Levant

تضغط الدول الغربية وبعض دول الخليج وتركيا وبدرجة أقل حتى واحدة من مؤيديه الرئيسيين، روسيا، على رئيس الدولة السوري بشار الأسد ليكون أكثر مرونة بشأن قبول تسوية سياسية للصراع السوري. لكن الأسد رفض التزحزح شبرًا واحدًا.

في الوقت الحالي، تريد معظم الدول المعارضة للنظام السوري من الأسد قبول قرار الأمم المتحدة رقم 2254، الصادر في عام 2015، والذي يدعو، من بين أمور أخرى، إلى انتخابات نزيهة ودستور وحكم ذي مصداقية يتسم بالشمول واللاطائفية.

لفهم سبب عدم تراجع الأسد، عليك أن تفكر في الخيارات التي يواجهها.

Western countries, some Gulf states, Turkey, and to a far lesser extent even one of his own key backers, Russia, have been pressuring Syrian head of state Bashar al-Assad to be more flexible about accepting a political settlement to the Syrian conflict. But Assad has refused to budge an inch.

“لاتزال ثمة عقبات خطيرة محتملة على المدى القريب أمام تشكيل حكومة إسرائيلية جديدة”

There is only one thread holding together the unprecedentedly disparate parties that will establish and support the nascent Israeli government announced on the night of June 2, an hour before the midnight deadline. That thread is, of course, a shared loathing for Benjamin Netanyahu. Whether that thread will even get the new government past its first hurdle, which is a vote of confidence in the Knesset, much less to its theoretical four years, is an open question. Until recently no one could have imagined such a political monstrosity might be conceived, let alone gestated, but there’s a decent chance this government will get off the ground.

“دعاوي أردوغان للهيمنة على ساحة تقسيم لها معنى رمزي”.

The recent push by a number of Arab states to normalize relations with the Assad regime is based on the false premise that the war is over and it is necessary to restore ties to lobby Damascus to change its relationship with Iran. Other regional dynamics are also a factor: The UAE, for example, sees it as a necessary balance against what it perceives as adversarial actions by Turkey with the Syrian jihadist group HTS in Idlib. Yet these rationales for rehabilitating the Assad regime are completely fallacious. The downsides and policy consequences will not only affect Arab states, but will also harm American interests, making it difficult for the U.S. to fully pivot to address the rising threat from China.

In the final leg of his recent Middle Eastern tour, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stopped in Amman for half a day to meet King Abdullah. Blinken’s main objective was to support the shaky cease-fire reached between Palestinian factions in Gaza and Israel after an 11-day military showdown. Speaking at a press conference on May 26, Blinken said that “the leadership of His Majesty King Abdullah was crucial, as it always has been in different issues, his role was essential in reaching a cease-fire in Gaza.”  Jordanians were less confident of their government’s role in ending what most saw as “Israeli aggression against Gaza,” however. Even before the recent military clash Jordanian pundits, some known for their close ties to the government, were critical of the lukewarm official response to the Israeli provocations of Palestinians at Al-Aqsa Mosque and in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem.

“إن استعداد مجلس حقوق الإنسان لإنشاء لجنة دائمة ذات تفويض شامل يشير إلى مدى التغيير في التصورات الدولية للصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني في السنوات القليلة الماضية”.

Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.

The recent round of fighting between Israel and Hamas, and especially the events that preceded it in Jerusalem, were the first significant test of the Arab-Israeli normalization agreements signed in 2020. Saved by Hamas’ intervention, the four normalizing Arab governments were nevertheless forced to address the consequences of their agreement in the face of popular discontent with the situation at home as well as criticism from other Arab and Muslim states over their relative silence. How they respond to the evolving Israeli-Palestinian tension going forward will be critical not only in regard to their own relations with Israel but also in terms of the future path of Arab-Israeli normalization.