Research & Commentary Results

Libya’s stability has taken on renewed strategic importance as the impact of the US and Israeli war with Iran reverberates through global energy markets. Sustaining existing Libyan oil production depends on a governing arrangement capable of keeping ports open, pipelines flowing, and revenues distributed without triggering conflict.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are confronting the greatest threat to their economic security and energy strategy since their formation. The economic fallout of the US-Israeli war with Iran is severe, but uneven across the Gulf. So too is each state’s ability to sustain energy exports and protect critical infrastructure—both of which have been targeted unequally by Iran.  

The US-Israeli war against Iran has created the largest disruption to global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies in modern history. There is a tremendous amount of economic uncertainty for Gulf states to navigate, and it will reshape the way they engage with one another and with Iran, Israel, and the United States for years to come. But this war has also laid bare how urgently the United States needs to update its own approach toward the Gulf states when it comes to energy.

The economic stress points vary considerably across the Gulf. Assuming a resumption of exports by May, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, and Qatar still face sharply declining revenues and contracting GDP—as much as 14 percent in Kuwait and Qatar—because of shut ins, time to restart, and lack of alternative delivery routes. After the Iranian attacks on Ras Laffan, Qatar’s economic outlook and time to recovery look much more difficult.

Gulf states — including their national oil companies and sovereign and related entities — are energy giants. They understand the risks of a prolonged threat from Iran and did not choose this war. They also recognize the risks of their geographic location, should the region endure another bout of instability and dislocation from a fragmented and collapsing neighbor.

With the Strait of Hormuz closed and oil production from Iraq’s south in free fall, Baghdad’s failure to maximize the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline is no longer a policy dispute. It is a national emergency.

The Israeli-U.S. military strikes on Iran that began on February 28 have done more than ignite a Middle Eastern war. They have sent shockwaves rolling across Asia, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Sea of Japan, exposing the brittle underpinnings of regional energy systems, straining diplomatic balancing acts, and forcing governments to make hard choices they have long deferred.

President Donald Trump said that the war against the Islamic Republic of Iran that he launched with Israel could last for four to five weeks with “the capability to go far longer than that.” Trump even left the door open to putting U.S. troops on the ground.

The latest cycle of U.S.-Iran escalation has followed a familiar script: sharpened rhetoric from the United States, calibrated military signaling by Iran in the Persian Gulf, indirect diplomacy through Oman, and Israeli warnings that remain deliberately ambiguous but unmistakably real. Yet beneath this choreography lies a more consequential development inside Tehran. The current crisis is forcing Iran’s political class to reassess its central foreign-policy wager of the past decade: that deepening alignment with Russia and China would provide strategic insulation against Western coercion.

Crude oil legally sanctioned by the United States and its allies today makes up an estimated 18% of global tanker capacity, or 6-7% of total unrefined petroleum flows — shares that have been growing. Increased pressure on Russian exports and US intervention in Venezuela have further constrained Russian flows and temporarily removed Venezuela, the smallest sanctioned producer, from the market. Iranian exports, however, remain largely untouched.

Hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Distinguished Military Fellow Mick Mulroy to discuss the Trump administration’s new National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its implications for the Middle East. While serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East from 2017 to 2019, Mulroy helped prepare the 2018 NDS, giving him an insider perspective on US defense planning. Together, Taylor, Czekaj, and Mulroy unpack what the new strategy means for US priorities globally and for the Middle East in particular, including how it could be reflected in a potentially looming military strike on Iran.

The decision by Washington and Tehran to shift their long-anticipated meeting, set for February 6, from Istanbul to Muscat is not merely a logistical detail. It is the latest reminder that when US-Iran diplomacy is on the verge of breaking down completely, Oman is the regional player the Iranian regime trusts the most to step in and mediate.

Brian sits down with Robert Malley, a former US official best known for his role as the lead negotiator of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Malley discusses the motivations behind his new book, Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel/Palestine, and offers his assessment of American perspectives on the war in Gaza. The conversation also explores his personal background as the son​ of an Egyptian Jewish father and an American Jewish mother—both outspoken on the political left—and how that upbringing shaped his worldview, alongside a career spanning the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations.

This article examines the changing volume and allocations of investment flows between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states over the last two decades, roughly from 2003 to the present.