Research & Commentary Results

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Charles Lister, Randa Slim, Jonathan M. Winer, Alex Vatanka, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Robert S. Ford, Mirette F. Mabrouk, and Syed Mohammad Ali.

Tom de Waal, Nicole Grajewski, and Theodore Karasik join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the recent border hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the role that Russia, Turkey, and Iran are playing in the geostrategically important South Caucasus.

The relationship between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa is centuries-old and complex. While the world’s attention is focused mainly on the “great power competition” in the region, primarily between the U.S. and China, the Horn of Africa has also become a central battleground for influence among competing regional players, principally Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Egypt. As they pursue their interests in the region, from Ethiopia and Sudan to Somalia and Djibouti, these competing states are the main drivers of tension and instability in the Horn of Africa.

After almost two decades of rule by the AKP and its leader President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has experienced major institutional, political, and social transformations, including a dramatic autocratization in recent years. There is another side to the story, however, one that still gives us hope for the re-establishment of democracy and the rule of law in the near future.

When the Saudi-led coalition launched military operations against the Houthi insurgents on March 26, 2015, all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, except for Oman, joined the multinational force. As has become clear, each of the Arab Gulf sheikdoms has its own national interests and unique history of relations with Yemen and Yemeni factions, and these have shaped their changing perceptions of the war over the past five and a half years. Kuwait’s role in Yemen’s multidimensional conflict is a case in point.

As many of the Gulf states pivot away from oil and gas, they have turned to digital development as a way to attract foreign investment and spur domestic growth. A critical part of these digital transformations is the widespread adoption of 5th generation mobile communication networks (5G). Large-scale investment in 5G rollouts in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain reflect this reality.

In an unexpected and disappointing turn of events, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party and its parliamentary ally, the Nationalist Action Party, rushed through a stifling social media amendment to Turkey’s Internet Act.

Both Turkey and India are middle-income secular democracies with deep historical connections, leading one senior Turkish lawmaker recently to refer to the two countries as “natural allies.” However, there has long been an impediment to developing more fruitful ties with India: Turkey’s pro-Pakistan orientation. The origins of this friction point date to the early 1950s, namely the inception of the Cold War and the early stages of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. This stumbling block has yet to be overcome. In fact, the “Pakistan factor,” specifically the Kashmir conflict, has lately resurfaced as a source of Turkey-India contention. 

As Russia partially reopens international travel amidst the ongoing pandemic, Turkey is in the top three countries for resumed Russian flights. Moscow also touts possible space cooperation with Turkey amidst tensions with the US on this issue. Despite disagreements between Moscow and Ankara over Syria, Libya, and the broader Black Sea region, Russia and Turkey remain determined to cooperate. But the relationship remains unequal.

The conflict in Yemen poses a real threat not only to its immediate neighborhood, but also to global players such as the European Union. Although the country is located relatively far away from the EU’s external borders, instability on the Arabian Peninsula could seriously affect European interests and security.

I don’t understand why Iran’s Revolutionary Guards insist on conducting military exercises in the Gulf waters that are as devoid of credibility as they are comical. Because if the goal of these drills is to intimidate or change the calculations of the U.S. Navy, nobody is flinching or losing any sleep in the Bahrain-headquartered U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, or NAVCENT.

On July 12, the Armenian and the Azerbaijani armed forces started a border skirmish. Fighting went on for several days, leaving at least 16 dead in its wake. Remarkably enough, the two sides are facing off outside the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, the usual flashpoint. This time around the flare-up took place well to the north, where Armenia’s Tavush region meets Azerbaijan’s Tovuz district. It is little wonder then that the crisis caught Turkey’s attention.

The coronavirus pandemic that originated in China could not have come at a worse moment for the UAE. Indeed, before its outbreak, relations between the UAE and China were in an excellent place. Underpinned by growing economic exchange, the bilateral partnership holds the promise of turning into a geo-economic and geopolitical one. For Beijing, the UAE is first and foremost a critical hub for re-export to the wider region and ultimately, it is in the domain of maritime trade and around China’s BRI that the partnership has its greatest potential.

Medical tourism is an important form of cooperation in the health sector between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Asia. The increasing flow of patients from the Gulf to Asian for medical treatment in recent years has been underpinned by a feature of GCC countries’ healthcare systems that is unique, namely government sponsorship of overseas medical treatment. This article discusses the immediate impact and possible implications of the Coronavirus pandemic for GCC-Asia health cooperation.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Mirette F. Mabrouk, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Gonul Tol, Alex Vatanka, and Gerald Feierstein.