Economics

In the last few years, the global energy outlook has been transformed. The rise of populist politics and a growing sense of urgency about climate change have roiled debates about energy policy in wealthy countries, generating a dizzying mix of new industrial policies. The COVID-19 pandemic made it far harder to predict fuel prices and consumption patterns and forced many countries to confront their connections to fragile multistate supply chains and legacy petrostates.

Since the early years of the Syrian conflict, the Assad regime has systematically diverted local resources dedicated for reconstruction purposes to rehabilitate facilities in areas and sectors that benefit it and its inner circle, as well as placed the burden of rehabilitating properties onto Syrians themselves. To finance this policy, the regime has exploited four key resources, including imposing multiple reconstruction taxes, diverting U.N. and INGO early recovery and rehabilitation projects, capitalizing on local-led crowdfunding campaigns, and forcing Syrians to bear the cost of repairing their own damaged properties.

For the sake of safeguarding transatlantic — and thus also American — security interests in the South Caucasus, it is becoming increasingly imperative that the United States better anchor itself economically, politically, and militarily in the eastern Black Sea region, especially strategically placed Georgia.

The Gulf states emerged from the global pandemic with the wind in their economic sails. But high-profile events like Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup and the UAE’s World Expo continued to mask two subtle but major weaknesses that have plagued them for decades. Why do Gulf economies lack innovation? And why do they struggle to create private sector employment for nationals?

The current complex situation in the global oil market seriously tests the abilities of OPEC+ to play the role of a regulator, forcing Saudi Arabia to assume the main burden of responsibility for keeping oil prices from declining further and for shoring up the cartel ranks.

After issuing positive statements around greenfield blue hydrogen projects in late 2022, the company, Bloomberg now reports, may be migrating away from the hydrogen scheme and toward LNG exports. Both would require significant capital investment. Assuming the company decides to pursue an LNG export project, it will face many potentially value-erosive challenges and risks that must be overcome before achieving economic success.

Despite a substantial growth in trade between China and Iran, especially when it comes to Chinese exports to Iran and purchases of Iranian oil, the same cannot be said for Beijing’s investments in the Iranian economy, which have remained anemic, particularly in the critical energy sector.

For the second time in three months, Egyptians have expressed their dissatisfaction — albeit largely symbolically and on a limited scale — with the government’s tight control over nearly all public freedoms. The Engineers’ Syndicate’s vote against a government-selected candidate to head the organization may be pointing to growing public dissatisfaction with the authorities’ policies, both on the economic and political fronts.

Several Gulf states have introduced renewable energy certificates into their low-carbon energy eco-system. What are RECs and how can they help companies navigate the energy transition?

Turkey’s new economic team may take a more hawkish tone when it comes to tackling inflation and preserving financial stability through fiscal and monetary measures. However, investors and policymakers should not be naïve, as this approach will only be temporary or partial, aimed at winning the upcoming local elections.

The prevailing political spirit in the Gulf region is presently one of de-escalation. In the case of the UAE and Iran, a number of existing connections could help hasten the process of de-escalation and enable it to happen faster than anywhere else in the region.The outcome should be of interest not only to the UAE and Iran but also to the U.S. given the latter’s long-standing efforts to shape Iranian policies.

While calls for the immediate return of Syrian refugees have increased at the regional and international levels, it is imperative to closely examine the direct link between the regime’s policy of property confiscation and the possibility of refugee returns. Property confiscation does not only impact the direct owners and their immediate families’ livelihoods but also hinders the ability of thousands of displaced Syrians to return while leading those who still reside under regime rule to consider migration.

Chinese companies are well positioned to participate in Iraq’s efforts to expand its oil production capacity and develop domestic gas supplies, as they are actively engaged in various energy-related undertakings throughout the country. However, if indeed China’s strategy is, as some have suggested, to become the dominant player in Iraq’s economy, achieving that objective will likely prove difficult given Iraq’s challenging operating environment and contentious politics.