More than a year has passed since the horrific attacks that took the lives of 1,200 innocent Israeli citizens on Oct. 7, 2023, a devastating day that led to many more devastating days in Gaza, where tens of thousands of innocent people have died and countless more have experienced suffering on an industrial scale. All hopes that the war might soon wind down are fading, as the conflict has expanded regionally and internationally and attention has been diverted to a hot cease-fire in Lebanon and the dramatic events unfolding in Syria.
This war has illustrated the precarious and unhealthy state of Arab-Israeli relations. It has also shown that no single leader has the power or can muster the political will needed to achieve peace. The resolution of this conflict will require a new dynamic of collective leadership that can look beyond the present moment to transform this disastrous situation into an opportunity to advance peace, stability, and security. Saudi Arabia is a key actor that can help support a credible path to peace, but it cannot do it alone. In order to bridge the gap between the current reality on the ground and the implementation of a two-state solution, all stakeholders need to do their part. The Saudis have taken an important step by establishing and leading a global alliance devoted to implementing the two-state solution.
What Saudi Arabia has done is create a new focal point and generate momentum upon which other states can gradually build. Notably, the alliance held its first meeting in Riyadh, lending a great deal of symbolic authority to this push for peace. With that said, the world has been here before. There have been peace initiatives and “pushes” toward resolution before, but none has reached the desired end goal. While there are many reasons for this, one is a lack of sustained effort to maintain the momentum moving in the direction of a two-state solution. This then raises the question of how a coalition supporting the establishment a two-state solution or any other peace process can be sustained — what is missing? One element that may be absent is diversification within the processes leading to the two-state solution.
One of the main characteristics of Saudi Arabian thought on economic and foreign policy development is calculated diversification. In line with this broader approach, there should be two components to a diversified peace process: resequencing peace before normalization and a movement toward regional integration.
Fusing peace and normalization
The most significant support the Saudis are giving the Palestinians currently is in what they are not doing, which is normalizing relations with Israel. Immediately prior to the events of Oct. 7, the Saudi government seemed on the verge of entering into a normalization agreement with Israel brokered by the United States. In exchange for this potentially ground-breaking change in policy, the Saudis would refrain from engaging with US strategic competitors (namely China), the US would not prevent the development of a Saudi domestic nuclear energy program, and Israel would not deny the possibility of the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state — a complicated construct that was not particularly popular among Palestinians. Hamas’ Oct. 7 attacks and the ensuing Israeli reprisals on Gaza halted the discussions, and the Saudis increased their demands for normalization from a “credible pathway” toward a two-state solution to clear demands for “irreversible steps” that would result in the “recognition of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.”
As the Israeli attacks on Gaza intensified, and Yemen, Iran, and Lebanon were drawn into the conflict, threatening a regional conflagration, Saudi Arabia’s position hardened. The language of Saudi demands remained somewhat malleable, however, in line with its broader approach to relations with Israel, which has enabled the kingdom to move closer to an agreement that achieves its domestic priorities while also distancing itself from an unpopular alignment with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing government. Within the context of the US elections and an expanding regional war, the Saudis continued to insist that there would be no normalization with Israel until there is a Palestinian state.
The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, reiterated Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s public support for the Palestinians in an October 2024 opinion piece in The Financial Times, in which he called for an immediate cease-fire, an end to the insecurity and suffering on both sides, and a return to serious efforts to achieve a just solution to the conflict. The chief Saudi diplomat reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the proposition that “Palestinian statehood is a prerequisite for peace, rather than its byproduct. This is the only path that can lead us out of this cycle of violence and into a future where both Israelis and Palestinians can live in peace, with security and mutual respect.”
Prior to the events of Oct. 7, the notions of peace and normalization held by each side were far apart, and the Saudi attempt to straddle the divide in pursuit of its own agenda without securing adequate guarantees for the Palestinian position doomed the negotiations to failure. Riyadh’s subsequent return to principle and renewed commitment to Palestinian statehood have garnered national and regional praise. Hashtags like “no relations without a state” and “Saudi Arabia is triumphing for Palestine” have made the rounds on Saudi social media. Given the strong popular support for the Palestinians at home and throughout the region, Saudi officials are unlikely to reverse their position on the issue any time soon.
That said, one can expect that there will be a strong discursive effort to prove otherwise. For instance, reports of a Saudi-Israeli “breakthrough” recently made the rounds once again. However, immediately, Saudi officials tacitly sought to shoot down the story, which was additionally denied by the Israeli prime minister’s office, particularly due to the reporting’s allusions to a vague ostensible agreement regarding a two-state-solution. More such sensational rhetoric is likely in the coming years. This speaks to the need to for those pushing for a two-state solution to be more vocal and invest in a sustained effort to keep the discourse constructive and aimed at finding a solution.
It is now imperative for the Saudi analytical community to flesh out what “credible” and “irreversible” steps toward a two-state solution would look like. Equally, Saudi experts must not just speak about Israel but speak directly to Israelis, and to clearly communicate Riyadh’s message about the unbreakable link between peace and a Palestinian state.
