Yemen: The Houthis’ Role in the Next Evolution of the Axis of Resistance

This article is part of a collection of short essays written by the Fellows of the Middle East Institute to explore aspects of the ongoing war with Iran. The intent of the collection is to help readers see new and unexpected elements of the dynamics and impact of the ongoing hostilities and to think harder, deeper, and broader about the implications of the conflict. To read the other essays from this collection, as well as download the full report, please click here.

An earlier version of this article was published by MEI on July 26, 2026.

The outbreak of the US and Israeli war with Iran on February 28, 2026, demonstrated the strategic value of maritime chokepoints in the Islamic Republic’s confrontation with the United States. But as Tehran’s strategy of using the Strait of Hormuz to pressure Washington seems to be backfiring because of the mounting damage it is doing to its own economy, Iran is working with the Houthis to strengthen its leverage over another strategic chokepoint: the Bab el-Mandeb. The recent escalation in Yemen should be viewed within this context.

As US-Iran negotiations faltered and hostilities around the Gulf flared up again in late July, the Houthis began positioning drones and missiles in Yemeni areas overlooking the Red Sea and deploying naval capabilities along the coast in preparation for resuming maritime attacks. Iran, meanwhile, moved to deepen its military and logistical access to Houthi-controlled Yemen, including through the establishment of a direct air link between Tehran and Sanaa.

The Houthis demonstrated the strategic value of this second pressure point by announcing a naval blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea, attacking Saudi oil tankers, and subsequently targeting Aramco facilities in Yanbu and Jizan. The escalation came as Riyadh increasingly relies on the East-West Pipeline to transport crude to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s long-term investment in the Houthis has thus positioned the Bab el-Mandeb, through which around 12% of world trade normally flows, as a second source of leverage over global commerce and regional energy security beyond the Gulf.

The Houthis have been driving an offensive toward southwestern Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb since late August. On September 9, they captured Mokha, a key port city on Yemen’s western coast approximately 50 miles north of the strait, and by September 11, the group’s forces were reportedly in control of several strategic islands in the Red Sea, including Perim (also known as Mayyun Island), located at the entrance of the Bab el-Mandeb. The offensive serves the Houthis’ longstanding objective of expanding their control inside Yemen, but it also strengthens their ability to threaten the strategic waterway. And as Yemeni government forces have pushed back with increasing Saudi support, the Houthis have reignited their campaign against Saudi Arabia, using attacks on the kingdom and its energy infrastructure to raise the costs of Riyadh’s assistance to their Yemeni adversaries. The Houthis’ domestic and regional objectives reinforce one another. Simultaneously, they advance Tehran’s broader strategy: consolidating its ally’s position around the Bab el-Mandeb gives Iran an additional source of leverage against the United States and the latter’s regional partners at a time when Iran’s ability to use the Strait of Hormuz as a pressure point is increasingly constrained by a countervailing US naval blockade that is also starting to choke the Iranian economy.

From Strategy to Implementation

On June 6, Ali Akbar Velayati, the international affairs advisor to Iran’s late supreme leader, spoke of a “new equation of power” in the Middle East and emphasized the importance of the Strait of Hormuz within that equation. Two days later, on June 8, General Esmail Qaani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force, spoke of an emerging “security belt” for the Axis of Resistance — Iran’s term for its network of allied state and non-state actors across Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and beyond. According to Qaani, this new security belt would stretch from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb, and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. To achieve this Iranian aim of closing off strategic chokepoints to pressure Washington and its close US regional partners, Tehran is increasingly relying on its ally in Yemen, the Houthis.

The Houthis have repeatedly affirmed their support for Iran and the Axis of Resistance throughout the war. In March, Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi described the US-Israeli attacks on Iran as “a war on Islam and Muslims” and declared that the Houthis stood with Iran and were “ready for all developments in this battle.” Iran soon intensified its support for the Houthis, openly and in defiance of the Yemeni government and the international community.

On July 3, a flight from Iran’s Mahan Air landed in Sanaa for the first time in more than a decade. Direct flights between Tehran and Sanaa had not operated since the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in March 2015. The Mahan Air plane picked up a Houthi delegation traveling to Tehran to attend Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s state funeral. The flight came a little over two weeks after the signing of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU), an agreement also meant to pave the way for renewed talks on Iran’s nuclear program. The Houthis accused the Saudis of flying fighter jets over Sanaa to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. They declared direct flights between Tehran and Sanaa would continue, warning that any future Saudi attempt to stop them would be met with a “comprehensive response targeting airports and vital interests on land and at sea.” Less than two weeks later, Iran dispatched a second Mahan Air flight to return the delegation. When the Riyadh-backed Yemeni government struck Sanaa International Airport to prevent the aircraft from landing, Tehran diverted the flight to Hodeidah, demonstrating its determination to establish a direct air link despite repeated warnings. In addition to the Houthi delegation, reports indicate that the Mahan Air flights transported IRGC commanders, military advisers, and missile and drone parts into Yemen. By early September, US officials estimated that hundreds of IRGC officers were operating in Yemen alongside the Houthis, supporting their military operations to gain control over the Bab el-Mandeb.

Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi followed through on threats to retaliate by announcing a blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea and later expanding attacks against Saudi Arabia’s Abha International Airport as well as its maritime and energy infrastructure. Rather than mere rhetoric, Abdulmalik’s statement appears to have laid out a ladder of escalation as part of Iran’s broader strategy.

From Confrontation to Consolidation

The Houthis’ threat to use force against Saudi Arabia to protect their newly restored air connection with Iran should not be viewed in isolation. Rather, it reflects a broader feature of Tehran’s evolving strategy: the increasingly coordinated use of the Axis of Resistance to transform periods of confrontation into opportunities to consolidate gains, reshape facts on the ground, and strengthen Iran’s regional leverage. If sustained, the air corridor would give Iran easier access to Houthi-controlled Yemen, facilitating the movement of IRGC personnel and advisors while strengthening the political, logistical, and operational connectivity that deepens Iran’s foothold in the country. More broadly, this effort reflects Tehran’s long-running objective of transforming the Axis of Resistance from a network primarily designed for asymmetric deterrence into a more tightly coordinated “unified resistance front” (wahdat al-sahat), capable of synchronizing military, political, and strategic pressure across multiple theaters.

The latest war has demonstrated how far this transformation has progressed. As Iran and its allies sought to broaden the conflict with the US, Hizballah opened a new front against Israel, entering the war from Lebanon under the banner of avenging Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, killed in an Israeli strike at its onset. At the same time, Iraqi militias expanded the conflict by launching attacks against US forces and interests across Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and the Gulf. These attacks demonstrated Tehran’s ability to activate multiple Axis partners simultaneously and mobilize them in pursuit of shared objectives.

Although these actions did not fundamentally alter the military balance in Iran’s favor, they significantly increased the perceived costs of further escalation. Strategically, they demonstrated that the conflict could spiral out of control and plunge the region into a wider crisis. By using the Strait of Hormuz as a source of leverage and then extending that coercive pressure to the Bab el-Mandeb through the Houthis, Tehran aims to pressure Washington into making concessions in the implementation of the MoU, including recognizing Iran’s leading role in the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz.

The Houthis and Iran’s Evolving Regional Strategy

The Houthis’ role during the earlier months of the war remained limited to sporadic strikes against Israel and threats to disrupt maritime traffic. This was often interpreted as evidence that the group sought to avoid being drawn into a costly regional conflict, but a closer look suggests a different explanation. The Houthis’ initial limited involvement may have reflected an Iranian calculus that there was little value in fully mobilizing the group, rather than any reluctance on the Houthis’ part to become involved. Through coordinated activation of Hizballah and Iran-aligned Iraqi militias, Tehran had already strengthened its negotiating position with Washington and ultimately secured a cease-fire and an MoU without opening the Bab el-Mandeb front. Rather than unnecessarily expending one of its most valuable regional assets, Iran may have deliberately preserved the Houthis for a more strategic role in the future.

Shortly after Iran signed the June MoU with the US, Quds Force Commander Qaani described the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as one of the Axis of Resistance’s “winning cards,” warning that additional capabilities could be revealed if necessary. The statement’s significance lies less in the threat to maritime traffic than in what it says about Iran’s thinking: Tehran views the Houthis not merely as a force capable of disrupting shipping but as a platform through which it can sustain, coordinate, and expand the next phase of the Axis of Resistance.

The Houthis have similarly cast their role in explicitly regional terms. In June, Abdulmalik al-Houthi said the group was in “full coordination” with others in the axis and ready to respond to any escalation. Earlier, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree warned that the group’s “fingers are on the trigger for direct military intervention” if the Red Sea were used to launch attacks against Iran. The recent fall of Mokha and the Houthis’ push south toward the Bab el-Mandeb thus represent the realization of those threats.

