Kate Seelye: Good morning everybody, I am Kate Seelye from the Middle East Institute. Thank you all for coming today for this discussion about the challenges and opportunities for peace between Israel and the Palestinians during this time of unprecedented change in the Middle East. I also want to thank the Foundation for Middle East Peace for co-sponsoring this very unique event with us today. Just to use a Malcolm Gladwell phrase: The Middle East is indeed at a “tipping point” with two leaders down due to popular anger and the potential for more change and the hope of course is that the overthrow of dictators will bring freedom and prosperity in the region, but we are also witnessing the dangers posed by a change of the new order. We have seen heavy bloodshed in Libya, an exodus of refugees from Tunisia, questions of Egypt’s commitment to the peace process, the recent passage through the Suez Canal of Iranian warships and so on and so forth. So many dangers presented by this current unrest and of course many countries in the Middle East are extremely worried about the future but perhaps no one country feels this threat more acutely than Israel, which of course fears loosing its two primary allies in to its east and west. Now there are many in the US and Israel who believe that during this time of instability, Israel must hunker down, guard the status quo, take no unnecessary risks and certainly not cede any land. However, there are others who believe just the opposite, perhaps they are in the minority, perhaps not, but the thinking there is that it is in fact a time, during this time of unprecedented change like today that Israel should reach out, broaden its allies in the Arab world and one way, of course, to do so would be to try to conclude a peace treaty with the Palestinians. Just recently, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was quoted as saying: “There is a danger that events in Egypt will misled some to loose hope in peace. However my advice to President Netanyahu,” he added “is don’t wait. Move. Lead and make history. This is the time. There will not be a better one.” Well, is that indeed the case? Or is it already too late, as some believe, with the peace process already dead: a victim of factors relating to both internal Israeli and Palestinian politics. Well we are very fortunate to have with us today two men who know the Israeli-Palestinian crisis inside and out, they have been working on the issue for decades and they are going to bring to the table their very own unique views about the challenges and opportunities posed by the new crisis or this unique time in the Middle East, I should say.
The Honorable Robert Wexler is the president of the S.Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. He served as a Democratic Member of Congress for seven terms representing Florida’s 19th district before retiring in January 2010 to lead the Center. Wexler was named one of the 50 most effective legislatures in Congress by Congressional Quarterly and in 2008 was named to the Forbes 50 list one of the most influential leaders in the American Jewish Community. In 2008 Congressman Wexler served as an adviser on Middle East and Israeli issues to President Barack Obama during his presidential campaign.
Dr. Yoram Peri is the Abraham S. and Jack Key Chair in Israel Studies and the director of the Joseph and Alma Gildenhorn for Israel Studies at the University of Maryland at College Park. He is also a former political adviser to the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and founder and former head of the Chaim Herzog Institute for Media, Politics and Society at Tel Aviv University, where he also served as a professor of Sociology.
I want to thank you gentlemen so much for joining us. It is a great honor and privilege to have you here. We are going to begin with Dr.Yoram Peri with the Israeli perspective.
Dr.Yoram Peri: Thank you very much. Well to say that a new chapter has started in the Middle East will be the most banal cliché ever made and the purpose of our discussion today is really to talk about Israel, but it will be a mistake not to put it in a wider framework. So two minutes on the wider framework. There are very many questions, at least four very important questions that are still open and the future of Israel within the Middle East really depends on these questions. So just to remind you what they are:
First of all, is the position of Egypt within the region. For four millennia, Egypt was the leading power in the region and the source of all the waves that took place in the region from Islamism, Socialism, Pan-Arabism, Salafist Terrorism, even to modern cinema and the peace with Israel. And the question is what path will Egypt take? Will it continue to be a leader? Or as some people say, will it withdraw to domestic issues and a more introspective approach? An open question, which we cannot answer yet.
Second, what will be the developments in the region? Namely, what will be the path of the process of democratization? Are we seeing something which is similar to the fourth wave of democracy with the fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, or it is more like the 1848 Spring of Nations, which did not have immediate effect but it took almost 50 years until we saw the effects.
Third, what is the compatibility between Arabism and democracy? A very interesting question and there are so many interesting articles that have been published. I am sure that many of you have read most of them in the last several weeks. An open question.
And fourth, the tension in between Islam, between the two major perceptions of the ijtihad and jihad. So each one of them we can discuss at length. We have to add to that of course the future of the Egyptian military, what path this institution will take, the Indonesian path or the Burmese path. Many people look at Turkey as the solution.
Each one of these four or five questions will really have an impact on the smaller domain that we are discussing today that is Israel and the Arabs.
Now I want to present to you the perspective of the Israelis that developed in the last month and like in any other case, you have at least two positions. Of course we have more than that but basically you see two major positions. One, which is unfortunately very limited, very small and the other one, which really represents the public opinion and the positions of the political class. So I will start with explaining them.
First of all there is a clear understanding by everybody that Israel’s geo-strategic position has been dramatically affected by the developments. Not only did it lose Turkey two years ago as a strategic ally, probably it will lose Egypt as a strategic ally in the future and then you have all the other questions that are still there: What will happen to Jordan? What will happen in the West Bank? What will happen to other countries in the region? Particularly when you see according to that perception a decline of the American power in the Middle East, and more critical approach taken by the European states vis-à-vis Israel. So under Netanyahu’s government they tried to build new coalitions, Greek instead of Turkey, new Europe instead of Western Europe but that is not – India instead of others, India instead of Iran but of course this will not suffice. So you see the analysis is that there is deterioration.
