Research & Commentary Results

Gulf oil producers do not envisage a post-2050 world devoid of hydrocarbons, even though two of the region’s biggest producers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and 2060, respectively. Reconciling their future environmental commitments with their current reliance on hydrocarbons is going to be an arduous and expensive journey that starts with decarbonizing their oil and gas production to reduce their carbon footprint and increasing their domestic green energy production. With demand for oil and gas forecast to continue post-2050 — albeit at lower levels than now — their net-zero target does not equate to zero oil and gas production. Instead, their transition will differ from that of other countries and will happen at a different pace.

Saudi Arabia has undergone tremendous social change in recent years, but it has struggled to make good on some of its more ambitious financial goals. Much of the promised foreign direct investment has yet to arrive, and the kingdom’s growth agenda has drained its foreign reserves. Most of Mohammed bin Salman’s more eye-catching promises, including futuristic urban megaprojects, remain unfinished.

Ethiopia is Iran’s gateway to the Horn of Africa and the broader East Africa region. By helping Ethiopia in its ongoing conflict with the rebel Tigray Defense Forces, which represent the Tigray ethnic minority, Iran is preserving its so-called strategic depth in the region to bolster its influence.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of Vladimir Putin in the 1990s, military and economic relations between Iran and Russia have improved, as their tensions with the West have intensified. One aspect of the relationship that has received little attention is their growing economic and trade cooperation involving the production, export, and import of halal meat and other products since 2015.

What these attacks and many others in the region have in common is Iran’s irrefutable involvement. They may have different local contexts and their perpetrators, all loyal to Iran, may have different motivations, but every single one of those attacks was possible only because Iran provided either the weapons or the know-how to assemble and use them.

Will Raisi succeed where previous Iranian regimes have failed?

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

Three days have passed since the Houthi attack on the UAE, yet there’s still a lot we don’t know about what really happened. Here’s what we do know: The Houthis officially stated that they were the ones who struck Abu Dhabi, and unlike in September 2019 when they made the same claim, this time they might not be lying. Yet this is not enough to help us answer what in my opinion is the ultimate question: to what extent were the Iranians involved in this attack?

Iran’s new president, Ebrahim Raisi, has presented his first draft budget bill for the upcoming Iranian year (1401), which starts on March 21, 2022. Rather than facilitating a much-needed economic recovery, the proposed budget is designed to strengthen the regime’s power base and impose austerity while keeping society under control.

Look to the people of the region first, then the evolving competition among regional states and global powers, for signs on what to expect.

On Jan. 17, the Houthis perpetrated another attack, targeting an Emirati oil facility in Abu Dhabi, killing three international citizens, and damaging infrastructure. The story here is unfortunately all too familiar and begs a coherent response now. After all, what is becoming routine in the Gulf will likely be copied and repeated in other locations.

Recently, the Iranian regime’s anti-Israel campaign scored an own goal when various hard- line regime news outlets targeted former Iranian national soccer team captain Mehdi Mahdavikia with severe criticism and condemnation. Mahdavikia’s crime? Wearing a jersey at an international exhibition soccer match arranged by FIFA in Qatar that featured the flags of all 211 FIFA members, including Israel.

Long-simmering economic and political tensions between the U.S. and China have continued to spill over into the technology sector, where the two superpowers have made this ever-more vital industry the site of a new Cold War. The acrimony looks poised to only get worse moving forward, potentially leading to a tech decoupling, and 5G is at the heart of it. Some third parties have sought to find a way to navigate this divide and the dilemma is particularly acute for the Gulf states. As they seek to balance their relationships with both Washington and Beijing, several have chosen to stake out their own territory by building an Open Radio Access Network (RAN). This initiative could be a potential solution to the current conundrum that would give states 5G sovereignty in an era of great power competition, with a digital twist.

إن استراتيجية المملكة العربية السعودية لزيادة محفظتها من الأصول النظيفة والمتجددة قد تم تعزيزها في عام 2021، حيث شهدت المملكة العديد من عمليات تمويل المشاريع في قطاع الطاقة الشمسية وأطلقت صندوق البنية التحتية الوطني لتنويع اقتصادها.

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have been the main competitors in a struggle over who — and in what manner — should act as the patron of Muslims in the Balkans. These three countries are very different in terms of their historical footprint, economic and political presence, and local networks. What they share, however, is the use of Islam to exert soft power. This paper will discuss how they are seeking to wield influence, how regional actors respond to their overtures, and whether these three countries are meeting their objectives in the region.