May 4, 1999, was the original target date for a final status agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, meant to mark the end of the five-year transition period outlined in the Oslo Accords. Instead, the 25 years that have passed since have seen a fractured peace process defined by minimal progress, violence, separation, and occupation, alongside persistent efforts to undermine the feasibility of a two-state solution. Throughout this time, various Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations — often supported by international actors — have nonetheless tried to foster dialogue, protect human rights, and propose solutions for peace. However, while many of these organizations have demonstrated resilience in the face of crises and pressures, they have often struggled for relevance and political influence.

The devastating conflict that erupted on Oct. 7, 2023, dealt a near-fatal blow to these cooperative efforts, leaving both sides feeling as though they have returned to square one, unable to present a vision for a future of peaceful coexistence. The unprecedented violence and severity of the recent war have profoundly altered the consciousness of both Israelis and Palestinians, reinforcing a sense of existential struggle. Efforts to engage the public must contend with a hardening of positions and sentiment. On the one hand, polling suggests more than two-thirds of Palestinians (71%) believe that Hamas’ decision to launch the Oct. 7 offensive was justified. On the other hand, surveys indicate only 11% of Israelis believe that their government does not do enough to protect civilians in Gaza, while 81% support continuing the conflict. Mistrust between the two sides has reached alarming levels, with both communities attributing maximalist and genocidal intentions to the other, and support for a two-state solution languishes at around 30%.

The need for a civil society comeback

For pro-peace civil society organizations to make a positive impact in the wake of this grim reality, they should reassess what conflict transformation means for Israelis and Palestinians, build new narratives, engage new actors, and renew their focus on the political arena, to create conditions that are more favorable to peace.

Mobilizing political support for diplomacy and a peaceful transition is daunting. The deadly Oct. 7 Hamas attack has redefined the conflict as an existential struggle or a zero-sum game, aligning with the current Israeli government’s ideology of perpetual conflict and preventing any discussions about a "day after." Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has boasted of his success in thwarting efforts to establish a Palestinian state for decades, a stance that has not been challenged by the weakened Israeli opposition. Israel’s traditional pro-peace and left-leaning parties — Labor and Meretz — are in decline, currently holding only four seats in the parliament (compared to 13 following the previous elections, in 2021, and 56 in 1992).

Over the years, peacebuilders, activists, think tankers, human rights defenders, grassroots organizers, academics, and faith leaders have made significant efforts to promote a two-state solution, challenge the entrenchment of occupation, and educate future generations. Some argue that, as grim as the current situation might seem, it may offer opportunities for renewal, given the revived national and international focus on a conflict that has long been neglected. For such opportunities to be realized, it is crucial to accept that past paradigms have been shattered and to deal with discredited assumptions. Both Israeli and Palestinian civil societies need to accept that they have underestimated key challenges, among them the brutality of Hamas, the persistence of the Israeli far right, the belief in the irreversibility of facts on the ground, the fluctuating interest of the international community, and the capacity of those living under constant conflict to either turn a blind eye or succumb to despair.

Moving forward

It is often unclear whether politicians lead public opinion or vice versa. Elected officials are expected to represent the will of the people, but they also shape public perception through their decisions and actions. This dynamic interplay is crucial in driving policy and governance, meaning that neither aspect can be neglected. The following recommendations suggest a path forward for Israeli civil society to have an effective impact on both public opinion and politics.

Re-compassing

There is a pressing need to establish new parameters for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and to build a consensus around them. Political imagination will be essential to refreshing existing peace plans and engaging new actors, particularly the younger generation that holds more extreme-right positions, disillusioned by its own leadership and shifting between hopes of immigration and intentions of revenge. This approach must move beyond the past tendencies of the stronger party in the conflict to impose peace as a means to maintain the status quo. To that end, the peace rally held in Tel Aviv in July 2024 symbolizes a significant shift in realizing that any solution must be guided by principles of equal partnership, security, and freedom for all, encompassing both the framework for resolving conflicts and the pathways to achieving it. This should be the basis for future people-to-people Israeli-Palestinian initiatives, particularly Track II efforts, which should remain open to examining diverse solutions. Israelis would welcome Palestinian efforts to demonstrate their willingness to pursue self-determination through non-violent means, while Palestinians will look for a change of government in Israel as a sign of a different course of action.

Going regional

The multifront war following the Oct. 7 attack has demonstrated that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict extends beyond the area between the river and the sea, revealing previously obscured regional dynamics. On one side lies the Axis of Resistance, including Iran and its proxies; on the other, countries that engage with Israel, with or without official diplomatic ties, some of which (including Saudi Arabia and Jordan) have played an active role in countering Iranian aggression against Israel throughout 2024.

On the sidelines of the 2024 United Nations General Assembly, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi stated that Jordan and other Arab and Muslim countries would guarantee Israel’s security — but only if Israel takes steps toward establishing a Palestinian state. This sentiment was echoed by Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, who asserted that Palestinian statehood must be a prerequisite for peace. The Saudi position is in line with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and with a recent effort also led by Arab countries to establish a global alliance for the implementation of the two-state solution.

It is increasingly clear that a stable and secure future depends on a multinational alliance determined to take on the regime in Iran and turn the Palestinian issue from a driver of conflict into an engine of peace. To achieve this, more funding and diplomatic support should be directed toward policy-oriented regional frameworks and collaborations, from civil society engagement to official processes. Israeli-Palestinian civil society dialogue becomes easier to carry out when conducted under a broader regional umbrella, which will be given legitimacy by Palestinian participation. Additionally, it is vital to inform the public about how regional cooperative agendas address immediate security concerns, provide tangible economic benefits, and build a foundation for long-term peace and mutual understanding.

