US disengagement and new regional security dynamics in Afghanistan’s neighborhood

Afghanistan’s neighborhood is in the midst of a consequential restructuring of its security architecture. Perhaps unsurprisingly, key regional actors Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and China have been continuing to adjust their defense plans and security partnerships to meet the growing threats posed by domestic and cross-border terrorism. But at the same time, these four countries have also been looking for new ways to fill the vacuum in southern Asia left by the United States military’s departure from Afghanistan and the sharply scaled-back American political influence throughout the region. These considerations have prompted Islamabad, Kabul, Tehran, and Beijing to reassess their mutual relations as well as their ties with external powers. Evidence of this emerging regional dynamic can be seen in Chinese efforts to draw the area’s countries into its security and economic orbit as well as in Iran’s search for strategic partners to the east to help it weather its multifaceted challenges. The shifts in the regional landscape are also being shaped around an ideologically driven, insecure, and terrorist-hosting Afghanistan that covets international respectability, and a politically embattled Pakistan beset with militant Islamic extremists it knows it cannot quell alone. Meanwhile, the US, with its geostrategic priorities elsewhere, has largely acted as a bystander to these consequential regional developments. By withdrawing from Afghanistan, the US had hoped to put behind it two decades of deep, ultimately failed engagement with the region; yet it may find that by continuing this policy of benign neglect it is placing American security increasingly at risk.

Mounting security challenges draw neighbors closer

With the pullout of American and allied forces and the subsequent loss of the US’s intelligence sources in Afghanistan after the Taliban retook power there, the principal responsibility for addressing regional terrorism has fallen mainly on Pakistan. In mid-June 2024, the Pakistan Army launched Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability), the latest in a series of military campaigns to clear the country’s border areas of terrorists. But notably, in describing the Pakistani operation, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s office for the first time mentioned a multilateral component: “In the politico-diplomatic domain, efforts will be intensified to curtail the operational space for terrorists through regional cooperation.” The statement certainly referred to dealing with terrorist safe havens in neighboring Afghanistan; but it also seemed to call for closer coordination with regional countries that shared Pakistan’s security concerns, namely China and Iran. Greatly strengthened trilateral security cooperation with China and Iran, in particular, not only aligns with Pakistan’s revised 2024 basic counterterrorism directive, its National Action Plan, but additionally complements China’s Global Security Initiative and Iran’s Look East Policy.

Heightened terrorist activity along Pakistan’s western borders with Afghanistan and Iran is pushing Islamabad to try to overcome earlier obstacles to working more seamlessly with its neighbors in the security space. Afghanistan’s provision of sanctuary to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists remains a serious bone of contention, but Pakistan and Iran have also had their differences over how to deal with transborder terrorists. The 560-mile-long porous border between Iran and Pakistan has become a hot spot for terrorist activity in recent years, and the security forces of both countries have found themselves targeted by Baloch separatists. Likewise, Sunni extremists in Jaish al-Adl along with Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) have presented Pakistan and Iran with similar security challenges. Unlike with Afghanistan, however, differences with Iran should be easier to resolve because of their shared experiences. And indeed, recognizing their comparable situations in the evolving regional threat landscape, Iran and Pakistan have recently pursued a more cooperative security partnership. Collaboration is currently issue-specific, focusing on areas like the protection of Chinese workers in Pakistan from terrorists, but Iran has left open the possibility of moving beyond joint counterterrorism efforts — where their immediate interests are most aligned — to broader defense cooperation.

In a significant step in that direction, Iran’s chief of the General Staff, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, last month visited Pakistan, where he met with Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir and President Asif Ali Zardari. During discussions with Munir, Bagheri proposed enhanced defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and joint military production, alongside counterterrorism initiatives. He also suggested joint military drills, cross-border patrols, and naval exercises, following on from Iran’s recent participation in Pakistan’s Aman-25 multinational naval drills. Furthermore, Pakistan and Iran are expected to launch joint counterterrorism operations soon, targeting Baloch separatists and ISKP militants.

