In many ways, the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran and the war in Gaza that preceded it seem transformative. After decades of shadow warfare, Iran and Israel have now attacked each other’s homelands directly. And Israel and the United States have joined forces in a genuinely novel way to wage war against Iran.
For more than a decade, assessments of Chinese strategy in the Middle East and Africa have focused on assets, including the ports Chinese firms own, the pipelines they finance, and the networks they build. This lens has produced familiar maps of Chinese “footholds” and debates over future military bases, but ownership alone reveals less about influence.
The more useful question is not what China owns, but how Chinese firms become embedded in the operational and digital systems that keep trade corridors moving. Influence derives not from controlling infrastructure outright but from participating in the governance of the networks that move goods, data, finance, and information across them.
United States Central Command (CENTCOM), one of the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) six geographical combatant commands, is responsible for countering threats, responding to crises, and strengthening regional stability in the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of South Asia.
Something more consequential than another oil market disruption is underway. The Iran war has exposed and accelerated an institutional weakness within OPEC that had been building for years. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the UAE’s departure, Iraq’s brief flirtation with exit, and the continued rise of U.S. oil production all point to a deeper question about the cartel’s durability. The issue has shifted from OPEC’s ability to manage crises toward whether its model of collective discipline can withstand mounting structural strain.
Iran is transforming its Axis of Resistance into a decentralized, Yemen-centered network that leverages the Houthis to threaten both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, extending Tehran’s coercive reach over the world’s key maritime chokepoints and reshaping the post-war balance in the Middle East and Red Sea.
During the opening days of the 2025–2026 U.S.–Israel war with Iran, Kuwait’s military briefings highlighted intercepted Iranian missiles and drones while revealing little about strike locations or damage. The approach reflected a familiar wartime dilemma in which governments must reassure populations while limiting information that could aid adversaries or fuel uncertainty. Yet Kuwait’s response revealed a broader shift across the Gulf. Information was no longer simply a messaging tool; it had become part of the battlefield.
A year and a half into Donald Trump’s second administration, the Middle East is far from where the president had hoped or expected it would be.
This past June, I had the opportunity to visit Ukraine and see a bit of a war I heretofore had only read about. The contrasts with the Middle Eastern wars I had experienced were stunning, as was, in particular, the juxtaposition with the current Iran conflict and the ongoing threat to our Gulf allies. There are lessons to be learned about commitment, intensity, self-reliance, and the importance of alliances. They could serve our allies and ourselves well in both theaters.
President Trump’s family businesses are once again in the spotlight as a new financial disclosure showed they earned $2 billion in income in 2025 — a dramatic increase on the year before, with much of it coming from Gulf entities, raising emoluments concerns. Mounting perceptions of corruption, combined with unresolved crises in Iran and Israel-Palestine, are eroding trust among key partners in the Middle East. With the 2026 midterms approaching, these entanglements could represent a major political vulnerability and further undermine America’s already-strained standing in the region.
After the US-Israel-Iran war — and the strikes that followed the cease-fire — the Gulf states find themselves dangerously exposed. Host Alistair Taylor is joined by MEI Associate Fellow Gregory Gause to discuss the war’s impact on the Gulf, their partnership with the United States, and whether the turmoil of recent months will push Gulf leaders to reassess their alliances and international engagement.
The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran may have ended one of the most consequential Middle Eastern crises in decades, but it has not resolved the strategic problem it exposed. Whether the 60-day talks it set in motion will produce a final agreement remains far from certain.Yet the central lessons are already clear: Iran has preserved significant leverage, Washington has had to scale back its ambitions, and Europe and the Gulf face the prospect of protracted regional tension. Europe and the Gulf should therefore use the aftermath of the US-Iran deal to articulate their own “other MoU”: a Europe-Gulf Resilience initiative.
This study proposes a model for constraining and verifying Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal by employing a layered Strategic Verification Model with seven components: comprehensive baseline declarations; missile test and launch monitoring; intrusive inspections; quantitative and qualitative limits on missile capabilities; production controls, especially on solid-fuel manufacturing; a robust enforcement and compliance architecture; and regional confidence building measures.
The US administration appears to have great expectations for Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali Falah al-Zaidi. But the expectations need to be tempered.
The 2026 Iran war has made Lebanon a core Gulf security concern, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar now have a narrow opportunity to curb Hizballah’s influence by leading reconstruction, strengthening Lebanese state institutions, and tying economic re-engagement to reform.