These efforts build on a strategy that has evolved over the past decade. Long before the current war, Tehran was already working with the Houthis to expand Iran’s influence across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa while gradually strengthening the group’s maritime capabilities. According to Houthi expert Adnan al-Gabarni, Iran began training Houthi personnel in maritime warfare as early as 2014. Yemen had become so important to Iran that Abdolreza Shahlai, a senior commander in the IRGC Quds Force, was reportedly already operating in Saada by January 2014, where, according to a prominent tribal leader from the governorate, he was assigned to oversee the Yemen file and the Houthis’ recruitment, training, arming, and military operations. He appears to have spent considerable time in the region and played a crucial role in deepening Iran’s ties with the Yemeni group. Iran’s investment in the Houthis “entered a more strategic phase in 2019 through supplying the group with anti-ship capabilities, maritime systems, and naval mines while deploying experts to adapt missiles for maritime use,” according to Gabarni. From 2021 onward, the Houthis began publicly showcasing these increasingly sophisticated maritime capabilities.

Iran’s investment in the Houthis also formed part of a broader evolution in its regional strategy. Over the past decade, Tehran has gradually transformed the Axis from a hub-and-spoke network into a more integrated ecosystem. Rather than relying primarily on transfers of weapons and financial support, Iran has increasingly invested in the technology, expertise, procurement networks, manufacturing capabilities, and operational know-how that enable partners to generate capabilities of their own and reinforce one another.

The success of this approach is already evident in the Houthis’ ability to develop links across the Horn of Africa on their own initiative, albeit with continued support from Tehran. Since 2023, reports have pointed to growing collaboration between the Houthis and Somalia-based al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab. Hundreds of al-Shabaab fighters have reportedly received training in Yemen, while Houthi operatives have been deployed to Somalia to provide instruction in drone adaptation and manufacturing of explosive devices. Beyond collaboration with al-Shabaab, the Houthis have been recruiting assets from communities throughout the Horn of Africa, laying the groundwork for longer-term political, logistical, and operational networks in the region.

Moreover, the Houthis are playing an ever more important role in advancing Iran’s objectives in Sudan. Following the outbreak of the civil war in 2023, Tehran restored relations with Khartoum and sought to establish a permanent naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast while simultaneously cultivating ties with Islamist factions aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces. Recent reports indicate that Houthi operatives were deployed to Sudan alongside IRGC personnel to train these factions in drone manufacture and operation. The Houthis have also allegedly transported weapons to them on Iran’s behalf.

Creating a Yemen Corridor

The 2026 Iran war has reinforced the growing importance of the Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea in Tehran’s regional strategy. Iranian efforts to establish direct air links with Houthi-controlled Yemen, extend the Houthis’ operational reach and ability to disrupt shipping traffic in the Red Sea, and expand their presence in the Horn of Africa point to a broader aim: establishing a durable logistical and operational corridor centered on Yemen. This developing corridor ultimately enables Tehran to threaten disruption at both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, and to hold leverage over a far greater share of global energy and commercial shipping than either chokepoint could provide alone.

Tehran is already translating this strategy into coercive leverage. The rapid progression from the announced blockade of Saudi shipping to attacks on Saudi oil tankers and energy infrastructure shows that the Bab el-Mandeb is no longer a contingency for future crises but an active instrument of Iranian strategy — in line with earlier reports that Tehran instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab el-Mandeb should the US strike Iranian infrastructure. The strategic logic is straightforward: if Washington seeks to make Iran’s Strait of Hormuz blockade economically unsustainable, Tehran will try to make sustained US pressure increasingly costly as well by widening the economic consequences of the confrontation beyond the Persian Gulf and forcing the United States to confront two major maritime crises at once.

While international attention has until now been fixated mainly on the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear activities, Tehran and the Axis of Resistance are adapting to the post-war environment and laying the groundwork for the next phase of regional competition. The Houthis’ heretofore limited role in the Iran war should never have been mistaken for a diminished threat — as their reported mid-September seizure of Perim Island makes clear. The greater challenge extends beyond Iran’s nuclear and missile programs to the quiet construction of a decentralized, self-sustaining network — one capable of generating military capabilities, supporting proxy operations, and creating multiple, interconnected sources of strategic leverage across the Middle East and the Red Sea region. Less reliant on overt Iranian support and more resilient, this model is increasingly capable of surviving the loss or degradation of individual partners, making it far harder to disrupt through conventional military or economic pressure.

Nadwa Al-Dawsari is an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the University of South Florida. He is the author of the forthcoming book The Lion, the Bear, and the Eagle: Iran, Russia, and the United States and Their Struggle over the Modern Middle East. Follow him on X at @MahmoudianArman.

Top image: Yemenis watch a speech by Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Huthi on a large screen, as crowds gather in the capital Sanaa on August 25, 2026. Photo by Mohammed Huwais / AFP via Getty Images. 

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