Turkey

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s July 19 visit to Tehran will have important repercussions for the region’s evolving security environment as well as the trajectory of Iranian-Russian relations more specifically. Although officially billed as seeking to revive the “Astana peace process” on Syria, the significance of the trip has less to do with the trilateral meeting between Iran, Russia, and Turkey and more with the deepening of ties between Moscow and Tehran.

Sudan has a longstanding strategic partnership with Turkey, forged on the basis of shared ideology and fostered by growing economic and political ties, that has proven resilient to regime change. Khartoum has not abandoned its relationship with Ankara despite the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 or the opposition of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, Turkey’s former regional rivals and more recent cautious partners.

Turkey’s economic problems continue to go from bad to worse. Its foreign trade deficit has reached a monthly average of $8 billion this year. Amid the sharp rise in global energy prices this spring following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the country’s average gross energy imports shot up from $3-4 billion per month to $7-8 billion. A reduction in energy imports and the recovery of tourism this summer have not offset this, and the current account deficit continues to widen.

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is notorious for pursuing a one-man foreign policy strategy to consolidate his popularity with his nationalist voter base. He has utilized bold, and sometimes reckless, foreign policy as a vehicle for his political ambitions. Now, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has opened up new high-risk opportunities for Erdoğan to improve his domestic image, especially as the next Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections approach.

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As the threat of a new Turkish military incursion into northern Syria looms, other international stakeholders in the Syrian crisis continue to voice their concerns over Ankara’s ambitions. At odds with Turkey since 2011 over its desire to overthrow the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its support for an array of armed opposition factions, Iran has been increasingly vocal of late in opposing a potential new Turkish military operation.

After 16 years under Angela Merkel, Olaf Scholz’s assumption of Germany’s chancellorship on Dec. 8, 2021 marked a new chapter in the nation’s politics. Within the “traffic light” coalition government formed by the Social Democrats, the Free Democratic Party, and the Greens, Annalena Baerbock heads the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before taking office, the co-leader of Alliance 90/The Greens was known for both her welcoming attitude toward immigrants and her full-throated condemnation of human rights violations by authoritarian governments. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has no shortage of the latter: According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, 17 out of the 20 countries in the region are “authoritarian” and not one is characterized as a “full democracy.” Beyond human rights, other key MENA policy issues for the new government include Iran, Turkey, ongoing conflicts in the region, and immigration. The challenges are numerous, if well-known, but how will Berlin respond? Is Germany’s policy toward MENA likely to change or remain the same under the new government?

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has opened up new opportunities for Turkey, but Erdogan should not overplay his hand.

With its recent deepwater exploration success in the Black Sea and prominent geographic location for interregional hydrocarbon pipelines, Turkey can play a material role in shaping the geopolitical landscape today, especially in the natural gas sector. The country will face a strategic conundrum, whether to utilize newly discovered gas resources entirely for domestic needs and thereby reduce gas imports that come with political baggage as well as foreign currency expenditures, or export gas to capture foreign revenue that Ankara desperately needs.

Water is slowly emerging as yet another potential cause for dispute between Ankara and Tehran. As of late, the two neighboring states have been at loggerheads over a number of issues, including Syria and Iraq, where they have opposing interests. After years of quiet diplomatic juggling, the issue of transboundary water management is gradually taking center stage in the two countries’ relations, a development that could, in the medium run, have serious repercussions for regional security.

The March 2022 elevation of the Turkey-Uzbekistan relationship to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” provides the Ankara-led Organization of Turkic States with a new geopolitical heft. To preserve its autonomy in the face of Beijing’s growing regional dominance, Tashkent has turned to Ankara to act as a countervailing force in both economic and security affairs. Combined with the expanding Turkey-Pakistan strategic partnership, this makes Turkey a rising Eurasian agenda setter that will impact the strategic calculus of both Beijing and Washington.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus has been unable to find a model for regional cooperation or form regional organizations. The relative calm that followed the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, especially after the signing of the November 2020 cease-fire agreement, renewed hopes that this might change. Significant challenges to regional cooperation remain, however, and Russia’s war with Ukraine has only complicated matters further.