Then already in the last three weeks, you saw very many steps, bilateral between Israel and Egypt that shows a very unpleasant path in the future. Immediately after the revolution many Palestinian prisoners ran away from jails in Egypt and came back to Gaza. There was a bomb blast in the gas pipe between Egypt and Israel; even when that was solved, the flow of gas did not continue and it is still closed. And Israel gets 40% of its oil from there.
Bedouins in the Sinai Peninsula took over some of the police stations, killed more the 25 policemen and there is a danger that they will continue to support terrorist organizations against Israel.
Gaza is more open than it used to be in the past.
And then you have the positions of the Muslim Brotherhood on which so many people wrote and discussed and you have different voices. On one hand you have the moderate voice, which was most beautifully presented by the article published two or three days ago by David Ignatius, wonderful work either of public relations or really they present one of the two younger faces of the Muslim Brotherhood. And yet you have other positions and other ideas, including demands to put the peace treaty with Israel to a referendum or to make it linked to the Palestinian issue. And the issue of linkage between the peace between Israel and Egypt was a very fundamental issue that was discussed during the Camp David negotiations. We have heard the former American Ambassador Sam Lewis who remembers very well the issue of linkage and how many hours they talked about it. So now suddenly it is again an issue.
And you have very many other expressions within Cairo, not all of them were monitored here but all of them were monitored in Israel, which called for even more harsh positions vis-à-vis Israel. For example, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi came back after many years of exile and he spoke about the liberation of Al-Aqsa, a total victory over Israel – by the way he supported suicide attacks in the past and said that the Holocaust was a deserved punishment from God to the Jews. And even some among the more moderate Arab parties, you hear different voices so that is perceived by the Israelis, the way it is perceived, which I will explain in a minute.
And then of course you have for the first time since 1979, the Iranian warships crossing the Suez Canal. Legally they are entitled to do so because according to the Constantinople Agreement of 1888 it should be open but for the last 30 years, since 1979 as I said, they did not. So all this is seen as a beginning of change of Egyptian position.
The last one happened two days ago at the UN, the Security Council, where Israelis think that because of the disappearance of President Mubarak, Egypt did not play a more moderate tone in trying to push the Palestinians’s position to become more moderate.
So what happened? How do the majority of the Israelis, particularly the major think tanks, writers and the government officials, how do they see the situation?
Number 1: What one can see is a change in the Arab stereotype in Israel. For years, for tens of years, the Israelis had a very clear stereotype of the Arabs, very negative of course and unified. There are shades of positions. There is one position which is anti-Israel and that has begun to change in the 1990s with the peace process and unfortunately reverted with the second Intifada and the suicidal attacks and in the last months you can see expressions which say there is only one sort of Arab. Prime Minister Shamir used to say “the sea is the same sea; the Arab is the same Arab,” namely there is only one kind of Arab and he was always against us and always will be against us and there were very many different studies in Israeli literature, cinema, whatever, culture, which showed that stereotype. That stereotype in the last month came again and one can see it in so many articles printed in Israel.
Second, the traditional perception of Israeli foreign policy, which is the worse case scenario, got again very strong. It declined a little in the last fifteen/twenty years and now again it came back. Netanyahu said, though he wanted to express his positive attitude towards any democracy or evolving democracy, so he said “we wish Egypt the best but we have to be prepared for the worst” and that is a very typical way of thinking by most Israelis when they look at their future. After all you can understand that a nation with a third of its children disappeared in its gas chambers have that approach but it became stronger than before.
Third, again something which I see negative, is a change in the traditional perception concerning the question of what is the source of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Until the second Intifada, the political class in Israel believed that the source of the conflict is the un-readiness of the Arab state and Arab people to recognize the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East. The first Intifada has changed that and Rabin was the man who really resembled or expressed this change and realized that the core of the problem between Israel and the Arab states or the Arab people is the Israeli-Palestinian issue. In the last month there is a reverse to the previous perception, you see now everyone is talking about the danger of Israel in the Middle East, Israel is losing its friends, if you have a friend it is only temporary. The problem is not the Palestinian, the problem is the unwillingness of the Arabs to accept Israel as a fact in the Middle East.
And fourth, which is a very dangerous phenomenon, is the descendant of the religious element in the conflict. The Israeli-Arab conflict is a multi-layered conflict. You have tensions between Western civilization and Eastern civilization if you want and Arab civilization, you have a conflict between two national liberalization movements, you have a territorial element and you always have the religious element. But both leaders, Israeli leaders and the Arabs, were capable in the past to contain the religious element. In the last several years, particularly in the last month, that religious element got a dramatic push and became much much stronger. So if you have that, every Israeli knows the three words in Arabic ذبح اليهود : “slaughter the Jews,” which I don’t remember that, but my father used to tell me when he lived in Jerusalem in the 20s and in the 30s, he had Palestinians, they didn’t see themselves then as Palestinians, shouting ذبح اليهود not the Israelis. It is the religious element. So this ذبح اليهود, which was used for so many years, it declined with the beginning of the peace process and now it came again.
So you see four very negative changes in the perceptions of the Israelis concerning the conflict and therefore what is the solution? So the majority school will say “well security comes before everything else.” So Israel should look at the military dimension more than any other dimension; Israel should strengthen its military position; Israel should put more layers on the wall that separates us and the Arab world or more barbed wires; go back to “Jabotinsky and the Iron Wall” perception or using the modern term that Defense Minister Barak says “Israel is a villa, namely a mansion, in a jungle.” So you have to be more ready to that. That is the majority, if you read all the think tank papers, most of them in Israel, many of the journalists and you will talk to individuals, this is what you hear. By the way, Prime Minister Netanyahu asked the cabinet ministers not to talk too much about the issue. Can you imagine the Israelis not to talk too much about this thing? But this is what you read in the newspapers, this is what you hear from the people and this represents really the majority.
