Salam Kawakibi

There are several curious aspects to the Pentagon’s new Guidance for Development of Alliances and Partnerships, or GDAP, which was publicly unveiled by U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on Oct. 20.

Let’s start with the context. Both as a candidate and later as president, Donald Trump has taken a transactional view of U.S. alliances and partnerships, alienating France, Germany, and other NATO allies in the process. Whether GDAP is an attempt to make amends remains to be seen.

Deadly fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh has continued unabated for over a month. This so-called “frozen conflict” on Russia’s periphery was never truly frozen. Unresolved grievances on both sides festered for almost three decades, and smaller skirmishes periodically erupted. But this time the fighting emerged as the largest and deadliest flare-up and even spilled into neighboring Iran. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s support for Azerbaijan played a decisive role in raising the scale and turning the tide in favor of Azerbaijan. Turkish involvement raises questions about Moscow’s role and expectations, and the broader Russia-Turkey relationship.

Nazila Fathi, Nazee Moinian, and Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss Iran, U.S. policy, and the potential impact of the upcoming presidential election.

The Islamic Republic of Iran recently announced that it is now welcoming the possibility of women’s leadership at the highest levels of government. Optimists are celebrating this development in the belief that it could reinvigorate weak voter turnout and lead to much-needed reforms in the country. But a more realistic analysis finds that this is little more than a cynical ploy. There is an overwhelming body of evidence that suggests not much has happened to truly advance women’s rights in the Islamic Republic in years.

The COVID-19 pandemic is impacting all communities in Israel, but it has hit some of them much harder than others. The plight of the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox Jews) has been widely publicized, but the Bedouin of the Negev Desert are also being devastated by the pandemic and no one seems to care.

Since May 2019, a series of Syrian loyalist offensives backed by the Russian air force has gradually encroached upon the country’s northwestern Idlib Province, home to the last major pocket of opposition-held territory. As the chief rebel group in control of Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has employed dozens of suicide car bombs as part of its continued defense of the area. Formally known as suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), these weapons have been a cornerstone of the group’s — and by extension, the entire opposition’s — military strategy since early stages of the war, when rebel forces began capturing and holding territory. In an attempt to further understand this strategy and how it has evolved over time, this case study seeks to compare and contrast HTS’s past and current use of SVBIEDs, with a heavy focus on the latter. It will also examine HTS’s evolving SVBIED design, paying particular attention to technical innovations such as environment-specific paint schemes, drone support teams, tablets with target coordinates, and live camera feeds, as well as upgraded main charges.

The renewed military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia threatens geopolitical stability in the wider Black Sea-Caspian region, and has the potential to evolve into greater regional escalation. The scale of military operations, and range of heavy military equipment involved, is increasing risks for major energy and transportation infrastructure, which connect Caspian oil and natural gas fields in Azerbaijan to major energy markets in Turkey, the Mediterranean, and different parts of Europe.

The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and conflict in the Eastern region of Donbas not only breached commitments made by Russia as a signatory of the Budapest Memorandum twenty years earlier, but also tested the ability of the U.S. and U.K to guarantee peace in Ukraine and hold the aggressor accountable for its malevolent actions.

Since Aug. 13, speculation has been rife that the Sultanate of Oman will soon follow the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) lead and formalize full-fledged ties with Israel. Yet, at least thus far, Muscat has refused to join the UAE, Bahrain, and now Sudan in normalizing relations with Tel Aviv. As a moderate Arab country, where tolerance is firmly embedded into the national ethos and the Ibadi sect of Islam, Oman appears to be maintaining a balanced position on the overall Arab trend toward normalizing relations with Israel. Muscat’s positive reaction to the Abraham Accords is not a major change in strategy and is more illustrative of Oman’s longstanding position on normalization.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Paul Salem, Jonathan M. Winer, Gonul Tol, Mohammed Soliman, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Elizabeth Dent, Mirette F. Mabrouk, and Robert S. Ford.

Next month’s election may be instrumental in salvaging what hope remains for a two-state solution.

Ultimately, those set to suffer the most in this game of “poker” are Idlib’s enormous population of 3 million civilians.