This article was originally posted on Charles Duelfer's blog.

A possible path ahead is to take advantage of the post-election negotiations and configure a leadership that accommodates Sunni interests. This would by necessity mean someone other than Maliki becoming prime minister.

Someone (possibly an American, but I doubt we are that knowledgeable, coordinated, or competent) needs to talk with key Sunni tribal leaders and former Army leaders—to include former Ba'thists. Just finding interlocutors who can represent and make commitments for those with legitimate interests will be difficult.

Maybe a UN representative could do this, but it would be better (essential) if such discussions were completely confidential. Bear in mind that anyone representing the Sunni voices will be at risk of assassination from ISIS. The vast majority of Iraqi Sunnis are secular (recall the Ba'thists and the Army under the former regime were strictly secular). The radical Islamists of ISIS will know they are small in number and, while ruthless, they can be crushed by the other Sunnis when the time is right.

Maliki needs to know that the United States will not support him as prime minister and the new government must accommodate Sunni interests in a material way. Stitching something together will be extraordinarily difficult. The last thing we should do is to give more military support to Maliki at this point. We would be seen as supporting the Shi'i side in what is becoming a sectarian war.

Somebody needs to talk to Sunni leaders and fast. At a minimum, they need to know that the United States will not oppose them (and indeed should support them) so long as their goals are limited and realistic. They need to know that the United States does not support Maliki, but does support a balance of power between Sunni and Shi'i groups.

The alternative to this path is to let the conflict play out. That will be costly, unpredictable, and end with a divided Iraq. Iran will be supporting the Shi'a in the south and others will back Sunni groups. Baghdad could look like Beirut in the 70s, or worse.

We may wind up there anyway.

 

The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.