The other school of thought says the opposite. It says that when the revolution started in Tahrir Square, Israel was not the issue, the Israeli-Arab conflict was not the issue, it was a domestic Egyptian problem and so are the problems that are occurring in other places in the Middle East. However if things will continue, it won’t take much – weeks – that the Israeli-Palestinian issue will become the focus of the issue in the entire Middle East. Therefore the interest of Israel is to diffuse that issue and the only way to do it is to take a very brave step, it should have been done according to that perception already three weeks ago, a very brave step, a very bold step and to try and solve as soon as possible the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Now if you read the minutes of the 36 meetings that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had with President Abu Mazen they were very close. So Israeli leaders, and it should be from the highest level, should meet the highest level of the Palestinian authority and negotiate the few issues that are still open and they can reach an agreement –if they want it. Now it is true that we see some change in the Palestinian position, it seems that the Palestinian position has become more intransigent because of the feeling that time works for them, that the public opinion moves towards their position so why should we hurry? But I think both the Palestinians, as well as the Israelis, and it will be worthless to say who will lose more, will lose from the status quo. It cannot continue like that, it will have a horrific impact and therefore Israel should negotiate with the Palestinians.
Two other points that should be mentioned, which of course I will be happy to develop that in the second part of our meeting today, is Israel and Syria and the Arab League Initiative. Israel and Syria were very close to an agreement. Ten years ago, the Israeli Chief of Staff, who is now Deputy Prime Minister, Moshe ‘Bogie’ Ya’alon, told me that we need three/four days to conclude an agreement. We were so close in the year 2000. This Israeli military since then continues to advocate an agreement between Israel and Syria. You need only the political will by the Prime Minister to do that. It is true that the public opinion has changed but if you have the military that supports an agreement and the security issues were almost resolved, it can be done. So this is something else that should be done. I am afraid that the Israelis are not helped by the US administration on that issue.
And the third thing of course is the Arab Initiative. Once the Israelis realize that the entire Arab world will be willing to support an agreement between Israeli and the Palestinians, it will change many of the positions of the Israelis.
So either of the three, I wished that it would be the whole three, but either of the three should start as soon as possible because the alternative, according to that school of thought, is not very positive. You see very few who advocate that. President Peres spoke to that effect but it doesn’t have a strong political position. You hear some slight pronouncements from the chief of the military intelligence and even the chief of staff when he left last week and ended his term, he said that “Israel should work hard to take out one of the states from the anti-Israeli axis.” I guessed he meant Syria but if you asked me whether this will happen shortly I would give it one against ten or 10% out of 100% because of many reasons.
Just two words: a) I believe that Netanyahu basically accepts the analysis that I gave you earlier, b) Netanyahu receives pressure from the more extreme parties in the coalition, and c) we are getting closer to an election year. After the second year in Israel, you start thinking about elections so we still had four/ five months to pursue negotiations and we still have a very short period of time, within two/three months it will be over. Even within his coalition the moderate forces like Defense Minister Barak became weaker so I don’t see in the near future a move by the political class in Israel or by the government towards the second school of thought. I am afraid that the first school of thought will be the dominant one in Israel. Thank you.
The Hon. Robert Wexler: Thank you very much. I want to thank the Middle East Institute for inviting me to participate. I would like to start with the conventional wisdom. Sometimes conventional wisdom is just that – wisdom. In this case, I think it actually represents more of a wisdom of fantasy rather than a wisdom of reality. What is it that I am referring to? Whether it is here in Washington or in Jerusalem or in Ramallah, the conventional wisdom as it relates to the Israelis and Palestinians, as we speak today, is essentially the winds of change have overcome the Middle East, Arab nations have enormous domestic problems, the turmoil has created both the necessity and the urgency for Arab leaders to focus on their own particular domestic and parochial issues and the notion of either an appetite for an Israeli-Palestinian negotiations or effort of being what they are going to wake up in the morning and think about first, or second or third, is just utterly nonsense.
Likewise in Israel, as the Doctor has correctly pointed out, Israel has seen its bedrock relationship with Egypt being literally twisted and turned upside down. What is happening in the Sinai in terms of lack of rule of law, lack of control, is terribly unsettling – justifiably so – to the Israelis. The Israelis are cautiously hopeful with respect to their ally Jordan but rightfully so wonder what will be in Jordan three months from now, six months from now, two years from now. In fact, Prime Minister Netanyahu who had already stressed, rightfully so, the security of his nation in the context of any negotiations with the Palestinians, has doubled-down and he has essentially, although he wouldn’t put it in these terms, going to build “fortress Israel.” Who could blame him? Who could blame the Israeli people for not having that desire?
Having lived the historical events that Dr. Peri rightfully points out, having more recently lived through the Intifada and now witnessing turmoil that is for the most part unsettling to the Israelis, who in their right mind would engage in some bold initiative that causes the Israeli public, the Israeli nation to have to pay a significant price? In these circumstances, I couldn’t imagine the political commercial that you would run to support such a position. Likewise in Ramallah, President Abbas is still reeling from disastrous political consequences from the Goldstone Report, having ceded to President Obama’s request not to pursue the Goldstone Report with the vigor that he otherwise might have done and a whole host of different political affairs such as the exposure of Saeb Erekat’s office in terms of the leaking of information. President Abbas has chosen maybe what appears to be, if not a more effective, a more comfortable route. Go to the United Nations, engage in a national campaign to delegitimize the state of Israel, go to the United Nations with creative resolutions that attempt to mirror American language and put the United States in a very difficult position. Those are much more comfortable positions for both President Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Let’s talk a moment about ourselves. Unemployment is still not resolved in America. Americans rightfully so are most concerned about our own fiscal order, our own fiscal condition. We still have to create millions and millions of jobs in America. The President wants to talk about an economic message in Ohio, an economic message in Missouri, an economic message in Wisconsin and throughout the nation. He is not necessarily interested in putting a step1 or focus 1 in terms of the American public, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not because he doesn’t understand the seriousness of it or the consequences of calamity that could result but because in fact he’s tried for two years. He appointed Senator Mitchell on his second day in office, he has gone to battle on both sides of the issue and he hasn’t seen a great deal of success so who could blame the American administration particularly after the November elections for reaching the conclusion that we need to take care of America, we need to get our own house in order.