Palestinian regional integration
Saudi Arabia is in a position to facilitate not only the creation of a peace framework but also its implementation. This would involve a process of linking Palestinian requirements with regional initiatives that would help integrate Palestine into the wider global community.
The Saudis know that the lack of a two-state solution resulting in a Palestinian state where Palestinians can live in dignity is detrimental to the security of the region. The Saudis see a Palestinian state not only as a right but as a necessity, the lack of which will harm real regional stability and prosperity — conditions that are crucial for Saudi Arabia to realize its own ambitions for its diversification process. As Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud said nearly a year ago, “we need stability and only stability will come through resolving the Palestinian issue.”
This is where Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification and its desire for regional stability can be leveraged in the service of diversifying the peace process to support a two-state-solution. A great deal of attention has been paid to the potential for Israeli integration into the region, but nowhere near as much attention has been paid to Palestinian integration.
If the Saudi ruling elite can diversify the kingdom’s own economy, strategic relations, and military cooperation, there should be no reason why Saudi support for the Palestinian issue could not similarly be diversified. In Riyadh, diversification is central to Saudi Vision 2030, an overarching framework designed to transition the country from an oil-centric economy into a multifaceted, diversified, and self-sustaining economic powerhouse. The Saudis, and their reform-minded Gulf neighbors, know they cannot achieve these ambitious goals without regional stability. At the 2024 World Economic Forum in Riyadh, the Saudi Minister of Finance Mohamed al-Jadaan said, “Today, to me, geopolitical risks are possibly the number one risk as you look at the global economy … policymakers will need to be very agile in dealing with this,” adding, “the region needs stability.”
To that end, Saudi Arabia’s investment in a more stable and integrated region is precisely the opportunity that a future Palestinian economic vision requires. The Saudi ruling elite can help build a Palestinian economic vision — a Vision 2035 for example — that acts as an economic horizon within a broader political framework linking Saudi domestic objectives to realistic Palestinian development goals and Israeli concessions to credible pathways for success. This would build confidence within the Saudi ruling elite that Palestinian projects are forward looking. The current Saudi leadership is of a generation where notions of business and tech investment are more appealing than traditional slogans. This is why there ought to be a re-articulation of support for Palestinian objectives that resonates with Saudi officials and others in the region.
If this reframing of efforts is successful, the resulting Saudi assistance could be instrumental in strengthening institutions needed for Palestinian state building, the provision of skills training, adoption of anti-corruption measures, and linkage of Palestinian projects with regional and international initiatives. In turn, this diversification of support for Palestinian aspirations will contribute to the building blocks of the two-state solution. Prince Turki Al-Faisal, a former Saudi spy chief who often reflects the kingdom’s official discourse, indicated in a recent interview that such an approach is not out of the question. When asked what Saudi Arabia could contribute to advance the Palestinian cause, the prince replied, “not just [Saudi] money, but technical knowhow.”
The Saudi diversification of support for Palestine need not only be in linking Saudi businesses together with their Palestinian counterparts but also institutes to institutes, initiatives to initiatives, and people to people. This will help Palestinians integrate with the region and do the heavy lifting of a regional approach to the two-state solution. And importantly, this step need not wait for an “acceptable” Palestinian political elite; rather it would entail a process of investing in a Palestinian civil society and business elite, which could then produce new political realities for the future and capitalize on a diversification of interlocutors within Palestine. The Saudis can amplify this diversification and internationalize the process by spearheading an Arab and Islamic donor conference where potential investors can support current and future initiatives to boost Palestinian economic agency. Indeed, this could serve as a natural next step, following on from the Global Alliance for Implementation of the Two-State Solution conference the Saudi government hosted in Riyadh in late October.
Conclusion
The road to a two-state solution has never been easy. The ongoing war in Gaza, the subsequent psychological trauma, and a growing sense of extremism all indicate turbulent times ahead. Even the announced appointments of new Israeli and American ambassadors to each other’s capitals signify that annexation of Palestinian lands by Israel may be on the horizon. Notwithstanding the obstacles ahead, representatives of the pro-two-state-solution community — whether Arabs, Israelis, or others — must vocalize and harmonize their voices.
A new discourse is needed to encourage all stakeholders to engage in this peace process by both addressing their concerns and elucidating incentives. Advocates for an independent Palestine ought to highlight the devastating consequences that failure to achieve peace will bring, including the spillovers and irreversible damage such a scenario will have on the region. At the same time, the discourse should underscore that diversifying the peace process and integrating the Palestinians into the broader Middle East can generate important opportunities for all sides. While the incoming Trump administration may be welcomed by the extreme-right Netanyahu cabinet, the US president-elect is preoccupied with peace to do business. Diversifying the peace process and Palestinian regional integration, therefore, would not be antithetical to Donald Trump’s preferred vision for the Middle East. That is precisely why Saudi Arabia and other proponents of a two-state-solution need to be more proactive about constructively influencing and steering the discourse to incentive all of the stakeholders to pursue this solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Dr. Aziz Alghashian is a Saudi researcher who focuses on Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Israel and Arab-Israeli relations more broadly.
Photo by FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP via Getty Images
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