Levant

In early June 2022, the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East met in Beirut. Facing a $100 million budget deficit and the indifference of donor countries, UNRWA’s future is uncertain.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

After 16 years under Angela Merkel, Olaf Scholz’s assumption of Germany’s chancellorship on Dec. 8, 2021 marked a new chapter in the nation’s politics. Within the “traffic light” coalition government formed by the Social Democrats, the Free Democratic Party, and the Greens, Annalena Baerbock heads the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before taking office, the co-leader of Alliance 90/The Greens was known for both her welcoming attitude toward immigrants and her full-throated condemnation of human rights violations by authoritarian governments. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has no shortage of the latter: According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, 17 out of the 20 countries in the region are “authoritarian” and not one is characterized as a “full democracy.” Beyond human rights, other key MENA policy issues for the new government include Iran, Turkey, ongoing conflicts in the region, and immigration. The challenges are numerous, if well-known, but how will Berlin respond? Is Germany’s policy toward MENA likely to change or remain the same under the new government?

Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has opened up new opportunities for Turkey, but Erdogan should not overplay his hand.

With its recent deepwater exploration success in the Black Sea and prominent geographic location for interregional hydrocarbon pipelines, Turkey can play a material role in shaping the geopolitical landscape today, especially in the natural gas sector. The country will face a strategic conundrum, whether to utilize newly discovered gas resources entirely for domestic needs and thereby reduce gas imports that come with political baggage as well as foreign currency expenditures, or export gas to capture foreign revenue that Ankara desperately needs.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

Water is slowly emerging as yet another potential cause for dispute between Ankara and Tehran. As of late, the two neighboring states have been at loggerheads over a number of issues, including Syria and Iraq, where they have opposing interests. After years of quiet diplomatic juggling, the issue of transboundary water management is gradually taking center stage in the two countries’ relations, a development that could, in the medium run, have serious repercussions for regional security.

The March 2022 elevation of the Turkey-Uzbekistan relationship to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” provides the Ankara-led Organization of Turkic States with a new geopolitical heft. To preserve its autonomy in the face of Beijing’s growing regional dominance, Tashkent has turned to Ankara to act as a countervailing force in both economic and security affairs. Combined with the expanding Turkey-Pakistan strategic partnership, this makes Turkey a rising Eurasian agenda setter that will impact the strategic calculus of both Beijing and Washington.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus has been unable to find a model for regional cooperation or form regional organizations. The relative calm that followed the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, especially after the signing of the November 2020 cease-fire agreement, renewed hopes that this might change. Significant challenges to regional cooperation remain, however, and Russia’s war with Ukraine has only complicated matters further.

On June 6 Israel’s coalition government lost an important vote, in which more than half of the Knesset members on both sides voted against their own most fundamental beliefs in a desperate effort to either bring down the coalition or to save it. The substance of the legislation was barely more than a pretext, but the opposition smelled blood and was willing to do virtually anything to regain power.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

The considerable financial shortfall experienced by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) over the past couple of years has measurably affected its morale, readiness, and operational capacity. There couldn’t be a worse time for the LAF to potentially fall apart. A series of monumental challenges await Lebanon now that the parliamentary elections are over, all of which demand a modicum of stability that only the LAF can provide.

Following a series of reshuffles within the Syrian National Army (SNA), a Turkey-supported alliance of armed opposition groups in northern Syria, four armed groups with roots in Syria’s eastern provinces, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Jaish al-Sharqiya, the 20th Division, and Suqur al-Sham’s eastern affiliate, announced the formation of the Liberation and Construction Movement (LCM) on Feb. 15, 2022. On April 25, 2022, the author held a four-hour conversation with the LCM’s leadership to discuss its genesis and ambitions, the issue of human rights violations, and the alleged incorporation of former ISIS members. In addition to providing the LCM’s perspectives on the Syrian conflict and its own role as a military, political, and societal actor, this conversation serves as a useful starting point for reflecting on the politics of humanitarian aid and predominant Western approaches to dealing with conflict parties such as the LCM.