Nabil Mohsen

Seizing Lebanon’s once-in-a-generation opportunity hinges on its ability to resolve its core dysfunction: reclaiming the state’s monopoly on force and its exclusive authority to determine matters of war and peace. Beirut, backed by deepening US support, must focus on achieving tangible milestones and strategic victories that momentum, making Hizballah’s disarmament unstoppable and the state’s reassertion of authority irreversible.

Judicial independence is at the core of any successful democracy, and for decades, this issue has been a matter of public concern in Lebanon. At a time when a credible window of opportunity for change has opened in Lebanon, restoring judicial independence is both a necessity and a prerequisite to enable the judiciary to carry out its duties and end the impunity under which it has historically operated.

The current government in Lebanon is keen to encourage financial recovery and find a new path to economic growth. A thorough understanding of the causes behind the country’s recession and the factors constraining a recovery are necessary to shape policy priorities. These are also important as an input into the discussions of the 2026 budget and to the ongoing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Using the wrong framework for these decisions could yield low economic growth, which would be harmful for a quick and decisive economic recovery. Conversely, improved economic outcomes and broad buy-in, following public consultations, will ease the implementation of politically difficult reforms. Thus, policymakers must take great care to develop a narrative about how to achieve progress in the short and medium terms that is adjusted to local circumstances.

Restoring both domestic and international confidence in the Lebanese government will ultimately depend on taking tangible steps towards economic revival. This article presents key policy options to achieve this result, including rebuilding trust through improved governance and judicial reforms, investing in digital infrastructure, driving sustainable growth via regional integration and innovation, and balancing economic revival with sovereign debt restructuring.

While the banking crisis remains unresolved, there is still ample scope for Lebanon’s central bank to advance reforms and set the stage for a sustainable economic recovery even without a comprehensive reform program supported by the IMF.

Seizing Lebanon’s once-in-a-generation opportunity hinges on its ability to resolve its core dysfunction: reclaiming the state’s monopoly on force and its exclusive authority to determine matters of war and peace. Beirut, backed by deepening US support, must focus on achieving tangible milestones and strategic victories that momentum, making Hizballah’s disarmament unstoppable and the state’s reassertion of authority irreversible.

The central challenge facing Lebanon today is whether the country will graduate to functional statehood or continue struggling to survive. Yet with Lebanese officials now insisting that the state “monopolize arms” and become the decisive arbiter on matters of war and peace, a relevant question arises: Where, territorially, does Lebanon begin and end?

To encourage and incentivize long-overdue structural reforms, the European Union and the broader international community should adopt a more proactive, hands-on approach to Lebanon. The current context calls for an approach that balances assistance delivery with active support to the Lebanese government in its quest to reform and rebuild the state.

Two years of horror and devastation gave way to relief on Oct. 13 when the Gaza ceasefire took hold.

Two years after Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attacks and Israel’s devastating war in Gaza, the two sides have agreed to a new cease-fire. But can it last, and what kind of Middle East has emerged from the turmoil in the interim?

US President Donald Trump started off his week by flying to Israel and Egypt to mark the Gaza cease-fire and release of the last remaining Israeli hostages. But as these positive developments unfolded in the Middle East, the Trump administration’s overall agenda remained weighed down on other fronts.

Iran’s nuclear trajectory is more like a cautious glide along a familiar route than a leap into the unknown, made up of tactical, reversible steps aimed at buying time rather than fundamentally changing the project. 

In New York, Iranian officials quietly explored whether a brief delay to the re-imposition of UN sanctions (‘snapback’) could be negotiated on the sidelines of the General Assembly if negotiations addressed their stockpile enriched to 60 percent. 

A year after Israel defanged Hezbollah, and in the wake of the annual opening of the UN General Assembly and several developments related to the Middle East, it may be a good time to take stock. In my 38-year career of diplomacy in the Middle East, anytime someone expressed optimism, I would suggest a head examination might be in order. However, today there are a few glimmerings of things that might help the region stabilize.