Research & Commentary

One of the most consequential changes in the Middle East’s geopolitical map is happening at the water’s edge. Along the entire eastern rim of the Mediterranean basin, global and regional actors are engaging in a spate of port capacity expansions, new private port construction, and the sell-off of major state-owned ports that will determine who sits atop the region’s global trade flows for decades to come. The international competition to rebuild Beirut’s port is one key puzzle piece in this larger process that is reconfiguring the Levant’s maritime commercial architecture and, as a consequence, the geopolitical contours of the Middle East.

The possibility that the Lebanese government could opt for China to reconstruct Beirut’s port has raised alarm in Washington and European capitals given China’s already outsized commercial port presence in Egypt, Israel, and Greece. Increased Chinese involvement in Lebanon’s port operations could consolidate Beijing’s hold over the commercial connectivity architecture of the Levant. Re-orienting global commercial flows between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia according to Beijing’s priorities would make China’s Belt and Road Initiative a dominant organizing principle in the international relations of the Middle East. The most effective way to offset China’s ambition may be to facilitate Mediterranean rivals France and Turkey to jointly rebuild Beirut’s port.

Six months into the 117th Congress, legislators continued to grapple with the complexities of a region in the midst of change. The reasons for this phenomenon were myriad. The Biden administration espoused a divergent worldview from that of its predecessor, the balance of power in Congress shifted, the international community continued to struggle with the ramifications of COVID-19, the Abraham Accords altered the dynamics between Israel and other regional actors, while the outbreak of violence between Israel and Gaza attracted attention from both sides of the aisle. Legislators offered an increased number of proposals to address these and other realities in the second quarter of 2021, marking a sharp uptick in legislation focused on MENA compared to the first quarter of the year.

Due to his divergent views on Iran’s international and regional policies, Hossein Amirabdollahian had various disagreements with then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif while serving as deputy foreign minister beginning in 2011, and these ultimately led to his removal from the post in June 2016. The official reason announced for the change was Amirabdollahian’s appointment as Iran’s new ambassador to Oman, although he refused to accept the position.

Hossein Amirabdollahian, Iran’s new foreign minister, is famous for his exceptionally close relationship with the Quds Force, the foreign operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as its regional allies.

Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, director of MEI’s Afghanistan and Pakistan program, joins host Alistair Taylor for a bonus episode responding to the Taliban’s rapid overthrow of the Afghan military and government over the past week.

Amb. Dennis Ross and Karen Young join guest host Gerald Feierstein to discuss the progress of relations between Israel and the Arab world one year after the signing of the Abraham Accords, as well as the agreement’s economic impacts and what role the United States will play moving forward.

The two countries in the Middle East with the highest growth expectations for 2022 are Israel and Egypt. Fitch Solutions estimates that MENA-wide GDP will grow by 3.6% in 2021, after a contraction of 4% in 2020. Egypt and Israel are the only countries within the region expected to grow their economies beyond the size of their pre-COVID-19 levels for 2021.

The below is an excerpt from the article, “The Geopolitics of Afghan-Iranian Relations,” by Ali A. Jalali, in the Summer 2021 issue of The Middle East Journal. The full article has been made available for free download for a limited time.

أولًا، انتصار طالبان يمثل انتصارًا هائلًا لرواية القاعدة والحركة الجهادية الأوسع. فبعد عشرين عامًا من وقوع الهجمات على الولايات المتحدة، ها هي الولايات المتحدة تُهزَم مرة أخرى وتُجبّر على الانسحاب بشكل مُذَل. سيكون هذا الانتصار بمثابة “برهان على صحة مبدأ” التجنيد الرئيسي للحركات الجهادية المتطرفة لعقود قادمة، ويجب أن نتوقع زيادة جديدة في التجنيد والعمل الجهادي في المنطقة، وزيادة المخاطر على المصالح الأمريكية والأراضي الأمريكية. ومن ثم فعلى الولايات المتحدة العمل مع الحلفاء والشركاء في المنطقة لوقف هذا المد المحتمل.

Charles Lister on what Afghanistan’s fall to the Taliban means for the future of al-Qaeda.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

The Cipher Brief:  Did you ever envision that the U.S. would pull out so quickly or completely leaving the Afghan military on its own without U.S. air support?  

General Votel: I did not anticipate this during my time – but once the President sets a hard departure date – then a fast withdrawal is inevitable.  No Commander wants to accept unnecessary risk with troops on the ground when you are up against a clearly articulated departure date.

The following testimony was presented to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission “Briefing on Human Rights and Freedom of Expression in Morocco” on August 12, 2021.

“You’re all going to die,” the diminutive, senior U.S. intelligence official observed in matter-of-fact fashion to her stunned Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) hosts. Her rather blunt appraisal was uncharacteristic of the engagement to which the senior Pakistani officials had grown accustomed and cut to the chase: the consequences of decades of Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, violent Kashmiri liberation groups, radical madrassas, and extremist local political groups were coming home to roost.

Since late June, Russia has expanded its diplomatic involvement in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. While Russia has offered technical assistance to the GERD’s conflicting parties, it has refrained from inserting itself into the Nile dam dispute as a mediator and instead balanced the views of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in multilateral fora. Russia’s balancing strategy has been positively received in Sudan and Ethiopia but has created latent frictions with Egypt. Russia has persisted with this non-interference policy, as it has largely prevented a spillover of tensions over the GERD to other areas of cooperation with Egypt and believes that its position will help consolidate its partnership with Ethiopia.