That is the conventional wisdom and in most normal times, I might readily except it, I might advocate that in fact it was the proper policy but if there is one message, one lesson to be extracted from the events in Egypt for me it is this: if anyone rationally believes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that events in the West Bank and Gaza, will neatly sit idly by while other leaders in a confined way deal with their preferred set of priorities, we are sadly mistaken. And unlike events in Libya or unlike events in Iran where America has limited leverage, I think it is fair to conclude that one of the few places in this immediate neighborhood in which America still thankfully contains a significant amount or possesses a significant amount of leverage, along with our Israeli allies, along with the moderate Arabs, the moderate Palestinians, this is the arena in which thankfully America, Israel, and moderate Arabs still have a great deal of leverage.
So I would argue that although the conventional wisdom has its obvious merits, that in fact we have two choices and neither one is necessarily a preferred choice but these are our two choices. We follow the path of conventional wisdom and maybe in one week from now, one month from now, three months from now or six months from now or twelve months from now but invariably we will wake up and the headline will not be Egypt, it won’t be Libya, it won’t be Iran, it will be the West Bank or it will be Gaza and some catastrophic event has occurred and the Israelis will rightfully so exercise their right of self-defense and we will spiral into a catastrophic situation in one of the most emotional spots on earth.
We can follow that path and hope that it will be two years or three years or five years or that I am totally wrong and that it won’t come. Or we can take a different path. A path that requires…Prime Minister Netanyahu or President Abbas to make a bold move. I wish that was the case. I wish both gentlemen concluded that it was in their self-interest to do so but I am afraid neither gentlemen will do. So the unfortunate reality is that the decision rests here in Washington and it rests with the Obama administration and I would respectfully request or suggest that the administration in its reconfiguration of American choices and options conclude that now actually is the best time - and I would not have argued this three months ago - that the American President should put out a set of principles or parameters upon which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be determined or negotiated. But I would argue in the very near term that is what the American administration should do.
Now let me go back to last week. There were a number of esteemed diplomats, former diplomats in this town and very well meaning groups that urged the Obama administration to veto the resolution before the United Nations Security Council condemning Israeli settlement activity. I happen to think that that urging was misdirected. It was not strategic in its ultimate outcome and that the Obama administration did exactly the correct thing in issuing its veto. Now everyone understands that the veto causes short term damage to America in the Arab world. On the one hand, the President is trying to at least get out in front a bit, of Arab public opinion in terms of the turmoil and change and here it is, we stand alone effectively against the world in condemning a resolution that at least attempted to mirror American policy. So why is it correct for the Obama administration to veto that resolution? I would argue this:
Regardless of what one’s position is on settlements, settlements are but one issue in terms of the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians and just as it would not be appropriate in my view to bring the settlement issue to the Security Council nor would it be appropriate to bring the right of return alone in its one context to the Security Council. Nor would it be appropriate to have the Security Council on its own say “Israel is a Jewish state, the homeland of the Jewish people” and say nothing more as to any other issue. Nor would it be appropriate to handle just the issue of Jerusalem, the future of Jerusalem. There are many interlocking parts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to highlight but one I would respectfully suggest is not a proper course of action.
Equally important, if not more important, if we were in fact to allow that resolution to pass, what does it say to the Palestinians? Why bother negotiate with the Israelis? Just continue with the UN Security Council and for those of us that deeply believe that the Palestinian people deserve a state of their own, to live in dignity, and to have their own leaders, their own elections, their own economy in a viable state, it is almost irrational to believe that a strategy employing the United Nations Security Council is going to get them to their goal.
Now rather what needs to follow that veto is an American initiative and I would suggest that the President should take this opportunity in the near future to visit both Jerusalem and Ramallah and outline a set of principles that essentially state the following:
- Two states for two people. Israel will be the homeland for the Jewish people, Palestine will be the homeland of the Palestinian people.
- The borders of that state, a non-militarized Palestinian state, will reflect the 1967 borders with subsequent developments. There have been a variety of negotiations. President Abbas has gone as high as 1.9% in terms of the exchanges and they need to be done on an equal basis and Prime Minister Olmert seemingly went as low as 6%. We can do the basic math. If Olmert was at 6% and Abbas was at 2%, it is fair to assume that the conclusion that will be fair to both sides is about 4% in terms of the land swapped. Now what does that mean? It is just a number. But what it means is actually something quite important because it is quite apparent from the Israeli negotiation strategy in the past and their sensitivity today that the issue of settlement and territory is less about security, ironically, and more about how many Israelis, Jewish Israelis in so-called settlements will have to be moved and it is an entirely rational, appropriate policy and objective of the Israeli government to want to have to move and dislocate as few Jewish Israelis as possible when this thing is all said and done. The magic of 4% is that roughly 80% of the Jewish settlers who today find themselves on the eastern or outside of the 1967 lines will find themselves within the internationally recognized borders of the state of Israel.
