Research & Commentary Results

The October 2025 cease-fire and hostage-release deal that ended the Israel-Hamas conflict marks the beginning of a complicated post-war phase. The agreement has created important opportunities to advance stability in the Middle East and build a lasting and sustainable peace marked by enhanced regional security and integration, but there are considerable risks to manage. Achieving these goals will require coordinated international action along multiple lines of effort: security, rule of law, recovery and reconstruction, responsive governance, and steady and focused diplomacy to build confidence among key parties. 

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, 2025, declaring that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” The wording of the agreement sparked speculation that Pakistan might use its nuclear capabilities to defend Saudi Arabia. MEI’s F. Gregory Gause contends otherwise, offering insight into the history and strategic calculations driving the deal. To learn more about the deal, visit our website.

Following Israel’s September 9 strike on Hamas targets in Qatar, Pakistan has taken swift and significant foreign policy steps in response and adopted an unusually assertive stance. This shift was largely influenced by Pakistan’s military chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir. The latter is determined to enhance his country’s strategic autonomy and diplomatic leverage in an increasingly complex international environment by positioning Pakistan as a key security actor and an emerging middle power on the global stage.

The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, signed in Riyadh on September 17, is far more than a bilateral pledge. It represents a profound reordering of alignments in the Gulf and South Asia, reflecting and reinforcing the broader erosion of US preeminence in the Eurasian security architecture. While much of the initial commentary centered on the striking commitment of a wealthy Gulf monarchy to the defense of a nuclear-armed South Asian state, as well as the question of whether Pakistan had in fact extended its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, the deeper story is arguably China’s potential advance.

The coming weeks may prove decisive in Europe’s long struggle to manage Iran’s nuclear ambitions. On Aug. 28, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany announced they will trigger the “snapback” sanctions mechanism. Whether Europe’s gamble succeeds will determine both the future of non-proliferation and the credibility of Europe as a strategic actor.

With its new government at the half-year mark and the UNIFIL international peacekeeping force’s mandate due for reauthorization at month’s end, Lebanon stands at a pivotal moment. In this episode of Middle East Focus, hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Senior Fellow Fadi Nicholas Nassar to evaluate whether the Lebanese state can reclaim its sovereignty, starting with the disarmament of Hizballah and the enforcement of a cease-fire.

After almost two years of fighting in Gaza, and after the decimation of Hizballah, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and the 12-day Israeli-American war on Iran, the Middle East is in new strategic and political territory. Two pathways lie ahead: the first is one in which the gains and changes brought about by war are turned, through intense diplomacy and negotiation, into new international and political arrangements that bring about a period of security and stability in the region; the second is one in which that corner is not turned, and the wars in Gaza, Iran, and potentially Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, continue indefinitely. The trajectory will depend on the choices of key actors — above all Iran, Israel, and the United States.

Probably few if any Middle East analysts had Israeli airstrikes targeting key government installations of the Syrian state on their summer 2025 bingo cards. And yet that is precisely what happened on Wednesday, as Israeli jets hit Syria’s military headquarters and an area near the presidential palace in Damascus.

Last June’s Israel-Iran conflict became a revealing stress test for Beijing’s Middle East strategy, its role in global diplomacy, and the coherence of what some have described as an emergent “Axis of Upheaval” between China, Russia, and Iran.

US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the third time in his second term this week, shortly after securing a major victory for his domestic policy agenda in the budget bill passed by Congress.

Domestic politics has taken center stage in the United States as Congress struggles to pass President Donald Trump’s proposed budget plan. But July is also shaping up as a pivotal month for Trump’s foreign policy in the Middle East and beyond.

After Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, can we learn to deal differently with Iran?

Following seven years of diplomatic deadlock, Washington and Tehran have resumed nuclear negotiations — and for the first time in years, there are signs of real momentum.

Alex Vatanka, MEI Senior Fellow and author of The Battle of the Ayatollahs in Iran, joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to analyze the current round of talks, the technical issues under discussion, and the political stakes on both sides. He explores Iran’s economic and domestic pressures, US red lines, and the role of key players like Israel, China, and Oman in shaping the negotiations.

It is no surprise that both Iran and the United States have approached their first diplomatic engagement in four years with wariness. There are plenty of reasons to be skeptical about the probability of the negotiations culminating in a deal. But it would be a mistake to assume that the conditions in 2025 are the same as existed in 2015. Time is not on the Iranians’ side now and changes afoot in the Middle East and the broader global community give Iran an incentive to move toward an agreement, assuming that Washington is sincere and realistic in its negotiations with Tehran.

For much of the past two decades, ISIS has enjoyed favorable conditions in Syria, but since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, dynamics have changed. With Assad’s departure, ISIS lost its long-standing and vitally important safe haven in Syria’s central desert and its most significant driver for recruitment. The results — so far — have been dramatic.