القوى العظمى في الشرق الأوسط

The U.S. government agenda for Central Asia and the South Caucasus has regularly included a multitude of goals. Whereas in the 1990s, U.S. policy focused on state building, economic development, WMD elimination, and democracy promotion, in the 2000s, counterterrorism rose to the forefront of the U.S. agenda.

As with the rest of the world, COVID-19 is likely to wreak havoc across the Black Sea region in a very short period of time. With the outbreak projected to peak in April or May – and with some predicting the pandemic will last two years and infect 60 to 70 percent of the global population – it is difficult to fathom the potential consequences for this region. 

The European Union’s interest in the Black Sea is based mainly on the fact that two of its members, Romania and Bulgaria, are littoral states. However, the organization is also closely linked with other non-EU Black Sea states, be it economically or politically. Ukraine and Georgia aspire to be EU members while Russia and Turkey both have their own unique and difficult relationships with the EU. 

The outbreak of a Russian-Saudi oil price war earlier this month might offer some comfort to Iran, a country which has in recent years become unnerved by the increasingly close ties between Moscow and Riyadh. However, it is premature to see an Iranian geopolitical win emerging from the Russian-Saudi spat, and history should give Tehran plenty of reservations about Moscow’s ability to deliver on its economic promises to Iran. While Iran and Russia will likely continue to pay lip-service to the idea of an economic partnership, each side will remain preoccupied with larger concerns. This is a tale of unfulfilled economic potential.  

After Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hammered out a deal with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on March 5 to bring an end to the fighting in Idlib in northwestern Syria, he said he was hopeful that the two countries could extend their cooperation to Libya.

The sheer density of protracted conflicts in the Black Sea region makes it particularly exposed to the geopolitical ambitions of regional and global powers. The rapid militarization in Russia-controlled territories in recent years has only added fuel to the fire, dramatically increasing security concerns and underscoring the need for the West and its allies in the region to address the so-called frozen conflicts.

Since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, malign foreign influence within EU countries has been the subject of considerable scrutiny. What lessons can be learned from comparing EU and NATO members Romania and Bulgaria with partner countries Moldova and Georgia?

The Black Sea is a very important region for NATO, and has not received the attention it deserves; a separate focused NATO strategy and support for countries in the Black Sea would send a message that the Alliance takes the region seriously.

Turkey’s blossoming relationship with Russia has not only raised eyebrows in Washington and Western European capitals, it has also caused a great deal of discomfort in countries like Georgia that have borne the brunt of Russian aggression. A few recent scattered signals from Ankara, however, might comfort Turkey’s northeastern neighbor.

Over the past several weeks geopolitical experts have been talking a lot about what the surprise U.S. drone attack on Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the IRGC – Quds Force, on Jan. 3 means for the Middle East and relations between the major powers. What has received considerably less attention, however, is what Soleimani’s killing means for the South Caucasus, a region whose small size belies its strategic importance.

As neighboring regions, the South Caucasus and the Middle East are inextricably intertwined — so much so that the former is sometimes even considered part of the Greater Middle East. While geographical proximity is the strongest driver of interconnectivity between the two regions, geopolitics, business ties, and energy interests also link countries from the South Caucasus and the Middle East and form the basis for important bilateral and regional relationships.

On Jan. 8, Turkey inaugurated the TurkStream natural gas pipeline from Russia, seemingly deepening Ankara’s ties with Moscow. However, a fuller analysis of Turkey’s current energy policies and consumption trends indicate a dramatic shift westward, away from Russia and Iran.

Since regaining its independence nearly three decades ago, European aspirations have been a central part of Georgia’s political agenda and identity. But the reality is more complicated and Georgia is, in a meaningful sense, part of both greater Europe and the greater Middle East.

Having raised eyebrows among many European officials with rhetoric targeting Syrian and other Middle Eastern/North African refugees in Hungary, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán sees the return of Syrian refugees to their home country as serving vital Hungarian and European interests. As Hungary continues to align closely with Russia while deepening its ties with Turkey and other non-Western governments, Budapest’s foreign policy is eroding an EU consensus.

Given their territorial proximity, the regional actors of the Middle East have always had an interest in Georgia and the South Caucasus as a window to Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to Georgia’s isolation, and in the years since the country has gradually started reclaiming its historical role as a cultural and economic crossroads between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.