Research & Commentary Results

On November 18, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is scheduled to make his first trip to Washington since 2018. In a new MEI Policy Memo, Daniel Benaim breaks down why it matters for the US and the relevant policy considerations.

On October 31, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution centering Morocco’s autonomy plan as the basis for resolving the Western Sahara conflict. The UN vote and comments from United States Special Envoy Steve Witkoff suggest President Donald Trump wants another headline foreign policy “peacemaking” win. But the opportunity for the Trump administration is bigger than just resolving the Western Sahara issue. It could unlock an opportunity for Morocco-Algeria reconciliation that could integrate the wider Maghreb economy, reduce migration into Europe, expand energy cooperation, and enable stronger Sahel counter-terrorism coordination.

Over the past week, US President Donald Trump made an extended trip to Asia and threatened military actions against Latin American and African countries. But despite his administration’s continuing ambitions in the Middle East region, few major breakthroughs are expected there in the immediate future due to the government shutdown and unilateral cuts to national security infrastructure.

For years, the prevailing assumption was that the Houthis’ survival depended on battlefield victories and Iranian support. Both are essential, but there is a third critical and often overlooked factor: the weaponization of international engagement. In a pattern that continues to repeat itself, engagement without accountability strengthens rather than moderates Houthi behavior.

Ambassador Ryan Crocker reports on his visit to Lebanon and Syria on October 12-17 as part of a small delegation organized by the Washington office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

President Donald Trump continued to rewrite the playbook of US foreign policy this summer and early fall, with mixed results on the global stage but producing some important openings for progress in the Middle East due to a negotiated Gaza cease-fire and hostage-release deal.

For much of the past eighty years, the United States has seen itself — and often acted — as a global champion of democracy. Through the power of example, and through its diplomacy, security alliances, and aid programs, Washington has sought to strengthen democratic institutions and push back against authoritarianism.

The record, of course, has never been perfect. The US has at times backed autocratic leaders in pursuit of strategic or economic gain. But overall, it has been a net force for democracy worldwide.

Seizing Lebanon’s once-in-a-generation opportunity hinges on its ability to resolve its core dysfunction: reclaiming the state’s monopoly on force and its exclusive authority to determine matters of war and peace. Beirut, backed by deepening US support, must focus on achieving tangible milestones and strategic victories that momentum, making Hizballah’s disarmament unstoppable and the state’s reassertion of authority irreversible.

Judicial independence is at the core of any successful democracy, and for decades, this issue has been a matter of public concern in Lebanon. At a time when a credible window of opportunity for change has opened in Lebanon, restoring judicial independence is both a necessity and a prerequisite to enable the judiciary to carry out its duties and end the impunity under which it has historically operated.

The current government in Lebanon is keen to encourage financial recovery and find a new path to economic growth. A thorough understanding of the causes behind the country’s recession and the factors constraining a recovery are necessary to shape policy priorities. These are also important as an input into the discussions of the 2026 budget and to the ongoing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Using the wrong framework for these decisions could yield low economic growth, which would be harmful for a quick and decisive economic recovery. Conversely, improved economic outcomes and broad buy-in, following public consultations, will ease the implementation of politically difficult reforms. Thus, policymakers must take great care to develop a narrative about how to achieve progress in the short and medium terms that is adjusted to local circumstances.

Restoring both domestic and international confidence in the Lebanese government will ultimately depend on taking tangible steps towards economic revival. This article presents key policy options to achieve this result, including rebuilding trust through improved governance and judicial reforms, investing in digital infrastructure, driving sustainable growth via regional integration and innovation, and balancing economic revival with sovereign debt restructuring.

While the banking crisis remains unresolved, there is still ample scope for Lebanon’s central bank to advance reforms and set the stage for a sustainable economic recovery even without a comprehensive reform program supported by the IMF.

Seizing Lebanon’s once-in-a-generation opportunity hinges on its ability to resolve its core dysfunction: reclaiming the state’s monopoly on force and its exclusive authority to determine matters of war and peace. Beirut, backed by deepening US support, must focus on achieving tangible milestones and strategic victories that momentum, making Hizballah’s disarmament unstoppable and the state’s reassertion of authority irreversible.

The central challenge facing Lebanon today is whether the country will graduate to functional statehood or continue struggling to survive. Yet with Lebanese officials now insisting that the state “monopolize arms” and become the decisive arbiter on matters of war and peace, a relevant question arises: Where, territorially, does Lebanon begin and end?