In 2023, Pakistan, China, and Iran held their first trilateral meeting on counterterrorism and security at the inter-agency level, where they agreed to institutionalize their security cooperation. While Beijing has also facilitated parallel consultations between Islamabad and Kabul on security and counterterrorism, these efforts have not been as successful, as Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to view each other as threats. China, which had played a neutral role as a mediator between the two neighbors, has now taken Pakistan’s side in reiterating the call for the Taliban to fulfill its counterterrorism commitments and prevent militants from using Afghan territory as a sanctuary. This shift was reflected in a joint declaration issued after a recent meeting in Beijing between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Pakistani President Zardari.

A tighter security partnership among China, Iran, and Pakistan may enhance counterterrorism efforts. However, it also would carry risks, particularly for Pakistan. Over the decades, Pakistan has performed a careful balancing act between global rivals China and the United States as well as between regional adversaries Saudi Arabia and Iran. Its decision to establish new security ties with Iran could upset this precarious balance, forcing Pakistan to make difficult diplomatic trade-offs and take sides in conflicts it would rather avoid. Islamabad’s growing security cooperation with Tehran could directly contribute to strengthening Iran’s defense capabilities, for example, thus potentially emboldening the Islamic Republic in pursuit of its contentious regional and global ambitions that have put it at odds with the United States and the wider West. Consequently, deeper military collaboration with Iran could create a growing perception in Washington and other Western capitals that Islamabad is an Iranian ally, exposing Pakistan to potential diplomatic isolation and sanctions and further complicating its already delicate foreign policy balancing efforts. Combined with deeper security ties with China, Pakistan’s cooperation with Iran could — given longstanding American policy — seriously strain its ability to maintain amicable relations with the US, which serves as the major market for the South Asian country’s exports, a traditional source of development assistance, and supplier to Pakistan’s military.

Meanwhile, China and Iran are each also looking beyond Pakistan and have begun trying to develop strategic-level cooperation with Afghanistan. By ignoring such issues as government inclusiveness and women’s rights — which remain key obstacles to Kabul’s diplomatic normalization with the West — both Tehran and Beijing are actively working to integrate Afghanistan into the regional security architecture as seamlessly as possible. Recently, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei directed his regime to pursue “maximum engagement” with Afghanistan. This policy follows Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to the Afghan capital, where he emphasized that Iran’s security is closely tied to the stability of Afghanistan. Araghchi proposed joint counterterrorism efforts and intelligence sharing, and he described the engagement as the start of a “new chapter” in bilateral relations. A similar sentiment was echoed by the Chinese ambassador to Kabul, Zhao Xing, in an opinion piece published by an English-language Afghan newspaper, in which he asserted that China and Afghanistan have now entered a new phase of relations. Zhao emphasized China’s interest in Afghanistan joining its Global Security Initiative, stating at a press conference in Kabul, “China is committed to working with Afghanistan to combat terrorism decisively, ensuring collective security, and fostering a peaceful and stable regional environment.” To encourage Afghan cooperation, Beijing has reaffirmed its “Three Respects” and “Three Nevers” policy as the foundation of its relations with Kabul. More explicitly, this policy underscores China’s purported respect for Afghanistan’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity while committing to the idea that it will never interfere in Afghan internal affairs, seek self-interested gains, or pursue “spheres of influence” in the country.

China’s and Iran’s bilateral engagements with Afghanistan could potentially evolve into trilateral cooperation, given the geostrategic interests both countries have in Afghanistan. This is particularly important because Beijing and Tehran’s 25-year bilateral strategic cooperation agreement depends on stabilizing Afghanistan so that it becomes a reliable land corridor connecting Iran and China. Iran has already proposed the construction of an Iran-Afghanistan-China railway route to enhance trade and regional connectivity, although this would depend on first addressing cross-border security. Last year, reaffirming Iran’s commitment to the abovementioned 25-year agreement, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian vowed to strengthen ties with China and Russia to counter what he described as US-led “totalitarianism” and “unilateralism” in the international arena. 

