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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. He earned a B.A. in international relations from the University of California at Riverside in 1976, an M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 1978, and a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1982. Most recently, he is the author of Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012). Links to many of his articles can be found on his website: www.marknkatz.com
The Russian government, like its counterparts in the West, the Middle East, and elsewhere, was caught off guard by the outburst of Arab uprisings beginning in January 2011 that swept away long-ruling authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and (it appears) Yemen, and have threatened to topple those in Bahrain and Syria. The response of the Russian government to these events has, like that of Western governments, often been confused and inconsistent. Just as Western governments have done, Moscow has sought to protect its interests in the region.
In 1979, Saudi-Russian relations were extremely poor. The two countries did not even have diplomatic relations — nor had they since the 1930s. Many observers regarded Soviet military support for Marxist regimes in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan as ultimately aimed at surrounding the oil-rich Kingdom and bringing about the downfall of its US-allied ruling family. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the uncertainty about whether the Iranian Revolution might evolve in a Marxist direction only served to intensify the perception of a Soviet threat to the Kingdom.
