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Shahmahmood Miakhel is the Country Director in Afghanistan for the US Institute of Peace (USIP). Prior to that he was a Governance Advisor for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and, from 2003–2005, a Deputy Minister of the Interior in the Government of Afghanistan. In 1994–1995 he worked for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in South and Southeast Afghanistan helping to establish District Rehabilitation Shuras (DRS). He also worked as a reporter for the Pashto service of the Voice of America from 1985–1990.
With the US and Iran on a knife-edge, can Oman once again step in to mediate?
The decision by Washington and Tehran to shift their long-anticipated meeting, set for February 6, from Istanbul to Muscat is not merely a logistical detail. It is the latest reminder that when US-Iran diplomacy is on the verge of breaking down completely, Oman is the regional player the Iranian regime trusts the most to step in and mediate.
Long before the Gaza war erupted in 2023, a broad consensus had already taken hold across policymakers, activists, and foreign-policy circles: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was at a political dead end. The Oslo framework—and the promise of a two-state solution—had steadily lost credibility as a realistic path forward. Since Hamas’s October 7 attacks, the devastation in Gaza and the accelerating realities on the ground have made a two-state outcome even harder to imagine. And yet, it remains the default language of Middle East diplomacy. Most recently, UN Secretary-General António Guterres reaffirmed his determination to oppose Israeli actions undermining the two-state solution and called for renewed momentum toward Palestinian statehood.
Against the backdrop of the Iranian government’s brutal crackdown on protestors, Brian is joined by Emad Shargi, an Iranian-American businessman who was unjustly detained by the regime in 2018 until his release in 2023. Shargi recounts his firsthand experience in the notorious Evin Prison and offers rare insights into the mentality and tactics of the Islamic Republic. He and Brian also discuss his recommendations for US engagement in Iran and his hopes for the country’s future.
Bolstering US, Japan, and Gulf Cooperation in the High Tech Field
In recent years, both Washington and the Middle East have been looking eastward. The United States has been executing its own “pivot to Asia,” seeking to strengthen alliances and manage competition in the Indo-Pacific, while many Middle Eastern states are simultaneously deepening their economic and strategic ties with Asian partners. This dual pivot is creating new intersections for US–Japan cooperation. The discussion featured Ambassador Barbara Leaf, Mohammed Soliman and Amane Kobayashi, and was moderated by Ken Pollack. Drawing on their experience, the speakers examined how Japanese, American, and Gulf public and private initiatives can be integrated to create more dynamic, cutting-edge economies, symbiotic diplomatic relationships, and stronger mutual security ties.
Integration or conflict in northeastern Syria? Ten key points to consider
After 10 months of US-mediated talks failed to achieve an integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into Syria’s transitional state, hostilities erupted in early January. US diplomacy stepped in to try to calm tensions and force through the integration of the SDF’s Kurdish core into the Syrian state. Here are 10 key takeaways and indications of where things could go next.
Ambiguous Uncertainties: Phase Two of Trump’s Plan for Gaza
MEI Senior Fellow Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to discuss the latest developments in Gaza. Nearly four months after the Israeli government and Hamas agreed to President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, Washington has announced that phase two of the process is now underway. Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Taylor, and Czekaj examine the humanitarian situation in the devastated coastal strip, assess what phase two could entail, break down how international actors are responding, and explore what would need to happen to realize the plan’s aspirations.
Media and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are hyping the idea that President Trump’s attempt to gain sovereign control of Greenland has caused unprecedented and irreparable damage to the over 75 year-old Transatlantic Alliance. This “analysis” stems from multiple sources. On both sides of the ocean, there are those who pounce on any deviation from the norm by Trump as evidence the world as we know it is ending. And in Europe, there is the human but unattractive reaction of weak, dependent states against their one powerful ally when it rejects Europe’s preferred script. Much of the US media criticism is summarized by the concept that our other NATO allies can never again “trust” the US.
The US Commerce Department announced on November 19, 2025, that it had authorized the export of advanced American semiconductor chips to HUMAIN of Saudi Arabia and G42 of the United Arab Emirates. The approval enables both companies to purchase up to 35,000 Blackwell chips (GB300s). This sale is a core component of a broader “Compute Diplomacy” approach under the second administration of President Donald J. Trump, which was solidified following his May 2025 visit to the Gulf, where a series of multibillion-dollar artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure agreements were signed.
From a US military build-up in the region to Trump’s growing unpopularity at home, several factors could influence his decision on whether or not to attack.
Ankara’s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria
Whether the truce between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces holds or collapses will have major implications for neighboring Turkey, which has long-standing interests in Syria, but recent developments already point to a win for Ankara.
The question facing international oil companies is not whether Libya has oil and gas to develop. It does. The question is whether the country’s current political, economic, and security conditions allow that potential to be converted into reliable returns — and whether near-term changes could alter that calculation.
