On Syrian Talks and Ceasefires: An Open Letter to Secretary Kerry
Mr. Secretary,
No one has worked harder than you to find a way to bring all sides together to stop the Syrian civil war and muster more international action against the Islamic State. But as a former colleague, let me caution that without some major adjustments in its approach to the Syrian peace talks in Vienna, the Obama administration is headed down another dead end.
This article was first published in The Hoover Institution’s The Caravan.
Daesh or ISIS does not represent an existential threat to any state except Syria and Iraq. It occupies and controls ungoverned space in the region between Iraq and Syria and in parts of northern Africa; and its self-proclaimed Caliphate has benefited from the seizure of some income producing assets in these areas. Daesh depends on the dynamism of success and expansion, both of which have been in short supply of late.
Charting a Course for Syria after Paris and Vienna
The shooting down of a Russian SU-24 by Turkey on November 24 has ratcheted the Syrian crisis to a new level of urgency. This escalation, combined with the horrific attacks in Paris and the security situation still unfolding across Europe, is understandably dominating the news cycle. Amidst this tumult, however, the results of the Vienna Summit of November 14 have been largely buried. In truth, the downing of the Russian fighter and the massacre in Paris underscore the importance of looking again at what came out of the Vienna talks and what steps the U.S.
Under the pall cast by the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris, the U.S., Russia and other world powers met in Vienna Saturday and agreed on a timetable for a political process in Syria. However, the principles and steps they set conjure a sense of déjà vu.
This piece was co-authored by Chester Crocker, the James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. Read the full article at The National Interest.
There is a debate within U.S. policy circles about Russian president Vladimir Putin’s strategy in Syria. While all agree that Putin intervened to shore up the faltering regime of Bashar al-Assad, there are at least two interpretations of what Putin’s ultimate objective is.
Ten days ago 17 countries called for “credible, inclusive, nonsectarian governance” in Syria followed by a new constitution and elections. It sounds good on paper. However, the key element is not elections, nor is it a new constitution; it is the rule of law. Syria has had no rule of law to speak of under Baath and Assad family rule, and in its absence the Constitution is worth little and fair elections are impossible. Thus, the governance reference in the Vienna statement is the vital element. Only after serious governance changes are made can a new constitution come into real effect
Only a few authors have works that can be found on both floors of the Oman Library at The Middle East Institute, and fewer still that have a personal connection to both the institute and the history of the region. The late Ambassador Richard B. Parker can claim this status, having served 31 years in the Foreign Service and as the third editor of The Middle East Journal. He was also a longtime MEI scholar-in-residence.
Critics of the July 14 nuclear deal with Iran railed against it on the grounds that it would embolden what they argue is Tehran’s destabilizing behavior in the Middle East. The reasoning goes like this: lifting sanctions gives Iran access to tens of billions of dollars that will flow to fund disruptive activities and lets Iran freely pursue its regional ambitions without fear of reprisals.
A Message to Vienna: Build a Framework, but Leave the Details to Syrians
As Secretary of State John Kerry seeks to launch a new peace effort on Syria, he needs to be careful about the goals he sets and the language he uses. Getting the fundamentals wrong at the outset might scuttle the process or could ensure that whatever deal results will crumble under pressure. It will then lead to more warfare and a worsening of the refugee crisis. Moreover, it would preclude us from securing our strategic goal of mobilizing more Syrians to contain and eventually expel terrorists from Syria.
President Barack Obama has notoriously disparaged the moderate opposition as “farmers or dentists or maybe some radio reporters who didn’t have a lot of experience fighting.” The key question about the Syrian opposition is not whether it can fight — in fact many of its cadres are former Syrian army soldiers — but whether it can govern.
Recent Russian activity in Syria is not about combating the Islamic State, despite Russian claims to the contrary. Though actively fighting ISIS and thus propagating its long-stated goal of keeping Assad in power would seem to be the straightforward explanation for Russia’s recent behavior, the fact that Russian strikes are also hitting U.S.-backed, rebel-held areas demonstrates the hollowness of official discourse.
October 2015 marks the fourteenth month of formal U.S. military engagement in the struggle against the Islamic State (ISIS). The Obama administration was at first reluctant to engage U.S. military power in this struggle but then became more deliberate in its approach. U.S. involvement in the battlegrounds of Iraq and Syria has been evolving especially over the past year. This evolution has been defined and is in many ways limited by a strategy that emphasizes political change in Iraq and a broad coalition of states taking action against ISIS.
Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is at the United Nations in New York, making another push for Turkey’s long-standing demand for a safe zone in northern Syria, while President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to have realized that it might be a long shot given recent developments.
