Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

Several scholars of citizenship and migration in the oil-rich Gulf Arab states have noted the divisions between citizens and non-citizens in terms of mobility, access, geographic location, job prospects, and rights (or lack thereof) in these countries.^[1]These “rentier” states, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which rely on oil for the majority of their income, highly police the boundaries of citizenshi

It is not hyperbole to say that Emirati nationals (al-muwatinin) are vastly outnumbered by foreigners in their country at a ratio higher than almost anywhere else on earth. And, while a growing ethnographic literature documents late 20th century trends among South Asian migrant workers in the Gulf states, few have examined the less populous though highly visible and influential Westerners who work and live there. They deserve our attention.

This essay examines migration from the Iranian coastal region of the Persian Gulf to the nearby Arab countries. At the center of this research are questions of cross-border relationships, the construction of transnational spaces in border migration, and strategies for maintaining networks in both the home and host countries.

Over the past decade, migration to the wealthy states of the Arabian Peninsula has emerged as an increasingly central facet of scholarly attention to the region. This attention has resulted in the exponential expansion of our collective knowledge, and the near future promises even more nuanced and microcosmic analyses as recent and current fieldwork in the region bears fruit. Nevertheless, there has been little discussion of the “labor camps” in which many of the unskilled migrants dwell during their sojourn in the Gulf states.

Formal and informal practices of immigration and employment in the Gulf render inappropriate the classic image of an individual immigrant arriving to set stake and soon send for family. The majority of the foreigners in Bahrain reside there without family and until the 1980s were overwhelmingly male. Nonetheless, over the past century, the unique histories and circumstances of the various nationalities resident in Bahrain have led to the emergence and entrenchment of communities of foreigners.

The six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)^[1]have over five million migrant workers — one of the highest concentrations of migrant workers in the world. According to the World Migration Report (2003), 25% of the workers in Saudi Arabia, 65% in Kuwait, 67% in the UAE, and as much as 70% in Qatar are immigrants or non-nationals.

From fewer than 258,000 in 1975, the migrant Indian population in the Gulf rose to 3.318 million in 2001 and is now estimated at over four million. Indian migrant workers in the GCC countries belong to all three categories of labor: 1) professionals (e.g., doctors, nurses, engineers, architects, accountants, and managers), 2) semi-skilled workers (e.g., craftsmen, drivers, artisans, and other technical workers), and 3) unskilled laborers in construction sites, farmlands, livestock ranches, shops and stores, and households.

After four decades of successive waves of labor migration to the GCC states, three fundamental questions are still subject to debate: In what way can we better comprehend the role and functions in the Arab Gulf societies of this unique phenomenon? How should we assess the labor migrations policies adopted by the countries of this region? What are the possible outcomes of the current trends of this process?

Consider the following fact pattern regularly encountered by Iraqi immigration officers: a poor South Asian farmer submits an application for a temporary guest worker visa that would allow him to take a housekeeping position on an American military base. The Iraqi immigration officer is concerned about two potential difficulties with the application. First, the prospective migrant may overstay his visa. Second, the applicant may impose welfare costs on the state.

The flow of ideas, people, and commerce across national boundaries has been occurring with breathtaking rapidity in the broader Middle East, as elsewhere. These increasingly dense exchanges have generated new threats and vulnerabilities that have tended to impact women, children, and the poorest members of society disproportionately. At the same time, however, they have given people more resources and opportunities with which to shape their lives and their futures.

The Middle East Institute is proud to host Dr. Mark Katz, professor at George Mason University, for a discussion of current relations between Iran and Russia. The Obama Administration has attempted to improve US relations both with both countries. However, neither Tehran nor Moscow has responded favorably toward the new administration's initiatives. While Tehran and Moscow continue to distrust Washington, they also distrust each other.

The Middle East Institute is proud to host two former Ambassadors to Yemen, Thomas Krajeski and David Newton, for a discussion about Yemen and the role of US foreign policy in a country some political analysts characterize as a failed state. As Yemen grapples with multiple crises, including the growing influence of Al Qaeda, a Houthi Rebellion in the north, a secessionist movement in the south and severe economic woes, what should the US do to help stabilize and secure one of the Arab world’s poorest countries?