Defense and Security

Fearing war fatigue in Ukraine or an escalation of tensions with the potential to spill over beyond region, the West is keen to act. But what can the EU and NATO do to help resolve the war in Ukraine?

Most of the reporting on Russian recruitment in Syria has involved half-truths, if not outright lies. While it does appear that some Syrians have signed contracts to fight in Ukraine, there is no guarantee these fighters will actually be sent there. The coverage of this topic has also missed a key aspect of who would actually be involved if Syrians really do deploy to Ukraine.

Doesn’t Russia’s egregious invasion of Ukraine look familiar? Whether it’s the flagrant attacks on civilians, the hospital bombings, siege tactics, or rampant disinformation, Ukraine’s parallels with Syria are just about everywhere one cares to look. However, yet another feature of Syria’s grueling war now appears set to be repeated amid reports that Russia is already recruiting Syrian fighters to join combat units on the frontlines in Ukraine.

On March 13, Iran’s IRGC fired missiles at targets in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Erbil. While Tehran’s threat of force might shape the calculations of regional states that are weighing the pros and cons of establishing closer ties with Israel, the Iranians will inevitably have to reckon with the possibility that this heavy-handed approach may backfire.

As Russia pushes on with its relentless invasion of Ukraine, Damascus has done more than toe the proverbial Kremlin line — it has shown complete solidarity with its superpower patron.

The Middle East is experiencing a seismic shift in its geopolitics: the dawn of the era of drones. From Syria to Libya and from Yemen to Iraq, UAVs have altered the dynamics on the battlefield. Agile and affordable, drones aren’t just a menace to remote conflict zones, but also to states far removed from theaters of war.

On Feb. 17, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the coming withdrawal of French armed forces from Mali. The decision put an end to nine years of French military intervention in the West African country.

While there are similarities between Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine today, we argue that overstating them leads to a deeper misunderstanding of both conflicts and leaves out significant differences that need to be addressed.

Iranian observers argue that Russia is willing to sacrifice Iranian interests when expedient, and some might even think that Russia is pivoting toward Israel in its Middle East policy. Nonetheless, the big picture of Russo-Iranian relations over the last decade reveals security cooperation between Tehran and Moscow that stands on a strong and reliable foundation, with both countries benefitting.

Conventional wisdom has it that the conflict in Ukraine will lead the U.S. to bolster its military presence along NATO’s boundary in Eastern Europe, with a concomitant downscaling in the Middle East. While presenting a robust front in support of NATO is of course critical, it would be a mistake to do so at the expense of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East at a time when it appears likely that Russian President Vladimir Putin has chosen the region as the venue for the next moves in his campaign to marginalize the U.S.

In dramatic video coverage currently going viral on YouTube and TikTok, Ukrainian drones are seen to destroy a Russian convoy, with startling speed — and total impunity. The story of how destructive such drone attacks are proving to be was picked up by several U.S. papers, and brought to light the capability of the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone. Despite its emergence as an inanimate hero of the Ukraine conflict, the story of the TB2, and its employment by various actors over the last three years, brings with it a dire warning for the U.S. military.

As the Pentagon funnels more military assets and capabilities into the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command theater, U.S. commanders in the Middle East must now adjust their strategy using an economy of force approach. They need to achieve security and deterrence outcomes by proverbially “doing more with less,” including considering new and creative approaches to achieving results for regional deterrence, such as integrating theater logistics and engineering capabilities more prominently into the deterrence campaign.

The crisis in Ukraine, from the perspective of Ankara, carries significant risks, but also some opportunity. It is neither a crisis of their own making, nor one that they welcomed; nevertheless, Ankara has clearly developed a basic blueprint for weathering the storm. From the perspective of Washington policymakers, their strategy is likely to hold more frustration than reassurance.

Through the vehicle of defense reform, the Biden administration has an opportunity to engage the Saudis on critical national security matters while safeguarding U.S. strategic interests and honoring American values.