Research & Commentary Results

On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Défense Agreement, a collective-defense pact widely compared to NATO’s Article 5. This essay argues that the comparison is misleading. Mecca borrows NATO’s language of solidarity without yet possessing NATO’s institutional machinery, and the Houthi offensive against Saudi Arabia in September 2026 provided an early and revealing test of what the agreement actually means in practice. Neither Pakistan nor Turkey automatically entered the fight on Saudi Arabia’s behalf, and Washington, despite an initial reluctance to strike directly, remained indispensable through intelligence support and a major proposed F-35 sale. Drawing on realist alliance theory — Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Glenn Snyder, and Steven David — and on the precedent of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the essay contends that the Middle East is not dividing into rival blocs but moving from hierarchy toward a looser, overlapping geometry of hedged partnerships, in which American exclusivity is eroding considerably faster than American primacy.

When Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan agreed to a mutual defense pact in August, it was principally seen as a political commitment. The “Mecca alliance,” as it was dubbed, stipulated that an armed attack on one would be treated as an attack on all three, accompanied by deeper military cooperation.

In February 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggested that shifting international dynamics could push Turkey to acquire nuclear weapons. That rhetoric, combined with Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy and research programs and its indigenous surface-to-surface missile development projects, has fueled concerns that these capabilities could eventually form the backbone of a Turkish nuclear weapons program.

Turkey has become a major player in Africa, with a particularly strong footprint in the Horn. While economic and energy interests’ matter, one sector now stands at the center of Ankara’s regional activism: defense.

Turkish ambitions to develop nuclear weapons are not new, but the changing security environment is strengthening Ankara’s motivations and rationale for moving away from its longstanding role as a champion of nonproliferation and toward a strategy of preserving the option to build nuclear weapons without actually pursuing them. The challenge for Washington is to manage the nuclear trajectory of regional powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia rather than preventing them from acquiring greater nuclear capabilities altogether.

A Turkish court has taken a dramatic step that could reshape the country’s political landscape. It annulled the results of the CHP’s 2023 party congress, effectively overturning the election of Özgür Özel as leader of Turkey’s main opposition party and potentially paving the way for former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to return.

In 2025, jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan made a historic call for the group to disarm and dissolve, raising hopes of ending a 40-year conflict that has shaped Turkey and the wider region. Months later, the PKK symbolically laid down arms in what many viewed as a breakthrough moment for the peace process.

After a decade of post-Arab Spring isolation, Turkey’s leaders have recognized that their ambition to position the country as an agenda-setter on the world stage requires active engagement in all directions. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s consolidation of executive authority has centralized foreign policy decision-making and tied it to his domestic political priorities, transforming the country’s revisionist approach to one shaped primarily by personal and pragmatic interests.

The Iran war has posed significant immediate challenges for Turkey, including rising energy prices. But Turkish officials think that Ankara could reap benefits from the war in the long term.

After months of trying to head off a US-Israeli war with Iran, Turkey now finds itself caught in the middle of it — and deeply concerned that a prolonged, regionalized conflict could pose serious security, economic, and political risks.

The balance of power in the Middle East is shifting. Iran is on the defensive — its military capabilities were badly degraded by last year’s 12 days of Israeli and US strikes, and growing protests at home have made the regime look more vulnerable than it has in years.

Media and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are hyping the idea that President Trump’s attempt to gain sovereign control of Greenland has caused unprecedented and irreparable damage to the over 75 year-old Transatlantic Alliance.  This “analysis” stems from multiple sources.  On both sides of the ocean, there are those who pounce on any deviation from the norm by Trump as evidence the world as we know it is ending. And in Europe, there is the human but unattractive reaction of weak, dependent states against their one powerful ally when it rejects Europe’s preferred script. Much of the US media criticism is summarized by the concept that our other NATO allies can never again “trust” the US.