Mohsen Rezaei: The Unlikely Peacemaker
After decades of political setbacks, Iran’s former Revolutionary Guards commander has returned to the center of power. Is he an incidental beneficiary of war, or have observers underestimated him all along?
After decades of political setbacks, Iran’s former Revolutionary Guards commander has returned to the center of power. Is he an incidental beneficiary of war, or have observers underestimated him all along?
Gulf states and their partners are increasingly looking beyond their most immediate interests of containing the war with Iran. While recent talks between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran have kept de-escalation on the agenda, a broader regional security framework and non-aggression pact has also emerged, envisioning a longer-lasting solution to regional conflicts. The talks have yet to produce a settlement, but they reflect a growing recognition that Gulf security cannot depend entirely on Washington. Iran will still be there, and its neighbors will have to find ways of living with it.
This report explores maritime security conditions in the Mediterranean and the evolving US engagement in the region. As critical infrastructure becomes increasingly vulnerable to sabotage, freedom of navigation is undermined by conflict, and energy disputes generate tension, US policy focus on the region has become fragmented and disengaged. The authors call for a sustained American role to strengthen maritime domain awareness, allied coordination, infrastructure protection, and the capacity to respond when Mediterranean crises affect US and transatlantic interests.
China has perfected the role of concerned onlooker as the Middle East conflict spreads across the region.
The launch of large-scale US and Israeli strikes against Iran places Beijing in a strategically uncomfortable position. This campaign is the most significant US military operation since the Iraq War, unfolding across a region central to China’s energy security and commercial ambitions.
The latest cycle of U.S.-Iran escalation has followed a familiar script: sharpened rhetoric from the United States, calibrated military signaling by Iran in the Persian Gulf, indirect diplomacy through Oman, and Israeli warnings that remain deliberately ambiguous but unmistakably real. Yet beneath this choreography lies a more consequential development inside Tehran. The current crisis is forcing Iran’s political class to reassess its central foreign-policy wager of the past decade: that deepening alignment with Russia and China would provide strategic insulation against Western coercion.
China is becoming harder to ignore in the Middle East. Yet the gap between economic presence and strategic power remains wide, even as American policy swings, argues US academic John Calabrese.
The Abraham Accords have represented a remarkable shift in U.S. Middle East policy. They reframed Arab-Israeli normalization as a result of shared interests – within the Middle East and directly with the US, rather than as a byproduct of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Signed in September 2020, on the last leg of the first Trump administration, the Accords brokered by Washington normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, followed by framework agreements with Morocco and Sudan. From the American perspective, the Accords were intended to break decades of diplomatic stagnation in the Middle East in order to establish a regional framework aligned with American strategic objectives.
In November 2025, the United States sought and obtained approval for a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2803) endorsing the formation of a Board of Peace (BoP) and International Stabilization Force (ISF) to support the implementation of the 20-point peace plan agreed to by Israel and Hamas the previous month. The ISF’s stated role is to help secure and demilitarize the Gaza Strip, primarily by facilitating the decommissioning of weapons, protecting civilians, and training and advising burgeoning Palestinian police forces. In the intervening months, however, progress on standing up the ISF has stalled, and conflicting messaging from US officials provides more questions than answers.
Hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Distinguished Military Fellow Mick Mulroy to discuss the Trump administration’s new National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its implications for the Middle East. While serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East from 2017 to 2019, Mulroy helped prepare the 2018 NDS, giving him an insider perspective on US defense planning. Together, Taylor, Czekaj, and Mulroy unpack what the new strategy means for US priorities globally and for the Middle East in particular, including how it could be reflected in a potentially looming military strike on Iran.
Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban has shifted from open sponsorship in the 1990s to a silent partnership following 2001 to alienation and belligerence since 2021. Their current conflict, which comes at great cost to both countries and seems to have no easy military or political resolution, also poses a threat to the stability and prosperity of neighboring states. Although American strategic interests in the region greatly diminished following the United States’ military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the region’s altered political dynamics have prompted a growing American engagement with Pakistan and tentatively with Afghanistan. At the same time, the US has become a factor in how both Islamabad and Kabul have come to form their national security strategies.
Short description Fusce dapibus, tellus ac cursus commodo, tortor mauris condimentum nibh, ut fermentum massa.