- Let’s go further. There needs to be the most explicit, robust security arrangements between the United States and Israel to make Israel and the Israeli people comfortable with what would be about to occur. There are anti-missile defenses literally being tested as we speak: they have great promise. There needs to be an international force, whether it be a NATO force or whatever the compilation will be, with a significant American role or American command and that needs to be coupled with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s demand that there be an Israeli command or an Israeli presence. That needs to be married together by very abled diplomats so that the Israelis have enough presence, enough interaction but not so much that President Abbas feels that his sovereignty is being infringed upon. It can be done under an American umbrella, NATO umbrella where I am confident both sides can feel comfortable.
- Going a bit further, Jerusalem. The Jewish neighborhoods will need to be under Israeli sovereignty, the Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty, and a special arrangement made for the holy sites and the holy part of the city.
-We can go further in terms of the right of return. The Palestinian right of return will be to the state of Palestine. This is two states for two people. This isn’t one state for the Palestinians and a half a state in the state of Israel for the Palestinians. This is one state for the Palestinians, Palestine and the Jewish state of Israel of course with the rights of the minority protected as they must be in any democratic state.
These are the principles. They are not shocking. They have been discussed ad nauseam but the truth of the matter is that no American president in a public way, in a definite way, has said “We are going to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the 1967 lines with modifications that reflect subsequent agreements or developments.” Yes, American presidents have talked about the goal and the Palestinian position and the Israeli position. I would respectively argue that it is time to state an American position. It is unfortunate but it is only through, in my humble opinion, an American initiative that we will avoid a catastrophic situation in the West Bank and Gaza in a short period of time.
Prime Minister Fayyad of the Palestinian Authority has done an extraordinary job in terms of building its institutions. Not perfect but he has done an extraordinary job in beginning to create the elements of a state. We need to give that extraordinary effort a boost; presidential statement should do just that. The President shouldn’t do it alone, I would respectively argue. He should invite Chancellor Merkel, he should invite President Sarkozy, Prime Minister Cameron, he should invite whether it be Medvedev or Putin to join with him in travelling to Jerusalem, travelling to Ramallah so that the Israeli people in particular but the Palestinians also understand that this is a worldwide effort and invite the United Nations Secretary General to join with him.
And in closing, I would argue this one point. As we see the beginning of democracy break out in the Middle East and who knows where it will ultimately land but as we see that, why not as Americans argue and I think forcefully, ethically and morally so, that we actually will place our confidence in the democratic process that is vibrant and thankfully exists in the state of Israel and to a certain degree in the West Bank and to a lesser degree unfortunately in Gaza. Let the President go and make that presentation with his colleagues and hopefully Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas will take that opportunity to negotiate in earnest. But if they don’t, I don’t think we should fret and I don’t think we should then conclude that our effort was unsuccessful or for naught. No. What we then should so is essentially challenge the Israeli public to have a debate and I am very confident that the Israeli democracy, the democratic process will ultimately lead them to the right choice. And I think the same applies to the Palestinian people.
Only history can tell – I may be right, I may be wrong but it seems to me that that process or that strategy has at a minimum at least two advantages. One, for the first time in a long time as an American, I would be comfortable with either success or failure knowing that we have done actually the right thing, that we will have outlined what is a just solution to a very complex problem, that we didn’t impose it, we provided an opportunity and we provided it to two states or two peoples that will have a democratic opportunity to debate it. And simultaneously, from a purely American perspective, it will reassert American leadership at a time when many question our strength and our leadership capabilities and I believe we will actually reinvigorate America in the region if we do this in a strategic way. And that would be my respectful suggestion.
One point if I may, in terms of what Dr. Peri said, which is off-point but very important. He talked about the fact that Turkey is no longer a strategic ally of the state of Israel. We can argue of whether that is in fact the case or not. I will concede that. But what I will not concede is that that should always be the case from here on in. Just the opposite. The events in Egypt, the unfolding events in the Arab world make reconciliation between Israel and Turkey even more urgent and the issues that divide Israel and Turkey actually are far less complex than the issues that divide any of these parties in the region. It is a matter of an apology, it is a matter of compensation, it is a matter of acknowledging from both sides perspectives what happened in the flotilla and reconciling both sides’ point of view.
Thank you very much.
Kate Seelye: Thank you Mr. Wexler and Mr. Peri for that very interesting analysis. I should note that Mr. Wexler has written an op-ed that was published yesterday in Politico that was called “Obama’s Peace Process Moment.” We should have copies in the hallway, if not you can find it online. A lot of very interesting issues raised. I think we have a lot of questions about the viability of everything that has been proposed. We only have one microphone so I think we will bundle two questions at a time from let’s say this side and then we will go to the other side. If people could please state their name and affiliation. We have got a gentleman in the back here and then this gentleman in the front.
Question: I have spent the half century on aspects in the Middle East in the executive and legislative branch. I had a quick point and then a question for Mr. Wexler. My point with regard to the veto at the UN, which at first I was very concerned about, on reflection I think even taking the settlement issue by itself, not in the context, one could argue that that was the right decision for the reasons you explain later, that any resolution clearly is going to evolve to Israel getting some territory with substantial settlement blocks in it and to have the UN declare them illegal, although they may be, would make it infinitely harder for the Palestinian leaders to get the public to accept that swap. So even in that context one could argue that that was a good decision. My question is that it seems a little bit like listening to you watching Hamlet without Hamlet because you didn’t mention what the US position should be on Hamas and the tensions and immense problems for Abbas on Hamas. What would your comment be about that?
Question: I want to congratulate you Congressman on your bold initiative with the Obama peace plan because this is exactly what we have been pushing. However there is a flip side to this and it is called Congress and this is why your experience in Congress is so deeply important here and that is if the majority of Congress, particularly the majority of Jewish Congressman and Senators, don’t support Obama and the peace plan whatever that might be along the lines of what you have said, then frankly he is going to be undermined significantly and I think it is going to go nowhere. On the other hand, if they do and I think it would have to be a strong majority, then I think it would send a strong signal to the Israelis and frankly to the Palestinians too. What do you think the prospects of that happening?
