The conventional framing of China’s role in the Middle East in policy discourse centers on a familiar question: what challenge does Beijing pose to US primacy? The answer is often framed as a largely linear story in which expanding economic influence gradually translates into geopolitical leverage.Yet this view captures only part of the reality.
Europe did not choose the war with Iran, and most European governments still resist describing themselves as participants in it. But six months of military basing, missile-defense drawdowns, energy shocks, sanctions pressure and planning for possible migration crisis have made that distance harder to sustain.
When President Xi Jinping arrived in Cairo this week for his first state visit to Egypt in a decade, trade, investment and geopolitics were inevitably high on the agenda. But Xi also made something else unusually prominent: culture.
NATO and its Eastern Flank: Challenges of a post-COVID environment
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently urged that the current health crisis should not become a security crisis. To stay secure in the years to come, the Alliance must become more resilient and ready to meet the challenges of a post-COVID environment. This is especially true for the most vulnerable part of the Alliance – its Central and Eastern European (former Communist) member countries.
Arguably the time is now ripe to begin accumulating such nuances in regard to Turkey. The difficulties of dealing with Turkey and President Recep Erdogan are incontestable and well-known. Nevertheless, Turkey’s geopolitical significance is equally indisputable and far-reaching. Many of the major issues in European security – migration, Libya’s civil war, confronting Syria’s civil war (the equivalent in our time of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s), stabilizing the Balkans, defending the Black Sea, European energy security, and in particular accessing the energy in the Eastern Mediterranean – would benefit from the restoration of a true and ongoing strategic dialogue with Turkey. Indeed, neither we nor Turkey can make progress on them without such a dialogue.
Challenges of COVID-19 in areas of protracted conflict
COVID-19 poses immense humanitarian, economic, social and political challenges for the world. However, the threat is especially serious for those affected by ongoing or protracted conflicts. Despite United Nations Secretary General António Guterres appealing for a global ceasefire, there are many conflicts which are not at the forefront of international attention but remain extremely vulnerable to COVID-19. Among them are ongoing and protracted conflicts in the Black Sea and South Caucasus regions.
Iulia Joja and Bob Hamilton join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on economic migration, with a focus on migration trends in the Western Black Sea and South Caucasus.
For an organization whose primary mission is collective security in the North Atlantic area, the Black Sea is a very important region for the North Atlantic Security Organization (NATO). This region forms the southeastern frontier of NATO’s area of responsibility. Thanks to Russia’s actions in the region, there are more miles of coastline under illegal military occupation along the Black Sea than in any other place in the world.
Initial data of Covid-19 mortality rates in the United States suggest that in several regions and cities, the virus hits minority communities harder than the general population. A similar trend has emerged in the Islamic Republic of Iran where published data indicates Iran’s ethnic minorities have higher Covid-19 fatality rates than the general Iranian population.
Diversify and expand: Turkey’s drive towards natural gas security
President Recip Tayyip Erdogan has sought to dramatically reorient Turkey’s role and relationships in the region. Gradually at first but then abruptly, he has pivoted from the Republic’s historical status as a key member of the transatlantic alliance towards new partnerships – including Russia. Erdogan has consistently aimed for freedom in executing his foreign policy agenda, of which energy concerns are pivotal. It remains to be seen whether this hard-sought autonomy will be limited or expanded by Turkey’s domestic energy needs and its prime position as a hydrocarbon transit state.
US engagement in the Black Sea and Middle East. What more can be done?
US support for the Black Sea and the Middle East has been through several phases in recent years, with President Donald Trump’s generals having the biggest impact on policy change. While there has been increased engagement in the region, much more is needed from the US – as well as NATO and the EU – to ensure Black Sea security.
Continuity and Change in US Policies towards the Caspian Region
The U.S. government agenda for Central Asia and the South Caucasus has regularly included a multitude of goals. Whereas in the 1990s, U.S. policy focused on state building, economic development, WMD elimination, and democracy promotion, in the 2000s, counterterrorism rose to the forefront of the U.S. agenda.
As with the rest of the world, COVID-19 is likely to wreak havoc across the Black Sea region in a very short period of time. With the outbreak projected to peak in April or May – and with some predicting the pandemic will last two years and infect 60 to 70 percent of the global population – it is difficult to fathom the potential consequences for this region.
Europe has a vested interest in a safe, secure, and prosperous Black Sea
The European Union’s interest in the Black Sea is based mainly on the fact that two of its members, Romania and Bulgaria, are littoral states. However, the organization is also closely linked with other non-EU Black Sea states, be it economically or politically. Ukraine and Georgia aspire to be EU members while Russia and Turkey both have their own unique and difficult relationships with the EU.
