On February 28, the US and Israel launched coordinated military strikes on Iran. MEI defense experts weigh in on the military and regional consequences.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed the fragility of the world’s most critical energy corridor.
Crude oil legally sanctioned by the United States and its allies today makes up an estimated 18% of global tanker capacity, or 6-7% of total unrefined petroleum flows — shares that have been growing. Increased pressure on Russian exports and US intervention in Venezuela have further constrained Russian flows and temporarily removed Venezuela, the smallest sanctioned producer, from the market. Iranian exports, however, remain largely untouched.
The Gulf states are betting big on artificial intelligence (AI). Their motive is simple: While hydrocarbons will remain part of the energy mix for the foreseeable future, the revenue and influence tied to crude are already beginning to diminish. AI is not just about technology; it is a hedge, and potentially a new foundation for sustaining and even increasing their power in the rapidly shifting world order.
Saudi Arabia has stepped up its efforts to unify and restructure Yemen’s anti-Houthi forces after the rapid expansion and sudden implosion of the United Arab Emirates-backed secessionist Southern Transitional Council following Abu Dhabi’s military withdrawal from the country.
While it may not have been perfect, the Trump administration achieved a considerable amount in the first year of its second term, and there is reason to be optimistic that additional dividends will accrue in 2026.
The United States’ rapid military buildup across the Gulf has triggered a familiar anxiety in Tehran, but the Iranians’ reading of American intentions has grown sharper and more layered than at any point in recent years.
US President Donald Trump hosted an idiosyncratic gathering of global representatives in Washington on February 19 that included some key Middle East figures meeting under the banner of peace to discuss the next steps in Gaza just as the US was sending more military forces to the region to pressure and possibly target Iran.
China is becoming harder to ignore in the Middle East. Yet the gap between economic presence and strategic power remains wide, even as American policy swings, argues US academic John Calabrese.
Hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Senior Fellow Natan Sachs to discuss Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s February 11 visit to the White House, Israel’s anxieties surrounding the ongoing US-Iran talks, and the domestic political dynamics Netanyahu is operating under. Taylor, Czekaj, and Sachs unpack what Netanyahu hoped to achieve during the visit, particularly regarding Iran, and what his relationship with President Donald Trump can tell us about the relative coordination and policy alignment between the US and Israel. They also examine Netanyahu’s political standing at home, two and half years since the October 7 attacks, as the 2026 election campaign begins in Israel. Finally, Sachs assesses what lies ahead for Israeli politics.
The United States is Israel’s closest ally, and its support is a central pillar of Israel’s national security. The US provides Israel access to purchase advanced weapon systems, ammunition and weapon emergency supplies in times of war, intelligence sharing, opportunities for cooperation in defense technology, and crucial diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council and elsewhere. It also provides Israel with regular security aid, to be spent in the United States, currently at an annual rate of $3.8bn (under an MOU that expires in 2028). Since October 2023, the US also offered active military support, in a break from the historical norm. It contributed substantially to Israel’s defense against Iranian ballistic missiles, in conjunction with Arab regional partners, and bombed nuclear sites in Iran in support of Israel’s campaign in the “12 Day War” of June 2025.
The Abraham Accords have represented a remarkable shift in U.S. Middle East policy. They reframed Arab-Israeli normalization as a result of shared interests – within the Middle East and directly with the US, rather than as a byproduct of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Signed in September 2020, on the last leg of the first Trump administration, the Accords brokered by Washington normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, followed by framework agreements with Morocco and Sudan. From the American perspective, the Accords were intended to break decades of diplomatic stagnation in the Middle East in order to establish a regional framework aligned with American strategic objectives.
MEI Senior Fellow Mohammed Soliman joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to discuss his new book, West Asia: A New American Grand Strategy in the Middle East. The book argues that it is time for the United States to move decisively away from nation-building and focus instead on order-building, outlining a framework for a new regional order that links Europe to the Indo-Pacific. Soliman also shares how he conceived of the core ideas behind his book and explains why his thesis is especially relevant in today’s geopolitical, economic, and technological landscape.
Trying to capture US President Donald Trump’s proudly unpredictable approach to foreign policy in fixed policy documents is inherently difficult. Surprise, leverage and improvisation are not bugs in Mr Trump’s world view; they are features. Yet the administration has now attempted this exercise twice: with the release of the National Security Strategy last December and the National Defence Strategy this January.
In November 2025, the United States sought and obtained approval for a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2803) endorsing the formation of a Board of Peace (BoP) and International Stabilization Force (ISF) to support the implementation of the 20-point peace plan agreed to by Israel and Hamas the previous month. The ISF’s stated role is to help secure and demilitarize the Gaza Strip, primarily by facilitating the decommissioning of weapons, protecting civilians, and training and advising burgeoning Palestinian police forces. In the intervening months, however, progress on standing up the ISF has stalled, and conflicting messaging from US officials provides more questions than answers.