Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

On September 30, the US completed its military withdrawal from Iraq, ending a 12-year-long mission to combat ISIS that began in 2014. The date was also meant to be the deadline for disarming the largely Iranian-backed militias known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), but Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has now pushed that cutoff back to June 30, 2027. MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow Amb. (ret.) Robert S. Ford joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to discuss what the US military withdrawal means for Iraqi security and the nature of the bilateral relationship going forward. They also speak about what it will take for Baghdad to bring the PMF militias to heel, and how Iraq may navigate the post-Iran war era.

In the summer of 2003, King Abdullah II told Bloomberg Jordan sits “between Iraq and a hard place,” a play on words designed to describe the kingdom’s challenging environment to an American audience amid the US-led Iraq war to the east and the lingering Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the west. Jordan is grappling with a much “harder place” today.

Proponents of the war with Iran have taken recent increases in crude-oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz as proof that the US strategy is finally working. President Trump is so confident in this that he recently rejected a seven-day plan, set forward by Iran’s foreign ministry, to end the war and open the strait. The United States is “winning tremendously,” Trump boasted.

Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline is back in operation after a drone attack from Iraq, blamed on Iran-backed militias, shut it down for nearly two weeks. The pipeline is the kingdom’s main way to export oil while the Strait of Hormuz is closed, so the shutdown dealt another blow to global energy markets. How vulnerable is this route, and what does that mean for the kingdom and the world economy? This episode of Middle East Focus features a recent MEI Virtual Briefing in which Director of Communications Zeina Al-Shaib is joined by MEI Senior Fellow Colby Connelly and MEI Affiliate Yesar Al-Maleki. They examine the new geopolitical risks facing the oil market, what further losses of global supply could mean for Saudi Arabia and the world economy, and which buffers outside the Persian Gulf could ease the pressure.

On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Défense Agreement, a collective-defense pact widely compared to NATO’s Article 5. This essay argues that the comparison is misleading. Mecca borrows NATO’s language of solidarity without yet possessing NATO’s institutional machinery, and the Houthi offensive against Saudi Arabia in September 2026 provided an early and revealing test of what the agreement actually means in practice. Neither Pakistan nor Turkey automatically entered the fight on Saudi Arabia’s behalf, and Washington, despite an initial reluctance to strike directly, remained indispensable through intelligence support and a major proposed F-35 sale. Drawing on realist alliance theory — Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Glenn Snyder, and Steven David — and on the precedent of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the essay contends that the Middle East is not dividing into rival blocs but moving from hierarchy toward a looser, overlapping geometry of hedged partnerships, in which American exclusivity is eroding considerably faster than American primacy.

When Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan agreed to a mutual defense pact in August, it was principally seen as a political commitment. The “Mecca alliance,” as it was dubbed, stipulated that an armed attack on one would be treated as an attack on all three, accompanied by deeper military cooperation.

This article is part of a collection of short essays written by the Fellows of the Middle East Institute to explore aspects of the ongoing war with Iran. The intent of the collection is to help readers see new and unexpected elements of the dynamics and impact of the ongoing hostilities and to think harder, deeper, and broader about the implications of the conflict.

The outbreak of the war with Iran demonstrated the strategic value of maritime chokepoints in the Islamic Republic’s confrontation with the United States. But as Tehran’s strategy of using the Strait of Hormuz to pressure Washington seems to be backfiring, Iran is working with the Houthis to strengthen its leverage over another strategic chokepoint: the Bab el-Mandeb. The recent escalation in Yemen should be viewed within this context.

As the summer draws to a close, the storyline for the 2026 Iran war remains incomplete and the United States’ broader Middle East policy direction highly uncertain. None of the major issues that have long headlined Washington’s Iran portfolio appear any closer to resolution, and new problems have emerged that did not exist before.

A war that the White House initially hoped would be brief has now dragged on for more than six months, with prospects for a resolution frustratingly remote, and the Trump administration’s credibility among friend and foe alike is nearly exhausted. Focusing on defense and security, there are multiple lessons from the Iran war that should shape US strategic thinking.

In February 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggested that shifting international dynamics could push Turkey to acquire nuclear weapons. That rhetoric, combined with Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy and research programs and its indigenous surface-to-surface missile development projects, has fueled concerns that these capabilities could eventually form the backbone of a Turkish nuclear weapons program.

When the US and Israel launched military action against Iran on February 28, 2026, it set in motion a chain of events that saw violence spread across the Middle East. Yet as the region found itself engulfed in conflict, Syria has experienced its most peaceful months in 15 years, and the government in Damascus appears determined to stay its course toward recovery.

More than 30 years after NATO overcame the threat from the Eastern Bloc, the alliance is struggling. Russia is waging war on Ukraine, the US is trying to pivot to Asia, and fresh conflict has erupted on Europe’s doorstep, with Russia and China both seeking advantage. Unexpectedly, for an alliance feeling unmoored, herein lies opportunity.