Monday Briefing: Despite strains, the Abraham Accords have proved resilient, but what’s next?
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
There is a new and little noticed geostrategic alliance on the rise. India, Israel, and the UAE have had surface-level, transactional relations for a long time. However, last year’s normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab states — chief among them, the UAE — along with Turkey’s bid to return as the leader of a Muslim order and the growing distance between the UAE and Pakistan have created an unlikely and unprecedented “Indo-Abrahamic“ transregional order. This emerging multilateral pact may fill the gap the United States is leaving in the Middle East and has the potential to transform the region’s geopolitics and geoeconomics.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Guled Ahmed, Mirette Mabrouk, and Mohammed Soliman join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the latest developments for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Egypt’s African diplomatic outreach, and the creative solutions required to meet the region’s growing energy needs.
“في النهاية، كانت النتيجة متوقعة: دعّم أعضاء مجلس الأمن جهود وساطة الاتحاد الإفريقي وأوصوا باستئناف المفاوضات بأسرع ما يمكن”.
It would be an understatement to say that the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Germany has written the book on how to analyze textbooks. The Institute has actually published many books — ones that are meticulous, detailed, and dispassionate. Now the Institute has published one more, this time on Palestinian textbooks.
Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.
تخوض مصر وإثيوبيا والسودان في مأزق خطير بشأن نهر النيل، وعلى الرغم مما يعتقده المجتمع الدولي، فإن خطر المواجهة العسكرية بين الدول الثلاث ليس مستبعدًا على الإطلاق. إذ بدأت أديس أبابا في المرحلة الثانية لملء الخزان خلف سد النهضة الإثيوبي العملاق في أوائل مايو/أيار دون اتفاق مع الدول المشاطئة – مصر والسودان. غير أن الكثير قد تغير خلال العام الماضي والملء الثاني يتم في ظروف مختلفة نوعًا ما عن الملء الأول في يوليو/تموز الماضي. ففي الأشهر الماضية، عززت مصر من تواجدها الدبلوماسي وظهرت كلاعب مؤثر في حوض النيل والقرن الإفريقي وشرق ووسط إفريقيا.
Sunday was a festive day in Baghdad. The last time Iraqis had received an Egyptian president 30 years ago, the region was gearing up for war and uncertainty as the late President Hosni Mubarak shuttled between Baghdad and Gulf capitals prior to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The circumstances were quite different on June 27, when Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and King Abdullah II of Jordan were given the red-carpet treatment at a tripartite summit marking the fourth meeting between the leaders of the three countries aiming to form a new regional alliance.
Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are caught in a dangerous deadlock over the Nile River and despite what the international community seems to think, the risk of military confrontation among the three nations is not at all far-fetched. Addis Ababa began the second phase of filling the reservoir behind its giant Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in early May without an agreement with the riparian nations — Egypt and Sudan. However, much has changed over the past year and the second filling has played out rather differently from the first last July. In the intervening months Egypt has ramped up its diplomatic outreach and emerged as an influential player in the Nile Basin, the Horn of Africa, and East and Central Africa. Cairo succeeded in forging strategic alignment with Khartoum to exert diplomatic pressure on Addis Ababa, forming webs of alliances with different regional powers across East and Central Africa and the Horn of Africa to project power and influence, and exerting geopolitical forward pressure on Ethiopia in parallel with the diplomatic track to solve the GERD dispute.
Some international concern has been voiced about the future prospects of the Abraham Accords under Israel’s new government. This stems from the perception that the normalization agreements Israel signed in 2020 with the UAE and Bahrain were the personal achievements of two former leaders — Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu — and would not have happened without them. The question thus arises of whether the agreements can survive their departure from power. Not only will the Abraham Accords survive, they will now be able to flourish and reach new heights. Foreign Minister Yair Lapid’s statement that his first visit abroad will be to the UAE is a good indicator.
In a landscape of suppression and retaliation against Palestinian journalists and activists at the hands of Israel, social media networks have been at once critical organizing platforms and tools for exacerbating censorship.
One of the first foreign policy decisions facing Israel’s new government will be if it wants to maintain or modify the policy spearheaded by Netanyahu to counter the United States’ determined effort to return to the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. Moreover, the new government needs to assess how successful the maximalist approach Israel has embraced since the negotiations between Iran and the great powers began about two decades ago has been, and to what extent it has pushed the international community to refrain from making concessions and compromises vis à vis Iran.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
On Dec. 21, 2020, the United States Congress passed the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act. The new law provides $250 million over five years to expand peace and reconciliation programs between Israelis and Palestinians as well as to support projects bolstering the Palestinian economy. But such programs are unlikely to be effective because the whole approach on which they are based is structurally flawed in two critical ways: first, because it is disconnected from local political, social, cultural, and economic processes and expectations; and second, because it tends to reinforce the inequalities that sustain the conflict between the two sides while undermining the declared goals of this intervention.