Iran’s New Defense Minister Is a Missile Man, Not a Military Man
Mehrdad Akhlaghi was appointed defense minister in October 2026 by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. He is an unusual choice, as, unlike most of his predecessors, he does not come from a uniformed military background. And his appointment comes arguably at the most sensitive time in the history of the Islamic Republic.
Washington says it doesn’t know who runs Iran. Tehran insists its leadership is united. MEI Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to sort out where the truth lies. They look at the small circle of political and military figures now steering the war effort in Tehran: who they are, how they make decisions, and how unified they really are. They also discuss the current state of US-Iran negotiations, the role of the upcoming midterm elections in the United States, and how the Islamic Republic is preparing for a potential renewal of conflict afterward.
Crude oil is flowing out of the Gulf again, but the market is no better prepared for another disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. It has assembled a temporary system for managing one. Crude exports from the Gulf, excluding Iran, returned to pre-war levels in September, while total Gulf shipments reached 15.5 million barrels a day, more than 80% of the pre-conflict volume.
According to the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects 2014, there are 28 “megacities” worldwide (i.e., urban agglomerations with populations in excess of 10 million). By 2030 another dozen will likely be added to their ranks.
Critics of the July 14 nuclear deal with Iran railed against it on the grounds that it would embolden what they argue is Tehran’s destabilizing behavior in the Middle East. The reasoning goes like this: lifting sanctions gives Iran access to tens of billions of dollars that will flow to fund disruptive activities and lets Iran freely pursue its regional ambitions without fear of reprisals.
Recent Russian activity in Syria is not about combating the Islamic State, despite Russian claims to the contrary. Though actively fighting ISIS and thus propagating its long-stated goal of keeping Assad in power would seem to be the straightforward explanation for Russia’s recent behavior, the fact that Russian strikes are also hitting U.S.-backed, rebel-held areas demonstrates the hollowness of official discourse.
Russian President Vladimir Putin made waves leading into the UN General Assembly with new military deployments to Syria and an accord with Iran and the Iraqi government, signaling the formation of something like an alternate coalition combating ISIS. The sudden moves serve as a wakeup call not only for the United States and its allies, but also for Iran. The Russian actions are not enough to lead the Iranians to openly second-guess their support for Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, but they are bound to raise tough questions among officials in Tehran.
Looking to capitalize on the momentum from the July 14 nuclear deal, the moderate government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is now seeking ways to reduce tensions with its regional rivals, particularly Saudi Arabia. This is no small task. Not only must Rouhani convince his domestic critics that mending ties with their arch rival is in Iran’s interest, but he must also get a read on Riyadh’s new leader, King Salman, and the ruling elite.
Upgrading Civil Society in Iran: Dynamics of Adaptation
Since the end of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government in June 2013 and the election of the moderate Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s diplomatic activity has changed, specifically its engagement in nuclear talks. The possibility of an agreement reignited enthusiasm for and attention to Iran’s civil society, which played an important role in supporting a diplomatic solution to the nuclear dispute. While many lauded Minister of Foreign Affairs Javad Zarif as the champion of the diplomatic breakthrough, others interpreted the progress in the negotiations to be the result of effective collective efforts by pro-democracy activists.
In the United States the nuclear deal with Iran has become a political football of historic proportions, but that hasn’t been the case in Iran. Why not? Most likely it is because for Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, there is no viable alternative to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It’s a choice between a deal with the world community or more isolation and economic pain, as well as the social-political uncertainty at home that could come with it.
Here are some criticisms of the Iran deal that contain at least a kernel of truth; they are worth addressing for the sake of clarifying some of the arguments pro and con.
The Iran nuclear deal has only one big surprise: it is consistent with the April 2 “parameters” that preceded it and contains no surprises. No one caved. Nothing got walked back.
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