The Return of Iraqi Shi‘i Militias to Syria

It has long been known that the Assad regime, facing a shortage of manpower in its regular army, has had to rely on irregular paramilitaries in its bid to reverse rebel advances. This became particularly apparent in 2013, when Hezbollah openly declared its participation in the capture of Qusayr, a town in Homs Province on the border with Lebanon.

Since then, the presence inside Syria of Iraqi Shi‘i militias, most of them proxies of Iran, has been extensively documented. When the militias first appeared in 2013, they claimed to defend the Sayeda Zainab shrine in Damascus. Though there is some validity to this narrative in that jihadi rebels, who have influence in the Damascus area, would consider the shrine to be a religious affront that should be destroyed, the militias’ involvement in fighting went far beyond the Sayeda Zainab area. This demonstrates an effort by Iran to mobilize its proxies to help secure the Assad regime’s survival in western Syria.

Most of these fighters then left Syria by the end of the summer of 2014 to focus on the Iraqi home front, but in past months many have come back to Syria. The security situation in Iraq has stabilized to some degree so that ISIS is no longer seen as an imminent threat to Baghdad and the Shi‘i holy sites at the heavily garrisoned city of Samarra. In addition, ISIS has been driven back from besieged Shi‘i towns such as Amerli, and Shi‘i militias and regular armed forces on the whole now find themselves on the offense against ISIS, expelling the group from all major towns in Diyala and Babil Provinces and currently attempting to retake the Tikrit area.

As a result of this shift in military dynamics in favor of Iraq’s government, many of the familiar Shi‘i militias have reappeared in Syria, with contingents now fighting in both countries. One example is Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar, which first emerged in 2013 and portrays itself as loyal to cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, even though Sadr has never officially sanctioned the Shi‘i militia effort inside Syria. The group’s spokesman, Salam al-Safir, confirmed in September 2014 the withdrawal of the group’s members to Iraq.^[1] Yet since December 2014, evidence indicates the group’s reemergence in Damascus. As Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar’s leader Hayder al-Juburi put it in mid-January 2015, “Yes, [we are] in al-Sham within the sector of responsibility because the holy sites are one, whether in Iraq or any place and at any time.”^[2] Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar’s recent involvement in fighting in northeast Latakia Province puts into doubt the group’s narrative as having returned to Syria to defend Shi‘i holy sites.[3]

Other Iraq Shi‘i militias that have reappeared in the Damascus area include Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein and the Rapid Intervention Regiment.^[4] These groups have formed a close working relationship, and the Rapid Intervention Regiment lately announced a new “Martyrdom Operative Battalion” inside Syria.[5]

Media reports on Assad’s recent offensive launched in Deraa and Quneitra to reclaim southern border territories from the rebels have mostly focused on the participation of the Syrian Army, Hezbollah, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, when in fact an Iraqi proxy of Iran, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, which first emerged in Syria, is also participating.^[6] Its participation is officially presented as part of the narrative of defending Sayeda Zainab.

On January 25, 2015, prior to the launch of the offensive, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada announced on its website the passing of two “martyrs” who had died fighting in defense of Sayeda Zainab—a clear reference to operations in Syria.^[7] For the group’s involvement in the Deraa-Quneitra offensive, one must look beyond the official website. Al-Anwar 2, an Iraqi television channel,[8] produced a documentary on Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’s participation in the offensive, entitled The Men of God in Syria, in which the fighters present their effort as part of defending Sayeda Zainab and at one point affirm that they are in Deraa province, just 20 kilometers away from Israel.^[9] Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’s participation in the Deraa-Quneitra offensive[10] alongside other Iranian proxies and Iranian personnel points to Iran’s aim of opening up a potential front in the Golan region against Israel.[11]

Further north, a more diverse set of irregular actors has emerged.[12] In contrast to the situation in 2013, nothing currently suggests the involvement of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq—another Iranian proxy in Iraq—in the fighting in Aleppo, where it previously had an official contingent known as Liwa Kafeel Zainab.^[13] However, the current participation of another Iraqi Shi‘i proxy of Iran, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba,^[14] whose fighters first emerged in Syria in 2013 under a variety of brands such as Liwa Ammar ibn Yasir,[15] compensates for that absence. Yet media reports have again tended to overlook this ongoing Iraqi participation in Aleppo, focusing instead on the undeniable role of Hezbollah and Afghan Shi‘i fighters.

The involvement of foreign Shi‘i fighters still appears to be crucial for the regime as it seeks to consolidate control of western Syria from Deraa north to Aleppo. This does not mean that most of the fighters supporting the regime are foreign, but the reemergence of Iraqi Shi‘i fighters in Syria should be more widely recognized as a sign of the consolidation of militia dominance—of those that are Iranian proxies, above all—in Iraq and the relative stabilization of the security situation there.