The Hon. Robert Wexler: Let me respond to the second question first. As to the politics of an American initiative, this is not an arena in which Congress will lead and as a person who has the deepest respects for the institution of the House of Representatives and the Senate, that is not a bad thing. What I think is very important in analyzing the politics there for the President if he wishes to make this step. I would argue yes but it is dependent on a certain set of factors. Number one: members of Congress need to understand that the president is not 80% committed but 110% committed. They need to understand that the president is going to the mat on this, that he has put the prestige and power of his office on the line. That is also why I outline not for show but the significant desirability of bringing world leaders with him, that this not be just an American initiative but that it be an initiative that is blessed by our European allies, by the United Nations, by Russia is possible, so that this be one of those extraordinary moments where reason and soberness prevail and I have every confidence, that, while sure that people in Congress will always play politics as they should – this is a political environment, but that reason and rationality will prevail because the members of Congress themselves that are most sensitive about this issue, who care deepest about the American-Israeli relationship and about the security and the state of Israel. They will conclude that this type of strategy in policy is in fact advantageous both for America and Israel and for the region as a whole.
The American public also I think will play a role and I have absolute confidence based on a variety of different polling that ultimately at least two thirds, maybe closer to three quarters of the American public will be highly energized by such an effort and there will be skepticism and there will be questions, rightfully so, but that ultimate public opinion not only in America but also in Israel will be supportive of the effort.
Of the first question about Hamas, that is a very important question. What about Hamas? I would argue this from two different perspectives. First and foremost, Israeli concessions and Israeli concessions in the context of security positions need to be contingent upon performance. The Israelis are not going to evacuate sixty, seventy thousands of people, whatever it is, in 15 days. The evacuation from the Sinai when the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty took place took a considerable period of time. The Palestinians are going to have an enormous burden. I would argue that before any peace treaty were to become effective there needs to be a referendum on both sides, both the Israeli side and the Palestinian side and it shouldn’t become effective until both sides pass it. Palestinians need to have a debate too. Now President Abbas and his group are highly confident that if they were to put such an initiative to the people that the likelihood of it passing, again the importance of seeing world leaders show up in Ramallah is quite significant, and that it how you “beat” Hamas. But nobody should be naïve. Part of this security understanding that will need to be negotiated is how you either disarm or in some other fashion co-opt Hamas from causing the problem that it would appear to be likely to cause. Now some would argue, I do not, but some would point to statements that Hamas have made that have said that they would abide by a democratically-conceived decision by the Palestinian people. I don’t rely on that because I don’t trust Hamas. But it would not be correct not to point that out.
Kate Seelye: Could I jump in because I would like to hear Dr. Peri’s response to Congressman Wexler’s proposal. How do you think the Israeli public and Israeli government would respond to what he is proposing Obama should do? And what are your thoughts about Hamas?
Dr.Yoram Peri: Again the majority of the people would not support it I think but I can give you another argument of why you should follow and pursue your idea because I think it is very positive. And that is because if you look about at the history of Israel and its relations with Arab states and you do that not from an ideological point of view but as a student of the Middle East, I prefer the British term student rather than expert that you Americans use, you see that whenever the Israelis and Arabs negotiated directly they couldn’t solve the problem because of this basic perception that the conflict is a zero-sum game. If you win I lose, if you lose I win and you need a third partner to change the structure of the game into a non-zero sum game. Look at the Israeli-Egypt agreement, the issue was peace for territory. The Egyptians lost peace – it was something they had to give to the Israelis – but gained territory. The Israelis got peace but lost territory. But it was beyond that because the US was a partner but parties could gain more than these things. Both Egypt and Israel got a huge amount of military and economic support: $3 billion for 30 years. So a third partner and it can only be the United States, and not Europe, can change the structure of the conflict to a non-zero sum game and therefore, I will put it very strongly, without American support it will not be achieved.
The Hon. Robert Wexler: If I may just to follow, I have a feeling we may be saying the same thing differently. Public opinions polls in Israel for the past decade - and it didn’t matter if we were in the midst of an Intifada or an economic boom like we are now in Israe - the results are the same. Two-thirds of Israelis will in fact support a peace initiative based on the principles that I outlined, but it is important to point out that more than two thirds of the Israeli people don’t have any confidence that it will happen. So if you got past that reservation, if the Israelis saw an American president flanked by world leaders and they got an impression that maybe this is just different than all efforts that have tried and failed before, I think you would not only see that that two-thirds in support would materialize, it would be greater and as confidence grew that this wasn’t just a silly photography exercise, you would actually have a consensus developing amongst a large spectrum Israeli society and I believe the same would be the case in the Palestinian areas.
Question: My question is for Yoram Peri. You presented these two scenarios, one in which Israel closes off and one where there is beautiful Arab peace in the Middle East and considering that the latter will not actualize, I guess my question is what can we do to actually prevent the deterioration of the situation between Israel and its Arab neighbors?
Question: For both panelists, in terms of notions of zero-sum game and the formulation that Robert Wexler gave, I think that you have growingly set up a path forward that speaks to American political situation and the Israeli political situation but there are other aspects of regional and even Israeli-American politics that are lurking and waiting and the one is the whole question of settlements. I would be easier with the veto if somebody else in the Security Council had stood up and wanted to go in that direction. There is a level throughout all negotiations, there is a special role in terms of American politics and in terms of Israeli politics for the settlement issue, which has been allowed to fester within the Israeli political dynamic and within the US political dynamic, in which we have become enablers of occupation through the settlements. This is going to be a hard nut to cut if what you say in terms of the outline of an agreement would be great but getting there will be difficult. And then there is the dimension of both the regional turmoil and the notion of Palestinian politics between Hamas, Fatah and others is put in advance and these will politically come into play.
