Research & Commentary Results

Seizing Lebanon’s once-in-a-generation opportunity hinges on its ability to resolve its core dysfunction: reclaiming the state’s monopoly on force and its exclusive authority to determine matters of war and peace. Beirut, backed by deepening US support, must focus on achieving tangible milestones and strategic victories that momentum, making Hizballah’s disarmament unstoppable and the state’s reassertion of authority irreversible.

Judicial independence is at the core of any successful democracy, and for decades, this issue has been a matter of public concern in Lebanon. At a time when a credible window of opportunity for change has opened in Lebanon, restoring judicial independence is both a necessity and a prerequisite to enable the judiciary to carry out its duties and end the impunity under which it has historically operated.

The current government in Lebanon is keen to encourage financial recovery and find a new path to economic growth. A thorough understanding of the causes behind the country’s recession and the factors constraining a recovery are necessary to shape policy priorities. These are also important as an input into the discussions of the 2026 budget and to the ongoing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Using the wrong framework for these decisions could yield low economic growth, which would be harmful for a quick and decisive economic recovery. Conversely, improved economic outcomes and broad buy-in, following public consultations, will ease the implementation of politically difficult reforms. Thus, policymakers must take great care to develop a narrative about how to achieve progress in the short and medium terms that is adjusted to local circumstances.

Restoring both domestic and international confidence in the Lebanese government will ultimately depend on taking tangible steps towards economic revival. This article presents key policy options to achieve this result, including rebuilding trust through improved governance and judicial reforms, investing in digital infrastructure, driving sustainable growth via regional integration and innovation, and balancing economic revival with sovereign debt restructuring.

While the banking crisis remains unresolved, there is still ample scope for Lebanon’s central bank to advance reforms and set the stage for a sustainable economic recovery even without a comprehensive reform program supported by the IMF.

Seizing Lebanon’s once-in-a-generation opportunity hinges on its ability to resolve its core dysfunction: reclaiming the state’s monopoly on force and its exclusive authority to determine matters of war and peace. Beirut, backed by deepening US support, must focus on achieving tangible milestones and strategic victories that momentum, making Hizballah’s disarmament unstoppable and the state’s reassertion of authority irreversible.

The central challenge facing Lebanon today is whether the country will graduate to functional statehood or continue struggling to survive. Yet with Lebanese officials now insisting that the state “monopolize arms” and become the decisive arbiter on matters of war and peace, a relevant question arises: Where, territorially, does Lebanon begin and end?

To encourage and incentivize long-overdue structural reforms, the European Union and the broader international community should adopt a more proactive, hands-on approach to Lebanon. The current context calls for an approach that balances assistance delivery with active support to the Lebanese government in its quest to reform and rebuild the state.

US President Donald Trump started off his week by flying to Israel and Egypt to mark the Gaza cease-fire and release of the last remaining Israeli hostages. But as these positive developments unfolded in the Middle East, the Trump administration’s overall agenda remained weighed down on other fronts.

The October 2025 cease-fire and hostage-release deal that ended the Israel-Hamas conflict marks the beginning of a complicated post-war phase. In a new MEI Policy Memo, Brian Katulis breaks down why it matters for the US and the relevant policy considerations.

The October 2025 cease-fire and hostage-release deal that ended the Israel-Hamas conflict marks the beginning of a complicated post-war phase. The agreement has created important opportunities to advance stability in the Middle East and build a lasting and sustainable peace marked by enhanced regional security and integration, but there are considerable risks to manage. Achieving these goals will require coordinated international action along multiple lines of effort: security, rule of law, recovery and reconstruction, responsive governance, and steady and focused diplomacy to build confidence among key parties. 

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, 2025, declaring that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” The wording of the agreement sparked speculation that Pakistan might use its nuclear capabilities to defend Saudi Arabia. MEI’s F. Gregory Gause contends otherwise, offering insight into the history and strategic calculations driving the deal. To learn more about the deal, visit our website.

US President Donald Trump sent his top Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner to take part in Israel-Hamas talks hosted by Egypt this week aimed at ending the war in Gaza, securing the release of hostages, and producing progress toward a lasting and sustainable resolution to the conflict. Here are three things to watch for in US policy on this front in the coming days and weeks.

Following Israel’s September 9 strike on Hamas targets in Qatar, Pakistan has taken swift and significant foreign policy steps in response and adopted an unusually assertive stance. This shift was largely influenced by Pakistan’s military chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir. The latter is determined to enhance his country’s strategic autonomy and diplomatic leverage in an increasingly complex international environment by positioning Pakistan as a key security actor and an emerging middle power on the global stage.

The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, signed in Riyadh on September 17, is far more than a bilateral pledge. It represents a profound reordering of alignments in the Gulf and South Asia, reflecting and reinforcing the broader erosion of US preeminence in the Eurasian security architecture. While much of the initial commentary centered on the striking commitment of a wealthy Gulf monarchy to the defense of a nuclear-armed South Asian state, as well as the question of whether Pakistan had in fact extended its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, the deeper story is arguably China’s potential advance.