the region about the lack of a clear Iran policy that I heard consistently.
Brian Katulis [00:40:55] Post 10/7 was the question. I think there's been strains in the relationship, and some of those actually represent mostly an opportunity for the US to engage, but some threats. The biggest strain has been, and we've seen this at the UN votes and discussions between some of our Arab partners, including the UAE. There's a gap. There was just a gap between the United States in stated goals versus some of its leading Arab partners. Leading Arab partners have been calling for an immediate ceasefire and have prioritized that above and beyond sort of Israel's defense and also even, I would say, the return of hostages. So foreign ministers came here in December from Arab and Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, to lobby the United States, mostly in a PR show. In my take, there have been these dueling UN resolutions. So, there's tensions on sort of the immediate, and clearly Arab partners want to see the conflict come to an end as quickly as possible. The images of innocent civilians and women and children dying every day in Gaza, just leads to all sorts of tensions in Arab countries. The real gap, though, and the one that I think where there needs to be more policy work applied to, is the things that Mara was talking about, in terms of the longer term and what's the game plan. So, there's a short-term sort of crisis in how do you get Israel to agree to the notion of a two state solution in the short term, while they're traumatized and fighting a war and still facing threats from Hezbollah and Iran and its network. There's a longer-term challenge, of actually just assembling a team. I've suggested quietly, the United States should develop a contact group or some sort of coalition of the sort, akin to, not the exact same coalition, but it's similar to what was assembled after the ISIS coalition. ISIS rose and there was a coalition of regional partners.
Brian Katulis [00:42:49] But this coalition could just have people at a working level talking about, okay, we all want to drive towards a two-state solution. The Saudis in their Arab peace plan want that. What does that mean in practice? Where does this conflict likely end? And how do we marshal the collective support to produce that, and produce change inside? And those are less sort of, media and sort of visible gaps. They're sort of quiet policy-oriented gaps that I think, if it's a Trump administration or whomever or a second Biden administration, they're going to be dealing with in 2025, 2026, 2027, because these things are not going to conclude anytime soon. We're not likely to see, I think, end of combat operations, even if there's a temporary pause. My assessment has been the main combatants to this central fight, Israel and Hamas are so fundamentally at odds, I want to see sort of this theory of the case that a temporary ceasefire could lead to more diplomacy, but it's going to require more engagement. So, I would say relations were fraught under Biden, with some of our traditional Arab partners when they came in, because how he approached the region and deprioritized it. They stepped up the engagement that led to some reassurance. October 7th produced some additional turbulence, which, has some gaps, but then also has some opportunities to actually work together to produce the sort of joint game plans and proactive strategies that have been missing from US policy in the Middle East for decades, I think.
Thomas Halvorsen [00:44:20] Great. Thank you both. We have one more question here. It unpacks what you guys are saying more about the US Israel relationship and the two-state solution. But how does the US hope to build on a two-state solution when the current Israeli administration has made it clear that there's no intention of creating, and there's no desire for a two-state solution? How does the US see that as a positive, accomplishable policy approach?
Brian Katulis [00:44:50] I'll start and then Mara, if that's okay. I don't think, they see it as possible with this current Israeli government, especially to ministers that avowedly reject the two-state solution and have a very fundamentally sort of extreme right-wing view of the world, which I think is out of step with where most Israelis are at. And this is the key question right now. You know, Israel itself, is a fractious democracy, as we've seen from its multiple elections over the last several years. At any moment, I think there can be some sort of change. And clearly you saw last week, Netanyahu and others, rejecting in the media and this is media diplomacy, the notion of a two-state solution. But I still think when you talk to people in the agencies, certainly a lot of the Israeli security establishment do not want to own Gaza, and don't want to reoccupy over the long term. But they don't have a game plan. They don't. The fundamental problem, which was the problem America experienced this lesson that Biden has tried to advise the Israelis, of answering the question of how does this end? There's still no great clarity, even despite sort of Netanyahu last week releasing some sort of figment of a plan, which is basically, in my view, could be characterizes as a siege that does not plant the seed for a two-state solution. So, there's no hope right now with the current political authorities, I think. But it sorts of points to the need to talk to people inside the Israeli system and also the Israeli public to actually move them in that direction. And I would add to it, link it to some of the threats that they continue to face, including from Iran, even if that doesn't sound far afield, that the security of Israel itself, in the long run, benefits from a change division and some courageous leadership to advance some notion of a Palestinian state. A State of Palestine should be backed. People have different proposals of how you get there. I just think that the one thing the Biden team could be doing right now is assembling that team in the region in particular, and having the quiet conversations with those who were in previous Israeli governments and others in Israeli society about what it will take to get us there, even while this war is being prosecuted. It's not too soon. It's actually may be almost too late. So that how I would answer, Mara.
Mara Rudman [00:47:21] Yeah. I share a lot of that view. I think that there is both quiet conversations, which Brian you're talking about. I also think that there are various ways to reach out to help those in Israel. And I agree that there are many who desperately want stability and security for the Israeli people, who do not have a view that the current leadership has a plan for getting that or getting to that with them. And, finding ways to be able to make the case on where truce, security and stability in a sustainable fashion is going to come. I don't think that just the United States making that case. And in fact, I think it's probably more powerful if it comes from many in the region who I believe share those views as well. But I think there's a public case to be made here. And that is actually part of when I talked about steps on that pathway to two states. That is part of the steps on that pathway. Netanyahu was made very clear where he is, and that's because he is trying to hold together his hold on power with the two very far right ministers that are part of his ruling coalition at this point. The wartime cabinet, I would argue, is in a different place. And it's notable to me that, Benny Gantz in the wartime cabinet, not part of Netanyahu's ruling coalition, is running 2030 points ahead in polling. I'm not saying Benny Gantz is the next leader of Israel. I would say, look at that, as where the large number of Israelis are. They want security, they want stability. And even if publicly they are rejecting right now the idea of a two-state solution, it's because they don't see that as tied to security and stability. And if you listen to, I think, a number of center and centrist politicians in Israel, not just Benny Gantz, while they may not be embracing a two-state solution, they are leaving open space for how you make that security and stability argument, about getting to a separate Palestinian state.
Thomas Halvorsen [00:49:55] Great. Thank you both. Thank you both for answering that question. At this point, I think we're going to wrap things up, but if you have any other questions that you'd like to ask that you haven't been able to, please email them to me and I'd be happy to send them to Mara or Brian to answer at a later time. I hope you'll join me in thanking both Brian and Mara for participating in this week's session. We really appreciate your insights and your willingness to share your morning with us. So, thank you. And, if you've missed any of our sessions or wish to catch them again, you can find recordings and transcripts of all our briefings on our landing page at www.mei.edu/briefings-series. Thanks again for joining us for this week's session, and please be on the lookout for an invitation to next week's briefing in the coming days. If you find these calls valuable and want to learn more about other resources MEI can provide, don't hesitate to reach out to us. We'd be more than happy to connect. Thanks very much, and I wish you all a great rest of your day and a happy weekend.