Vacuum attracts alternatives at the expense of US interests

Globally directed terrorism has deep roots in southern Asia, where Washington’s national security concerns are mainly focused on blocking its export. However, America’s significantly smaller footprint after its withdrawal from Afghanistan, together with China and Iran’s increasingly assertive roles as security players, has sharply diminished US leverage in the region. This comes at a time when Washington finds itself ever more reliant on regional actors for counterterrorism efforts. These shifts not only weaken Washington’s ability to collect intelligence and mount counterterrorism operations but have also paved the way for alternative security frameworks that exclude the US and may complicate its diplomatic and military strategies. President Donald Trump’s second administration will not simply be able to dismiss the makings of a new security alliance in southern Asia, encouraged by China’s expanding links in the region. Nor, like previous American administrations, is it able to ignore China’s leadership, in partnership with Russia, of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). A Eurasian political, economic, and security body, the SCO was formed in rivalry with the West’s various institutions in 2002. It has now enlarged to 10 member countries, including Pakistan and Iran, admitted in 2017 and 2023, respectively, and with Afghanistan given observer status. The emergent Chinese-Pakistani-Iranian security alliance folds nicely into the ambitious agenda of a growing but increasingly internally divided SCO.

It is difficult to predict how a new US administration will address these changing geostrategic realities. Without a carefully recalibrated high-level approach, Washington risks losing further influence in a region that is rapidly shifting under China’s strategic leadership. Trump’s “peace through strength” doctrine, together with its companion “America First” agenda, forms the foundation of his foreign policy and national security ambitions; yet its full scope and precise implications are still unclear. The prevailing interpretation of the Trump doctrine is that it seeks to strengthen the US global posture through hard power and achieve peace by preventing or ending conflicts. Trump’s intention of downgrading soft power as an instrument of foreign policy was made clear by his directive pausing for 90 days all US-funded foreign assistance programs and placing them under review to ensure their alignment with an agenda designed to make “America safer, stronger, and more prosperous.” US humanitarian aid, development assistance, and refugee settlement policies are almost certainly going to come under that knife, which would have a significant impact on Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as influence their security calculations.

Islamabad and Kabul initially reacted to the strong rhetoric and calculated threats in the early days of the Trump administration by extending their hands in welcome, in hopes of steering US policy in ways more favorable to their own interests rather than out of any particular alignment with the America First vision. At the same time, their willingness to cooperate with Washington on common goals is tempered by a wariness of US commitments given Trump’s reputation for withdrawing unpredictably from agreements. As a result, Pakistan and Afghanistan are increasingly turning to other partners with whom they can pursue their strategic interests as well as address regional challenges more effectively, particularly in the counterterrorism domain.

US should define its interests, align tactics

The emerging security order in the area bounded by Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and China is above all driven by a widely shared fear of transnational radical Islamic terrorism and insurgency. It has at its fulcrum an Afghanistan that either cannot or dares not try to contain or eliminate terrorist organizations operating from within the country. However displeased the neighboring states may be with certain Taliban regime policies, they nevertheless stand in general agreement that a stable, peaceful, and reasonably effective Kabul government is necessary to serve their bilateral and collective political and economic interests. This has led many countries to confer de facto political recognition and seek to integrate strategically located Afghanistan into their regional development plans. Moreover, coming years may see Afghanistan along with Pakistan and Iran slide into the China-Russia geostrategic orbit, which would set the stage for closer defense as well as economic cooperation. Only bold American initiatives focused on counterterrorism, targeted soft power, and sustained diplomatic engagement in the region can put the US back in the picture — which it must be to effectively address its national security concerns pertaining to southern Asia.

Marvin G. Weinbaum is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and served as analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the US Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute, focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Naade Ali is currently serving as a Research Assistant to Dr. Weinbaum at MEI. He has more than five years of involvement working with international organizations and think tanks as a political researcher, policy advisor, peace strategist, and human rights practitioner with experience in human and national security, democratization, conflict resolution, and political culture. Prior to joining MEI, Ali worked with Media Foundation 360, a think tank dedicated to strengthening democratic practices in Pakistan.

Photo by Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs/AFP via Getty Images