Levant

Since Turkey’s presidential election in May, western analysts have held out hope that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will moderate his strongman style of rule. Feeding their optimism are several steps Erdoğan has taken, including appointing market-friendly technocrats to his economic team, replacing the hardline interior minister, dialling down anti-western rhetoric and voicing support for Sweden’s Nato membership. All these moves, however, are aimed at strengthening Erdoğan’s one-man rule, and the west is helping him. 

When the Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, visits New York for the opening of the UNGA this week, he will try to project a sense of confidence and argue that the Iranian regime is purportedly committed to building ties with its neighborhood by promoting and referring to its membership in various regional dialogue forums. Yet their existence has historically not moderated Iranian behavior.

As the original Abraham Accords signatories — Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain — observe the third anniversary of their September 2020 agreement, there is a sufficient basis to evaluate whether the Abraham Accords are real, hype, or something in-between. Much like the case a year ago, the results so far remain mixed.

On Sept. 8, the Kurdish-led SDF, a key U.S. ally, announced the end of its “Operation Security Enhancement” in Deir ez-Zor in northeast Syria. While framed as an operation targeting ISIS sleeper cells and criminals, it aimed at quashing an armed uprising led by Arab tribesmen, particularly members of the Akidat tribe. While multiple factors may have contributed to fueling the uprising, the importance of the region’s longstanding grievances cannot be overstated.

Thirty years on since its historic signing, the Oslo Accords framework continues to define virtually all aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations as well as America’s and the broader international community’s approach to the peace process. Yet Oslo’s extraordinary longevity stands not as a testament to its utility but to its unmitigated and ongoing failure.

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On Sept. 8, the Syrian Democratic Forces were able to enter the villages and towns of Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside, stretching from al-Tayyanah to al-Baghouz, regaining control of all of the areas that had witnessed an uprising against their forces beginning on Aug. 27. But what sparked the fighting in the first place, how did things play out, and what might it mean for the region going forward?

تمكنت قوات سوريا الديمقراطية في الثامن من أيلول/سبتمبر، من الدخول إلى قرى وبلدات ريف ديرالزور الشرقي الممتد من بلدة الطيانة حتى الباغوز، بذلك أعادة السيطرة على جميع المناطق التي شهدت حالة تمرد ضد قواتها، التي بدأت في السابع والعشرين من شهر آب/ أغسطس الماضي.

Russia’s malign behavior in the Black Sea includes piracy, plunder, petroleum price cap violations, and actions to prevent the free transit of foreign commercial and naval vessels. Its largely unchallenged position in the Black Sea also helps Russia maintain access to foreign-made products and components, circumventing sanctions. The West and the broader international community have yet to act to decisively rein in these flagrant violations of international laws and norms.

The normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is looking increasingly likely, even if it does not take place in the immediate future. For Israel, normalizing relations with as many Arab states as possible — especially if it does not have to give up much in exchange — has always been a strategic goal. For the new Saudi Arabia, those ambitious goals strongly suggest opening up to the Israeli economy. 

Years of simmering tensions between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and local populations in northeast Syria have exploded this week into still-expanding battles across much of Deir ez-Zor. Conflict resolution requires the international coalition to engage with the Kurdish administration on deep political and administrative reforms. However, the violence in Deir ez-Zor may demand a more creative and locally driven approach to the northeast to foster a more resilient governance and security structure.

Last week saw a flurry of diplomatic activity between Baghdad and Ankara. The top priorities in the talks were oil exports, the presence of the PKK in Iraq, and Iraq’s water crisis. The outcomes have been unimpressive, but there is an opportunity for Iraq to shake things up and improve its bargaining position, at least on the oil export issue, possibly more.

As the Wagner Group has an entrenched military presence in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, the evisceration of its senior leadership will have serious repercussions for Russia’s influence in the MENA region. Wagner’s military contractors are unlikely to depart, since they guard strategically valuable oil and mining facilities; but they are likely to now be swiftly integrated into the regular Russian Armed Forces.

The SDF has always been a diverse coalition of localized actors. Over the past eight years, it has managed to contain these persistent frictions, but that may now be coming to an end. In the past three days, at least 50 people have been killed in fighting between Arab tribal fighters and the SDF in the region where Syria’s Khabur and Euphrates rivers meet. The catalyst for this fighting occurred late on Aug. 27, when Ahmed al-Khubayl, the leader of the SDF’s Deir ez-Zor Military Council, was lured north to Hasakah for a purported meeting, only to be arrested alongside his brother and four other commanders.