Dr.Yoram Peri: How to prevent deterioration? Well, the problem is that it is not a new situation from that point of view. The weakness of the position of the Israeli right is that though they had more resonance with their security concerns, they didn’t have a good solution for the future. That was their major problem since 1967. The left, or the peace camp, had positive solutions to the conflict but was seen as too soft on security issues. So the only solution that the right wing could say about how to solve the problem is really the perception that Jabotinsky used “the Iron Wall.” We have to be strong and one day the Arabs will realize that we are here and they will not be able to push us to the sea and they will accept us as a fact. How many more years do we have to wait for that?
So I am afraid that we don’t have a good answer from the right wing camp of how we can prevent deterioration and the fact that the intifada broke was a total surprise, the first Intifada and the second Intifada broke was a total surprise because that perception that we are strong enough and the Palestinians will not have the courage to revolt failed overnight. And I am afraid, I agree with you, that this will happen again in the near future if no serious political steps are taken by the leadership.
The Hon. Robert Wexler: To the point made in respect to the veto, I think you rightfully and correctly so point out the danger of issuing the veto and following it up with nothing meaningful. If the veto is the last and most important message that America makes and let stand in isolation for a long period of time, I would say that we are in a very difficult situation. That is why I would argue veto and now follow in a reasonable period of time with a very bold American initiative. But I think it would be remiss and I guess maybe not so popular possibly in this group to just point out though with respect to the settlement issue, and I understand the Palestinian perspective, but in fairness some of the points that Prime Minister Netanyahu makes are actually valid in this case. Settlements have been going on for decades. In fact, the left wing governments have been often times the initiators of the settlements, Prime Minister Rabin and others, President Peres. I think President Peres, actually, I hope I have this right, indoctrinated the town of Ariel, he went and signed the orders, he went out and did the christening for lack of a better word. So this notion that this right wing Israeli government showed up and all of a sudden settlements are a problem, no; left-wing governments have been a part of the Israeli strategy. But also in fairness where Prime Minister Netanyahu rightfully points out those settlements never prevented the Palestinians from negotiating before and that is true and also what I think is a valid point to bring up is that in fact Israel did provide a fairly significant settlement freeze for 10 months. Secretary of State Clinton correctly went and pointed out how it was unprecedented. That settlement freeze was mocked in the Arab world for the better part of 8 months and when it expired all of a sudden that was the key to continuing. Well you can’t have it both ways, you can’t mock it as being an insignificant and meaningless settlement freeze and then ten months later we can’t continue unless you continue that meaningless, irrelevant settlement freeze. So there are, I think, equities on both sides.
Question: A bold American initiative, as the phrase was used, can only be used by an American president and not by anybody else and yet it has been over a decade since any American president has taken a bold American initiative. I am talking about Bill Clinton, through two Bush administrations and now the better half of the first –I hope first – Obama administration. So how do you explain that? How is it that American presidents – Bush, Obama – have done relatively little from what we read beyond rhetoric and admonishment?
Question: This is a question mostly for the Congressman but I would like both gentlemen to respond. The outline of the presidential plan that you put forward, most of the elements of that have been common to the behind-the-scenes discussion of think tank recommendations for many, many years. This is what it takes to have an end of conflict settlement. As soon as the Palestine Papers were revealed and the Palestinians were talking about making such concessions, they immediately back-peddled and Erekat found it necessary to resign and drop out of it. So my question is what are you saying that is different that the Palestinians have not already publicly rejected whilst privately perhaps conceding that it might be necessary? I don’t see any change there, correct me if I am wrong.
The second, just a statement, you talked about the fact that Netanyahu is facing an election; so is Barack Obama and I think the issue that most Americans are going to be concerned about with the Middle East is the rise in price in oil very soon and that is going to be their concern. So I don’t know if he has the political capital to use all this.
The Hon. Robert Wexler: I think you are correct to point out the impact the Palestinian papers had. You asked the question, well what has changed in terms of what I am suggesting. The change is that it would be an American position. It has never been an American position advanced by the American president. You are correct that think tanks have talked about it, one part of Palestinian society has talked about it, one part of Israeli society has talked about it, there has been the Geneva Initiatives, there have been all kinds of things, but no American president has ever stood before the world and said, ‘Here is America’s position and I expect both the Palestinians and the Israelis to begin negotiations based on these principles.’ That would be what is different and if he did it, as I have said before, flanked by world leaders that would be a remarkable change of events.
With respect to politics and the price of oil, that is a very valid observation. The politics of Barack Obama, I would argue, are far more tied to the American economy and whether unemployment is 8.8% or 7.8% or 6.8% and whether or not he is perceived as doing something meaningful on the budget and so forth. There is a whole host of thirty factors I think we can get together and outline that will dramatically impact Barack Obama’s electability in two years far more than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I agree. But that to me doesn’t change the equation of why the American President should take the initiative now. The price of oil, I grant you, is far more important in terms of political impact.
As to Mr. Gluck’s point, the way you phrased the question I am happy to defend both President Bush and President Obama, which is not a position that I am usually in. In fairness to President Bush, all times are not created equal. President Bush II came to office having watched President Clinton make a heroic effort, devoted himself to a degree that no American president had devoted himself to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and he saw essentially failure. And President Bush legitimately, rationally concluded, “you know what, I am not going to continue that fiasco, I have other things to do,” and also in fairness to President Bush it wasn’t a calm period of time. You had the war in Lebanon, you had an Intifada and an Intifada generally is not the time in which peace initiatives can be pursued while after Shabbat every Saturday night there is another bombing in Jerusalem or somewhere in Israel. So it is not apples to apples. President Bush was presented with an entirely different equation and ultimately of course 9/11 from an American perspective took our focus and changed our perspective. So I don’t think it is necessarily fair to issue a great deal of criticism relative to President Bush and saying he had all this opportunity in making wonderful initiatives and chose not to do it. No, it was a different world, different circumstances.
