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  • Recalibrating the Gulf Economic Model After Iran: Different Vulnerabilities in the Quest for Strategic Security

    External Publication

    November 18, 2026

    Karen E. Young

    Economics, Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

    The war with Iran is forcing a fundamental shift in the Gulf economic model: from diversification built around growth and global integration toward diversification built around resilience and strategic security. The crisis has exposed sharply different vulnerabilities across the GCC, particularly in hydrocarbon exports, trade routes, and fiscal capacity. Rather than reversing economic transformation, it is likely to strengthen the role of the state in directing capital toward critical infrastructure, energy security, and risk reduction. Sovereign wealth funds and national oil companies will therefore become increasingly important not only as engines of growth, but as instruments of economic and strategic resilience. The emerging Gulf model will remain globally integrated, but with greater emphasis on controlling vulnerabilities and protecting the state’s strategic interests.

    There is no single “Gulf model” of political economy, or single way of organising state-society relations or a national economic and social development agenda across the region. But there are recurrent themes that the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have engaged with and returned to over the past decade or more. Though their political systems are similar and aligned as constitutional monarchies or family rule based on tribal institutions, their economic resources and realities vary substantially. Diversification of government revenue and economic activity away from hydrocarbon revenues is a shared goal, but both the amount of resource wealth and the fiscal dependence on resource revenues vary among the six GCC states. And they have been able to exploit resource wealth at different times, with some reaching peak extraction and monetisation in the 1970s and 1980s, while others were later to the party, including Qatar’s entry into global Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) markets only in the late 1990s. Bahrain and the emirate of Dubai, for example, have largely exhausted their oil export capacity, while Abu Dhabi is now able to produce much more oil and gas at higher margins than ever before. Abu Dhabi’s crude oil production has increased significantly, rising from an average of 2.99 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2015 to roughly 3.8 to 4.1 million bpd today, with capacity to expand to 5 million bpd in 2027. Leaving the Organization of Petroleum Exporter Countries (OPEC) in May 2026 has freed the UAE from production quotas, while technology and investment have put more resources at the disposal of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The timing of peak resource extraction, changes in the global market demand (and price) for oil and gas, and the availability of investment and technology have all contributed to different financial returns in their oil and gas sectors and, by extension, different degrees of fiscal pressure to expand GCC economies beyond natural resource revenue dependence.

     

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    Photo by Elke Scholiers via Getty Images


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