Levant

Sudan has a longstanding strategic partnership with Turkey, forged on the basis of shared ideology and fostered by growing economic and political ties, that has proven resilient to regime change. Khartoum has not abandoned its relationship with Ankara despite the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 or the opposition of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, Turkey’s former regional rivals and more recent cautious partners.

Turkey’s economic problems continue to go from bad to worse. Its foreign trade deficit has reached a monthly average of $8 billion this year. Amid the sharp rise in global energy prices this spring following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the country’s average gross energy imports shot up from $3-4 billion per month to $7-8 billion. A reduction in energy imports and the recovery of tourism this summer have not offset this, and the current account deficit continues to widen.

Power-sharing arrangements remain a paradoxical phenomenon. As a powerful tool to stop the guns of conflict, they tend to kill the ingredients for peace by preventing politics from changing. Three countries with such arrangements have recently held elections in which outcomes have — ostensibly — led to such political change. Change, however, has yet to materialize and so far the elections have brought more of a perennial companion of power-sharing arrangements: political gridlock.

The emergence of Egypt as an Eastern Mediterranean energy hub resulted from a culmination of years of deliberate efforts. Increasingly, Egypt will be able to re-export Israeli natural gas or convert it into blue hydrogen, generate green electricity for export, or utilize its growing wind and solar power capacity to produce green hydrogen.

The latest IPCC reports clearly indicate that cities — responsible for up to 72% of global emissions — need to be redesigned to stand a chance against the climate crisis. The urban communities of the Middle East and Black Sea regions face some of the most difficult climate change effects. To properly address their challenges, a comprehensive analysis of drivers and strategies to follow is needed.

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هذا يضعنا أمام تسأل مهم، لماذا باتت ردود الفعل للمجتمعات المحلية على الإدارة الذاتية وجناحها العسكري ردود محدودة أو منعدمة في كثير من الأحيان؟، رغم أن هذه المجتمعات خاضت معارك طاحنة ضد النظام و تنظيم “داعش” لذات هذه الأسباب.

In early June, the SDF, the military wing of the AANES, raided the al-Mouh neighborhood in Abu Hamam in eastern Deir ez-Zor. They burned down several houses under the pretext that their owners were wanted for smuggling oil derivatives to areas under Syrian regime control, but the incident did not provoke any response from the al-Shaitat tribe affected. This raises an important question: Why do local communities respond to attacks by the AANES and its military wing in at most a limited way when these same communities fought fierce battles against the Syrian regime and ISIS when they carried out similar attacks?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is notorious for pursuing a one-man foreign policy strategy to consolidate his popularity with his nationalist voter base. He has utilized bold, and sometimes reckless, foreign policy as a vehicle for his political ambitions. Now, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has opened up new high-risk opportunities for Erdoğan to improve his domestic image, especially as the next Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections approach.

Given Jordan’s often cautious diplomatic demeanor, the best way to respond to media reports that the U.S. was about to launch a “Middle East NATO” regional alliance on the eve of President Joe Biden’s visit to the region was to step in and take a stand. And it seems that King Abdullah thought that saying “yes” to the idea when he meant “yes but” would be the best response at this stage.

Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.

As the threat of a new Turkish military incursion into northern Syria looms, other international stakeholders in the Syrian crisis continue to voice their concerns over Ankara’s ambitions. At odds with Turkey since 2011 over its desire to overthrow the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its support for an array of armed opposition factions, Iran has been increasingly vocal of late in opposing a potential new Turkish military operation.

The departure of Hossein Taeb from his post as the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Intelligence Organization triggered a wave of reshuffling in the command structure of the guardsmen. But the story is more than just a reaction to Iran’s unsuccessful terrorist targeting of Israelis in Turkey and counterintelligence lapses. There are internal power struggles and a natural maturation of the Islamic Republic’s security structure that also likely figured into the decision to remove Taeb.