Developing new narratives

Prior to Oct. 7, Netanyahu’s conflict-management approach successfully contained the Palestinian issue, resulting in a notable lack of discourse within Israel regarding peace with the Palestinians, while the Israeli media showed little interest in exploring the root causes of the conflict or challenging prevailing narratives. There is now a crucial opportunity to construct and advance new narratives that can persuade the public that Israel's security and identity interests can be achieved by making progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front as part of a broader regional framework. Campaigns should focus on leveraging Israel’s aspirations to emerge stronger from the current crisis and enhance its overall security, and make the case that resolving conflicts — rather than prolonging wars — is the best way to do that.

Linking pro-democracy and pro-peace activism 

Israel’s ongoing crisis of leadership — evident in its five election cycles between 2019 and 2022 — has sparked significant political engagement, polarized around pro- and anti-Netanyahu factions. In the wake of Oct. 7, the same infrastructure established to protest Netanyahu’s far-right government and its judicial overhaul attempt was reinvigorated to address various needs arising from the war. However, as the conflict in Gaza drags on, a growing number of people are concluding that Netanyahu's government prioritizes prolonging the fighting over rescuing the Israeli hostages still held by Hamas. For this majority of Israelis, Netanyahu and his coalition symbolize corruption and a shift away from liberal democracy toward a Jewish theocracy. This presents a unique opportunity to connect the struggle for democracy with opposition to annexation and settlement expansion as well as advocacy for peace. However, there is a risk that injecting an agenda that goes beyond opposition to Netanyahu's leadership may distract or divide an otherwise coalesced movement. To mitigate this risk, the choice between two alternatives for Israel's future needs to be articulated clearly as a choice between democracy and autocracy, regional agreements or perpetual war, the broad interest of the people or the narrow interest of the leader, and so on.

Fostering Arab-Jewish cooperation as a political path forward

Oct. 7 has profoundly affected the fabric of life between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Research indicates that Jewish sentiment toward Arabs has radicalized significantly, a shift evident in workplaces, universities, and hospitals. However, civil society mobilization has effectively prevented the situation from deteriorating into violent conflict, proving the essential value of Arab-Jewish cooperation in building an inclusive foundation for shared living.

The leadership of the Palestinian citizens of Israel has increasingly adopted a strategy of “influencing from within,” reflecting their public’s interest in being part of the decision-making process. With Arab citizens constituting around 15% of the Israeli electorate, they have the potential to act as catalysts for political change, in contrast to far-right efforts to suppress their vote. Investing in Arab-Jewish civil society cooperation within Israel and in a political coalition that includes Arab representation is therefore essential for building an inclusive foundation for future peace initiatives. Such a foundation will also prove instrumental in furthering regional normalization. The realization of this potential depends heavily on a shift in relations between Jewish and Arab citizens, overcoming barriers of fear and racism to ensure dignity and equality for Arab citizens, and making their safety a national priority.

Carrying out intra-national work to unlock non-negotiables

It has never been clearer that efforts to advance peace are being overshadowed by the actions of maximalist groups in both Israeli and Palestinian societies. These groups cannot be ignored while waiting for better leadership to emerge. It is essential to acknowledge that many Israeli and Palestinian communities view any compromise over the Holy Land as a compromise over their fundamental needs or beliefs, which they consider non-negotiable. For these influential stakeholders — who are capable of obstructing negotiations — reaching an agreement becomes nearly impossible. Therefore, peace activities within both societies must prioritize unlocking these non-negotiables to facilitate transactional diplomacy. Engaging community leaders from a wide range of intra-group perspectives is critical, as is facilitating a process where they have to propose and agree on compromises that they can live with. While this may necessitate temporarily setting aside comprehensive resolutions, and opting for a longer process, it could lay the groundwork for future agreements.

Engaging the United States to make a meaningful contribution

US support for the peace process has evolved from shuttle diplomacy and peace summits to robust financial backing for civil society initiatives. The Middle East Peace and Prosperity Act (MEPPA), enacted by Congress in 2020, is set to provide $250 million to “advance peaceful co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians to enable a sustainable two-state solution.” However, donors — including the US — now face a dilemma: on the one hand, the prolonged escalatory situation makes coexistence efforts seem detached from reality; on the other hand, the need for pathways to non-violent interaction, rehabilitation, and healing is undeniable, though quick wins remain unlikely.

A recent report by Amal-Tikva, a Jerusalem-based non-governmental organization (NGO) that works to strengthen the capacities of the Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding landscape, examined the field's situation post-Oct. 7. It suggests that “peacebuilding efforts should shift the global discourse on the conflict from negotiations and armistice agreements to long-term processes where warring societies adopt nonviolence as a means to achieve their national goals.” In the wake of this, the US and other key donors should hold NGOs to a higher standard of monitoring and evaluation, focusing on impact-driven results grounded in a sound theory of change.

Simultaneously, US actors working to advance the two-state solution should enhance streamlined coordination between civil society initiatives — whether funded through MEPPA or not — and relevant diplomatic efforts. Such coordination will not only enhance the effectiveness of NGOs, encouraging more strategic approaches, but also better position the US administration to make a meaningful impact on the region.

 

Yael Patir was the former Chief of Staff to Israel's Minister for Regional Cooperation, J Street Israel Director, and Israel Co-Director of the Palestinian Israeli Peace NGO Forum.

Photo by Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu via Getty Images


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