As the Trump administration pushes to expand the Abraham Accords in the Middle East and into the Caucasus and Central Asia, it overlooks a dramatic shift in perception across the Arab and Muslim world. Where once Israel might have been viewed as David battling a Goliath-like Arab world, today the roles appear reversed. Israel, empowered by unchecked military might and unwavering US support, is increasingly seen not just as a regional power but as a US-backed regional hegemon. For Gulf Arab states, this transformation presents a dilemma: Can a Goliath be a partner in peace?
The post-Oct. 7 military campaigns — spanning Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and culminating in Israel's historic direct strike on Iran — have led many Gulf officials to conclude that Israel no longer seeks mere deterrence, but rather dominance. In their view, Israel has gone from acting like a status quo power in the Middle East to using its military might to overturn the regional order. If the Abraham Accords were in part about creating a unified front among status quo powers against the threat of a revisionist Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance,” key variables in that equation have now changed. The Iranian threat has been greatly diminished while Israel presents a new challenge of its own to regional stability, raising fundamental questions about the accords.
The Israeli government’s actions, including a July 2024 Knesset resolution rejecting any future Palestinian state and a July 2025 rejection of a Saudi-French proposal for a two-state solution that came out of a United Nations conference, cement the impression of a maximalist vision. With over 60,000 Palestinians killed since the Gaza war began, and Gulf cities narrowly spared fallout from the Israel-Iran 12-day war, the perception is growing that Israel is prepared to use force not just to defend itself, but to pursue the strategic transformation of the region.
This transformation goes well beyond the battlefield. Israel’s ability to defy international pressure from both the US and the UN without much of a consequence signals a deeper political shift. Gulf observers note that not even Washington could force Israel to end hostilities, secure hostage releases, or avoid escalation with Iran. In June 2025, Israel launched its attack on Iranian soil just days before a new round of US-Iran nuclear talks were set to begin — and despite US objections. The US then struck Iranian nuclear sites itself to prevent further escalation. Taken together, these events shattered long-standing assumptions about American deterrence and Israeli restraint.
Aggression replacing accord
Against this backdrop, Gulf leaders are reassessing the Abraham Accords. Originally pitched as a framework for promoting peace and stability, the accords now risk legitimizing Israeli regional supremacy. This is particularly concerning for Saudi Arabia, which had symbolically supported the original accords by opening its airspace to Israeli flights. Today, Riyadh insists on a two-state solution as the only pathway to normalization, something Israel openly rejects.
Meanwhile, efforts to bring Muslim-majority states like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan into the Abraham Accords are less about forging new peace deals and more about signaling US leadership and consolidating regional alignment against Iran and Russia. Both countries have maintained diplomatic ties with Israel for decades, but that has not shielded them from public backlash. In Azerbaijan, protests during the Gaza war underscored the limits of normalization in the absence of justice for Palestinians. This is not 2020. Today, pro-Palestinian sentiment runs deeper and is more widespread across Arab and Muslim societies.
The core concern for Gulf states is that Israel’s “long-arm doctrine” — preemptively striking adversaries across multiple theaters — is no longer viewed as purely defensive, but as a strategy aimed at regional fragmentation. In Iran, this has meant attacks not just on military infrastructure but also on prisons and paramilitary bases as well as efforts to stir up unrest in minority regions like Khuzestan, Baluchestan, and the Kurdish areas. A similar pattern has already emerged in Syria, where Israel has justified operations in Druze-majority areas under the banner of protecting minorities. Gulf leaders fear that if this doctrine becomes normalized, it could eventually be applied to other fragile states — even to Iraq or Saudi Arabia itself.
This growing fear — that Israel is becoming a regional Goliath — raises difficult questions. Should Arab states continue to back a framework that enables this behavior? Or should they reshape it to reflect regional priorities: diplomacy, de-escalation, and inclusivity?
Some Gulf states, like Qatar and Oman, have already repositioned themselves as mediators between Iran and the West. Others, like Saudi Arabia, are pursuing a cautious middle path: keeping channels with Israel open while reviving ties with Iran and emphasizing internal state-building. This includes efforts to stabilize Iraq, prevent Syria’s collapse, and reengage Yemen’s Houthis. The goal is regional balance, not domination.
The 12-day war reinforced this shift. Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, and Iran’s retaliatory strikes on al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, shook Gulf confidence in American protection. Combined with President Donald Trump’s earlier failure to respond to the 2019 attacks on key Saudi oil installations, Gulf monarchies now understand that US guarantees are conditional, and that unchecked Israeli militarism can bring catastrophe to their doorstep.
Even Iran may be evolving. Since the 12-day war, Tehran has restructured its national security apparatus, forming a new Defense Council led by President Masoud Pezeshkian and centrists like Ali Larijani. Iran’s postwar messaging has emphasized diplomacy, including overtures to Pakistan and BRICS member states. Gulf officials increasingly view Iran as behaving more like David than Goliath.
Realism calls for peacemakers
In this light, Gulf states must rethink what a viable regional order looks like. The Abraham Accords cannot be expanded without a shift in Israeli behavior. Peace will not come from dominance, but from cooperation. That requires Israel to act like a citizen of the region, not an occupying power.
This is not appeasement. It is realism. If the Gulf states are to create sustainable peace, they must double down on the core principles of the Abraham Accords: investing in statehood, justice, and mutual recognition. A reimagined framework that includes both Israel and Iran, based on non-aggression, may be the only viable path forward.
In an increasingly multipolar world, a region free of Goliaths is not a utopia — it is a strategic necessity. But true stability will not come from the mere absence of hegemons. Without a regional balance of power, the resulting vacuum would invite new external Goliaths to compete for dominance, bringing their own forms of disorder. The challenge, then, is not to wish away power, but to manage it — to build a regional order rooted in restraint, reciprocity, and sovereignty.
Mohammed Baharoon is the Director General of the Dubai Public Policy Research Center (b’huth) in Dubai, UAE.
Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC.
Photo by Abir Sultan/Pool/AFP via Getty Images
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