Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

The subject of extensive international interest and attention over the past few years, blockchain technology is regarded as a key component of the fourth industrial revolution. This article seeks to shed light on the use of blockchain technology in the Gulf states by analyzing current trends of blockchain adoption in the region compared to those internationally. In so doing, it will determine Gulf institutions’ capacity for keeping pace with the changes and developments blockchain adoption has introduced.

On Nov. 23, Malaysia’s prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, announced that his country will stage an Islamic summit in Kuala Lumpur from Dec. 19-21. The event, on the theme of “The Role of Development in Achieving National Security,” will feature representatives from the host country as well as Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey. Around 450 leaders, scholars, clerics, and thinkers from 52 countries will attend, along with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan.

The leaders of the six GCC member states will meet in Riyadh on Dec. 10 amid signs that the 30-month-old confrontation with Qatar by the self-described “Anti-Terror Quartet” is diminishing.

Two months into the popular uprisings in Iraq and Lebanon, both countries are mired in a painful standoff.

Political analyst Hafsa Halawa and MEI Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the political crisis in Iraq following the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, the protest movements that have rocked both Iraq and Iran, and the impact of Iranian impact in Baghdad on Iraq’s development going forward.

The 12-country Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), which held its latest meeting in Equatorial Guinea on Nov. 28, has never had OPEC’s ability to control energy prices, but that is likely to change as liquefied natural gas (LNG) transforms the gas market from a regional to a global one.  

Faced with rapidly deteriorating public finances, Iranian policymakers had no choice but to reduce gasoline subsidies through a combination of rationing and price hikes. However, the way in which they did so was problematic, especially when they had other, better policy options that would have ensured a more equitable, effective, and efficient outcome.

The protests that began in Iran in mid-November may well have a direct impact on Tehran’s relations with Washington. Initially sparked by the Iranian government’s sudden decision to raise fuel prices, the demonstrations have made clear the country’s fragile socio-economic and political situation.

There is no end in sight to Iraq’s political crisis even though Parliament unanimously voted to remove Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi on Sunday. Abdul-Mahdi now tends a caretaker government while Iraq’s political leaders are interpreting the country’s constitution to give President Barham Salih 15 days starting from Nov. 30 to name a new prime minister.

Tehran’s reaction to the resignation of Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi is one of accepting the seemingly inevitable.

Female entrepreneurs in Iran have to contend with domestic, social, and legal barriers. To overcome the challenges, they are increasingly embracing online business, and many use Instagram as a platform.

Adding to the backdrop of economic mismanagement, corruption, and increasing rates of poverty and inequality, the recent gasoline rationing and price hikes have ignited widespread and violent protests inside Iran. Despite recent changes, the country’s energy subsidy regime remains highly inequitable, ineffective, and inefficient.

Although 350 Iraqis have died to date and close to 16,000 have been wounded, protesters are not going home. Yet, most of the ruling clique is still rejecting the idea of forcing the prime minister to resign.

Since early October, the southern provinces of Iraq have been consumed by protests and strikes. While ruthlessly attempting to suppress protests, the Iraqi government has promised legal and political reforms. Yet some of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq’s elites are suspicious that the government’s reform agenda is a “conspiracy” against Kurdish entitlements masquerading as a good faith effort to placate the protestors. The region’s hegemonic parties are concerned that legal, constitutional, and procedural reforms may overhaul the institutions that guarantee their positions of influence in the federal government and secure their territorial claims.