As to President Obama, also I would differ with you. There has been little or no success – that I would grant – you but unlike President Bush, from the beginning he said that he would focus on this and I would respectively argue that we didn’t pursue a particularly successful strategy in terms of putting forth the settlement freeze as step number one, and I would have argued and did argue – at the time I was still a member of Congress – that asking an Israeli Prime Minister whether he or she is Likud, Labor or anywhere in between, let alone a Likud Prime Minister with a right of center coalition to in effect make a concession on Jerusalem as an opening act - because that is in effect what Prime Minister Netanyahu was asked to do - is unrealistic. Why would he do that? That is what you do at the very end after you understood all the different issues but for an American president, an American administration to pursue a strategy after the Arab allies, did not give steps of normalization let’s remember. They tried steps of normalization; the King of Saudi Arabia said “No, sorry Mr. President I am not giving it to you.” Yet we still insisted upon the Israelis, even though Saudi Arabia is not stepping up to the plate, you need to step up to the plate and have a policy for East Jerusalem that would be very different from past policies from Israeli governments. I don’t think that was particularly wise to do as an opening act.
Dr.Yoram Peri: Since being a veteran of the peace track to peace negotiations, I have developed a different take on the issue of the peace plan, which I advocated for almost ten years. We know what the solution will be. Most Israelis and Palestinians know what the map will be. It started with the Clinton Parameters and it went on to the Taba Agreement and then to the Geneva Accord and then to negotiations between Olmert and Abu Mazen; we know how it is going to happen. Slight differences between here and there which are marginal. What we lack is a will on both sides and only will will make it and therefore to negotiate half a meter here and half a meter there is not the topic or issue. The issue is the will. Until now there was no strong will on both sides. Now we are in a new situation as the question is the price. What will be the price for not achieving an agreement? And the price is more important than the lack of will yesterday. So perhaps by showing both the Palestinians and the Israelis that the price today is much higher than it used to be that might change the perspective.
Question: Mr. Wexler, with all that you have accomplished in life you don’t strike me as a kind of person who would throw yourself in front of a bus. What you have done in your article and what you are saying today is basically challenging the President to move out. So in a sense you are providing the will or hoping to spark the will that Dr. Peri just talked about but I can’t imagine that given your political experience that you would through out something like this without having taken some soundings and put up a few balloons and so forth. Either that or you see desperate times require desperate acts. I would appreciate any comments you have on that.
Dr.Yoram Peri: Maybe you are the balloon.
The Hon. Robert Wexler: I don’t want to give any incorrect impression. My statement is mine, it is not the administration, it is not a trial balloon for the administration. However I think there are a far more number of talented people than I in this town that are coming to at least a similar perspective, very concerned that the lack of initiative will, as was rightfully pointed out, creates a price that is untenable. And that, while conventional wisdom would suggest otherwise, that a significant bold stroke by the President may in fact be what is required and I believe that there are very capable people in the administration that are considering these elements. For me, for my role, I am going to take this show wherever I can take it and try to persuade people I respect greatly in the administration and I am confident that Secretary Clinton and her team are extremely capable of analyzing both the costs and the benefits of each one of these strategies and I think that they are as we speak re-evaluating as they should be.
Question: I just want to challenge my friend over there about an inch for this and an inch for that. Mr. Begin gave up quite more than an inch to get peace. Israel has already demonstrated that it will give an enormous amount just for the sake of peace.
Dr.Yoram Peri: I think that I was misunderstood. What I meant is that whether Israel will have to compromise on 1.5% or 2.7%, these are not the issues or how many parts of East Jerusalem will belong to the Palestinian state or to the Jewish state. The issue is the principle, whether the Armenian quarter will be part of Israel or whether the Armenian quarter will be part of Palestine is less important, whether there will be agreement of the two sides. So it is the principles because when you talk to the people who are involved in the negotiations in the last twenty years, they more or less agreed. For example take the right of return. Every Palestinian will continue to say publicly the right to return for the Palestinians is sacred and we know in track two that they understand that no Israelis will accept it and therefore they are willing to give it up. And this is the reason why Erekat had to resign because he showed there that he understood that point. The same applies to the Israelis and the territories. So we know what is said for the public and unfortunately the truth is not said to the public by both sides but the people who are involved in negotiations know exactly, more or less, what the solution will be.
The Hon. Robert Wexler: I would just – I agree in part but I do think however in fairness the security requirements of the state of Israel have been dramatically changed in the last several weeks and the events that are unfolding in the Arab world has created an entirely different dynamic that hasn’t yet been negotiated before. Although certain of the principles may be similar, I do think that there are parts of this resolution that are yet to be determined.
Mr. Yoram Peri: That is true. Take for example the Jordan River, the Jordan Valley. I thought that until a few months ago Israel could accept not having sovereignty or Israeli forces on the Jordan Valley and accepting international forces so they are not sure if they will do that. You are right.
Kate Seelye: During this historic period of change in the Middle East, MEI would like to do more panels like this, as well as panels on Egypt, Libya, Yemen and the implications of the change in the region so please consider becoming a member. We have membership forms outside. Thank you all for joining us, thank you our very fine panelists.
About this Transcript:
Assertions and opinions in this Transcript are solely those of the above-mentioned author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.