Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

This backgrounder provides an overview of how the Abraham Accords came about, the US interests involved, their economic and strategic consequences, and the prospects for further enlargement going forward.

On November 18, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is scheduled to make his first trip to Washington since 2018. In a new MEI Policy Memo, Daniel Benaim breaks down why it matters for the US and the relevant policy considerations.

Over the past week, US President Donald Trump made an extended trip to Asia and threatened military actions against Latin American and African countries. But despite his administration’s continuing ambitions in the Middle East region, few major breakthroughs are expected there in the immediate future due to the government shutdown and unilateral cuts to national security infrastructure.

For years, the prevailing assumption was that the Houthis’ survival depended on battlefield victories and Iranian support. Both are essential, but there is a third critical and often overlooked factor: the weaponization of international engagement. In a pattern that continues to repeat itself, engagement without accountability strengthens rather than moderates Houthi behavior.

For decades, the 1979 takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran has symbolized the righteousness of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s revolutionary defiance and the legitimacy of “resistance” as state ideology. To question it is to pry open the logic of the entire enterprise.

President Donald Trump continued to rewrite the playbook of US foreign policy this summer and early fall, with mixed results on the global stage but producing some important openings for progress in the Middle East due to a negotiated Gaza cease-fire and hostage-release deal.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, 2025, declaring that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” The wording of the agreement sparked speculation that Pakistan might use its nuclear capabilities to defend Saudi Arabia. MEI’s F. Gregory Gause contends otherwise, offering insight into the history and strategic calculations driving the deal. To learn more about the deal, visit our website.

Following Israel’s September 9 strike on Hamas targets in Qatar, Pakistan has taken swift and significant foreign policy steps in response and adopted an unusually assertive stance. This shift was largely influenced by Pakistan’s military chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir. The latter is determined to enhance his country’s strategic autonomy and diplomatic leverage in an increasingly complex international environment by positioning Pakistan as a key security actor and an emerging middle power on the global stage.

The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, signed in Riyadh on September 17, is far more than a bilateral pledge. It represents a profound reordering of alignments in the Gulf and South Asia, reflecting and reinforcing the broader erosion of US preeminence in the Eurasian security architecture. While much of the initial commentary centered on the striking commitment of a wealthy Gulf monarchy to the defense of a nuclear-armed South Asian state, as well as the question of whether Pakistan had in fact extended its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, the deeper story is arguably China’s potential advance.

The September 17 Saudi-Pakistani defense agreement generated a wave of overheated commentary about Saudi Arabia now residing under a Pakistani nuclear umbrella and how a new strategic reality was in the offing in the Persian Gulf and South Asian regions. Analysts need to slow their roll. Extended deterrence is an extremely difficult thing to pull off. The devil is in the details, about which we know nothing.